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Motivation: towards a pension gap 
indicator
Pensions are an important determinant of their 
beneficiaries’ economic independence. When 
examining independence for people of working 
age, we are led naturally to think about the gen-
der pay gap. Focusing on gaps in pensions would 
be the natural follow-up (or sequel) to an inter-
est in gender pay gaps. Those gaps would reflect 
the cumulated disadvantages of a career spent 
in a gender-biased labour market. This is even 
more true for older cohorts. Pension systems are 
not simply neutral reflections: they may amplify 
imbalances, by rewarding thri"; or they may 
dampen them, as a social policy choice.
An annual indicator tracking gender imbalance 
may be justified by the complexity of gender ef-
fects affecting pensions. The structure of pen-
sions is influenced by three sets of factors:
First, very long-term structural changes: 
ageing is obviously the most important influ-
ence, although echo effects of past employment 
also play a role. Today’s pensions may reflect 
yesterday’s employment as well as social norms 
such as divorce, widowhood, and cohabitation 
between generations. Second, today’s pensions 
are affected by past pension reforms. Today’s 
pensioners are frequently covered by transitional 
arrangements. They will have lived and worked 
under one system and will in many cases receive 
benefits under another. Being a ‘group stuck in 
the middle’, they may not be protected by the 
internal operational logic of the system, whether 
new or old.  As time proceeds, however, more in-
dividuals will be affected by new features and 
be vulnerable to new kinds of pension risks. 
Two reforms are most likely to have a dispro-
portionate effect on women.  First, the switch 
in emphasis from public (‘first pillar’) pensions 
to occupational (‘second pillar’) pensions: the 
overall effect tends to tighten the link between 
contributions and benefits, what in US has been 
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named ‘the privatisation of risk’. Second, the em-
phasis on working longer. Although its rationale 
is unassailable, there may be hidden side effects 
in the medium term leading to lower pensions 
for those who do not respond to the incentives. 
The third set of factors shaping pensions are 
short-term pressures connected with the cur-
rent economic crisis. These pressures vary from 
country to country but could lead to important 
swings in gender effects; these could affect both 
occupational and State systems.
Thus, older women are recipients of echoes of 
past disadvantage, just as they begin to receive 
signs of future problems. As the EU has taken 
a lead on both ageing populations and gender 
balance, it is appropriate that it devotes atten-
tion to possible side effects of their interaction. 
A decisive step in that direction would be to pro-
duce a gender gap indicator for pensions on a 
regular basis.
The only realistic data source for such an indica-
tor would be the EU Statistics on Income and Liv-
ing Conditions (SILC), possibly supplemented by 
another international data source, the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) 
concerning individuals over 50. Using this data 
set would highlight and with time improve the 
quality of information and would clarify issues 
of definitions that now appear problematic. The 
option of relying on administrative data must be 
ruled out for three reasons: information is not 
comparable, is fragmentary and sometimes may 
be gender insensitive.
The indicator should focus on people over 65. 
Younger pensioners are a self-selected atypical 
group; the choice of an age cut-off point would 
keep the analysis in line with demographic prac-
tice. To describe the gender situation one needs 
two indicators: firstly, an indicator for coverage 
– i.e. who is a pensioner; and secondly, an in-
dicator for determining differences in pensions 
for those who draw a pension. The latter is the 
key diagnostic tool used and is called the ‘Pen-
sioners’ Gender gap in pensions’. An alternative 
8concept, the ‘Elderly Gender gap in pensions’ is 
defined over the population, i.e. it includes those 
with no pensions.
The Gender gap in pensions is the percentage by 
which women’s average pension is lower than 
men’s; it measures by how much women are lag-
ging behind men.
Considerable research effort has concentrated 
on Gender Gaps in Pay. Although a generalisation 
to pensions is a natural extension, this topic has 
received little attention. Does old age maintain 
pre-existing inequalities, does it cumulate and 
amplify them, or does it give a chance to level 
out life chances?
The large international literature concludes that 
gaps are the result of three facts: Women partic-
ipate less in the labour market; they work fewer 
hours and/or years; they receive lower wages. 
The ‘bad news’ is that these facts snowball 
women’s career earnings. The ‘good news’ is that 
pay gaps have been shrinking in the past two 
decades, although progress has slowed down in 
recent years.
Does this mean that pension gaps will likewise 
start shrinking with a similar lag, and that there-
fore they are a problem that will correct itself? 
The US experience is very disappointing. A recent 
study noted that, whereas earnings gaps have 
shrunk dramatically, pension gaps have been es-
sentially immobile. In Europe this question has 
not been formulated; or if it has been formu-
lated, it has not been answered. There exist a 
number of national studies with a focus on spe-
cific institutional features or reforms. The overall 
picture of where Europe is - and of where it is 
going - essentially absent.
A statistical characterisation of 
gender gaps in pension in Europe in 
2009 
The statistical analysis proceeded in a series of 
structured series of questions:
How wide is the pension gap in Europe? Our 
central estimate of the Gender gap in pensions is 
that the gap is very wide. The EU-27 average 
is 39%. The two highest figures are for Luxem-
bourg (47%) and Germany (44%). At the other 
extreme, Estonia has the lowest gender pension 
gap (4%), followed by the Slovak Republic (8%). 
A large number of countries are around 30%, 
while 17 out of the 27 have gender gaps in pen-
sion greater or equal to 30%.
This is more than twice the figure of the gen-
der pay gap indicator (equal to 16%). However, 
there is no simple relationship between the two 
figures. Suffice it to say that Estonia (lowest pen-
sion gap) also has the highest pay gap. In some 
cases pensions may reduce pre-existing inequal-
ity; in others they may also widen it, sometimes 
as an unwanted side-effect of pension features.
Who receives a pension? Coverage effects 
and the elderly pension gap. Pension gaps 
may also be calculated for the total population 
over 65. In some or possibly most countries this 
makes little difference, as all elderly people are 
drawing some kind of pension. However, in some 
countries more than a third of women have no 
pension, while in others that figure is more than 
one in ten. Including people with zero pension 
has a large effect on computed pension gaps, 
altering the ranks considerably.
Is the pension gap tending to rise or fall? 
Cohort analysis. Are pension gaps, like pay 
gaps, shrinking over time? If we compare pen-
sion gaps of those aged 80+ with those aged 
65-80 using EU-SILC data, we see that pension 
gaps are considerably lower for the older group. 
However, this may be due to the equalising ef-
fect of pensions collected by widows. A similar 
exercise using data from SHARE leads to a mixed 
picture: in some countries younger people’s pen-
sions have higher gaps, while in others the op-
posite is the case. As a consequence, data do not 
provide a definitive answer on this issue.
Effects of education and lifetime income. 
Education is closely linked to career income. If 
gender gaps rise with education (e.g. through 
‘glass ceiling effects’), we might expect that 
they will rise in the future given that we know 
that educational attainment of future pension-
ers will increase. However, the picture emerging 
from the data is mixed. Although in the EU27 
the higher the education, the larger the gender 
gap, this is not a picture which holds true in all 
Member States. This is partly because gender 
differences at either extremes of the educational 
spectrum tend to increase the gap, but less so in 
the middle.
How are pensions distributed? Are (pro-
portional) gender gaps higher where pen-
sions are higher? How are pensions distributed 
around the average? Women are greatly over-
represented among lower pension recipients, 
and conversely for every poor man, there are 
almost two poor women. When calculating sepa-
rate gaps for each tertile (i.e. the third part of the 
pension distribution), there are some countries 
where the gap is rising with income and some 
where it is falling, indicating that this feature 
operates in different ways in different parts of 
Europe.
Can we discern trends in the pension gap 
over time? Comparing points five years apart 
(2010 and 2005) we again see a mixed picture. 
Whereas on average there is a widening of gaps 
(by 1.7pp), this masks opposing trends – from 
improvements of the order of 4-5pp to deterio-
ration of 4-6 pp. 
9Pension Gaps and Broken Careers. Women in 
the past have worked for fewer years than men. 
In general, shorter careers are associated with 
larger pension gaps, though that relationship 
is not one-to-one. In some cases gaps rise and 
then fall. Distinguishing what was the ‘dominant 
job’ during one’s working life, the lowest gender 
gaps are met in the public sector (where they 
might even be negative), and the largest for the 
self-employed.
The effect of multi-pillar systems. Second-
pillar systems are well established in a small 
number of countries. In Denmark, the Nether-
lands and in Switzerland the second pillar is suf-
ficiently mature to enable analysis using data 
from SHARE. In these countries the composite of 
the two pillars has a wider gender gap than the 
public pillar on its own. The second pillar in those 
countries also displays very significant coverage 
gaps, as fewer women choose to enrol in occu-
pational pension plans.
Gender gaps by marital status; is there a 
motherhood penalty? Gender gaps are nar-
rower for single women, however even so they 
remain wide (17%). Gender gaps are widest 
for married women, while divorced women are 
somewhere in the middle. Using SHARE data, a 
very clear and strong relationship is apparent 
between the number of children raised and the 
gender gap.
Are disparities larger if we look inside 
households? The intra-household pension 
gap. Our central gap indicator, the Gender gap 
in pensions, is essentially a macro-level or ag-
gregate indicator comparing the average pen-
sion for women to that for men. We also looked 
inside the household and compared each woman 
with her own partner to construct a micro-level 
indicator, the intra-household Gender gap in 
pensions. We found that disparities in pension 
income are higher within households than in the 
aggregate. The intra-household gap in pension 
is higher than the aggregate gap in the EU as 
a whole and in the vast majority of its Member 
States. In particular, the median intra-household 
gap is 4 pp higher than its aggregate equivalent 
within EU27 (46% against 42%) and 20pp higher 
in five countries. It is lower in only six countries, 
four of which are Eastern European countries.
Putting the picture together: decomposition 
analysis and the adjusted gap. Decomposi-
tion methods supplemented the factor-by-factor 
analysis with a multivariate examination. The key 
finding is that netting out differences between 
men and women in the observed characteristics 
reported by SILC (education, age, length of work-
ing career, marriage status and weight of third-
pillar pension income) has only a moderate im-
pact on the Gender gap in pensions. In six of the 
nine countries under analysis, the ‘adjusted’ gap 
(a"er netting out) ranges from -15% to +11% of 
the original gap (the UK, the Netherlands, Aus-
tria, Greece, Italy and Poland). In Germany and 
France netting out entails a decrease of around 
30% of the original gap, up to about 100% in 
Estonia where, however, the original gap is very 
low (around 4 percent). In most countries a size-
able gap remains that cannot be easily explained 
away with the differences in characteristics be-
tween men and women recorded in the data. 
Understanding and addressing this gap is an im-
portant challenge for both research and policy.
Some lessons from countries’ expe-
riences
This report also set out to generate gender gap 
information comparable to SILC using locally 
available administrative data. National experts 
were asked to collate and comment on local 
administrative information on pensions and pen-
sion gaps for ten countries: Estonia, Poland, Den-
mark, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, the 
UK, France and Sweden. Though in some cases 
this required little effort, in the majority of cases 
it was a very difficult exercise; in some it proved 
impossible; in one case at least, no information 
was produced by gender at all. Thanks to a re-
cent national study focusing on the gender pen-
sion gap, we could also access local information 
for an additional country, Germany. 
Where the SILC and the national sources can be 
matched (Estonia, Italy), the correspondence is 
very close; the same holds for France and Austria 
where correspondence was only possible for the 
headline gap. However, in the other two multi-
pillar systems (the UK, the Netherlands) match-
ing of data was very imperfect.
The report concluded with opinions of the na-
tional experts on three themes: prospects for the 
future; data and gender visibility; and the issue 
of derived rights. The experts largely concur that 
more needs to be done to measure and under-
stand what causes gender gaps; and that, even 
in those cases where the issue is less acute, 
there are no grounds for complacency.
Policy directions
The fear is that individuals accustomed to eco-
nomic independence in their daily affairs might 
be confronted, once they enter pensionable age, 
with systems built around the presumption that 
dependence is the ‘normal’ situation. What had 
been gained in the labour market may be re-
versed in pensions.
The worrying fact is that we are only gradually 
forming an opinion as to whether this fear is un-
founded or not. The statistical analysis showed 
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that gender gaps in pension are many times as 
wide as pay gaps. One especially unsettling is-
sue concerns the lack of visibility of the problem. 
The report uncovered wide gaps in most coun-
tries, but also their overwhelming complexity. 
The hope that improvements in pay gaps will 
necessarily percolate through to pensions is un-
founded.
When a new concern enters policy ‘radar 
screens’, understanding proceeds in three steps: 
Awareness; Amelioration; and finally Prevention. 
In the case of pension gender imbalance, we are 
still in stage one – visibility of the issue. At this 
stage the EU can play a decisive role to place the 
issue on the agenda and to galvanise the type of 
national initiatives that can proceed with amelio-
ration and possibly prevention.
Thus, the key policy lesson is Vigilance.
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Motivation: vers un indicateur sur 
les écarts entre les pensions de 
retraite.
Les pensions de retraite constituent un élément 
déterminant de l’indépendance économique 
de leurs bénéficiaires. Lorsque l’on se penche 
sur l’indépendance des personnes en âge de tra-
vailler, il est naturel de songer à l’écart de ré-
munération entre les différentes générations.  Il 
serait tout à fait logique de se concentrer sur 
les écarts entre les pensions de retraite, après 
s’être intéressé à l’écart de rémunération entre 
les générations. Ces écarts semblent refléter le 
cumul de désavantages inhérent à un parcours 
professionnel sur un marché du travail où il ex-
iste la discrimination liée au sexe. Cela est en-
core plus vrai pour ce qui est des cohortes plus 
âgées. Les systèmes de pensions de retraite ne 
sont pas de simples réflexions neutres. Au con-
traire, ils peuvent amplifier les déséquilibres, en 
encourageant l’épargne, ou encore les atténuer, 
en tant que choix de politique sociale.
La mise en place d’un indicateur annuel mesurant 
les déséquilibres liés au genre pourrait trouver 
sa justification dans la complexité des effets liés 
au genre qui affectent les pensions. La structure 
des pensions subit l’influence des trois séries de 
facteurs énoncées ci-dessous.
Premièrement, le caractère à très long terme 
des changements structuraux: il est évident 
que le vieillissement est le facteur qui a la plus 
grande influence, bien que l’effet d’écho des 
postes de travail précédemment occupés peut, 
lui aussi, avoir un rôle à jouer. Les pensions 
d’aujourd’hui peuvent être le reflet des postes 
de travail occupés par le passé, ainsi que des 
règles sociales afférentes aux situations telles 
que le divorce, le veuvage et la cohabitation en-
tre les différentes générations. Deuxièmement, 
les pensions d’aujourd’hui subissent l’influence 
des réformes des pensions antérieures. Les 
retraités actuels relèvent, bien souvent, de ré-
gimes transitoires. C’est ainsi que lorsqu’ils ont 
vécu et travaillé sous l’empire d’un système, 
dans de nombreux cas de figure, ils percevront 
leurs prestations dans le cadre d’un autre sys-
tème. S’agissant d’un groupe «pris entre le mar-
teau et l’enclume», ils peuvent ne pas bénéficier 
de la protection de la logique de fonctionne-
ment interne du système, qu’il soit nouveau ou 
ancien.  Au fil du temps, néanmoins, de plus en 
plus d’individus se verront affectés par les nou-
velles caractéristiques, et seront vulnérables 
face au risque que les nouveaux types de pen-
sions représentent. Deux réformes ont toutes 
les chances d’avoir un effet disproportionné sur 
les femmes.  Il s’agit, premièrement, du passage 
des pensions («premier pilier») publiques aux ré-
gimes de retraite professionnels («deuxième pili-
er»): l’effet général qui s’en suit tend à renforcer 
le lien entre les contributions et les prestations, 
phénomène connu, aux États-Unis d’Amérique, 
sous le nom de «privatisation du risque». Deux-
ièmement, l’accent est mis sur l’augmentation 
des années travaillées. Bien que les raisons à la 
base de ces réformes soient inattaquables, il n’en 
demeure pas moins qu’elles pourraient avoir des 
effets indésirables à moyen terme, et entraîner 
une réduction du montant des pensions pour 
tous ceux qui n’auraient pas répondu aux incita-
tions. Les pressions à court terme associées à 
la crise économique qui sévit à l’heure actuelle, 
constituent la troisième série de facteurs qui 
façonnent les pensions. Ces pressions diffèrent 
en fonction des pays, mais pourraient déboucher 
sur des variations importantes pour ce qui est 
des effets liés au genre, susceptibles d’affecter 
tant les systèmes de retraite professionnels que 
les régimes publics.
Aussi, les femmes âgées subissent les répercus-
sions des désavantages du passé, tout en com-
mençant à ressentir les effets des difficultés à 
venir. Alors que l’Union européenne a assumé le 
rôle de chef de file en faveur des populations 
vieillissantes et de l’équilibre entre les hommes 
et les femmes, il conviendrait également qu’elle 
Résumé
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s’intéresse aux effets indésirables éventuels de 
l’interaction de ces deux politiques. Un pas dé-
cisif en ce sens serait constitué par la mise en 
place d’un indicateur permanent des écarts liés 
au genre en matière de pensions de retraite.
La seule source de données réaliste susceptible 
d’alimenter un tel indicateur serait représentée 
par les statistiques de l’Union européenne sur les 
revenus et les conditions de vie (SILC) et, éven-
tuellement, par une autre source de données in-
ternationale, à savoir, par l’enquête sur la santé, 
le vieillissement et la retraite en Europe (SHARE), 
concernant les personnes âgées de plus de 50 
ans. Le recours à ces ensembles de données 
permettrait de mettre en lumière et d’améliorer 
(dans le temps) la qualité des informations, ainsi 
que de préciser les définitions, lesquelles appa-
raissent, à l’heure actuelle, problématiques. Le 
recours à des données administratives devrait 
être écarté, et cela pour les trois raisons suiv-
antes: ces informations ne sont pas compara-
bles, elles sont fragmentaires et, parfois, elles 
peuvent ne pas tenir compte du genre.
L’indicateur envisagé devrait se focaliser sur les 
personnes âgées de plus de 65 ans. Les retraités 
plus jeunes constituent un groupe atypique 
auto-désigné. L’option consistant à fixer une 
limite d’âge permettrait de faire en sorte que 
l’analyse demeure en phase avec la pratique dé-
mographique. Pour décrire la situation en termes 
de genre, deux indicateurs s’avèrent nécessaires, 
à savoir: premièrement, un indicateur de cou-
verture (c’est-à-dire, qui a la qualité de retraité), 
et deuxièmement, un indicateur permettant de 
déterminer les différences entre les pensions 
parmi ceux qui en perçoivent une. Le dernier 
de ces deux indicateurs constitue un outil de 
diagnostic essentiel, dénommé «Écart entre les 
pensions des retraités percevant une prestation 
de retraite lié au genre». Une notion alternative, 
«l’Écart entre les pensions des personnes âgées 
lié au genre» est défini en fonction de la popula-
tion, de sorte qu’il tient compte des personnes 
qui ne perçoivent pas de prestation de retraite.
L’écart entre les pensions des retraités percevant 
une prestation de retraite lié au genre est le taux 
qui mesure la différence entre le montant des 
pensions perçues par les femmes et celui de 
celles perçues par les hommes. Il mesure l’écart 
qui sépare les femmes et les hommes.
Des efforts considérables de recherche ont été 
consacrés à l’écart entre les rémunérations lié au 
genre. Bien que leur généralisation aux pensions 
de retraite constitue une extension naturelle, ce-
tte question n’a mérité que très peu d’attention. 
Est-ce que l’âge maintient des inégalités préex-
istantes? Est-ce qu’il les cumule et les amplifie?, 
ou au contraire, constitue-t-il une occasion de 
niveler les chances?
La littérature internationale conclut, pour la 
plupart, à ce que les écarts existants sont la con-
séquence de trois réalités, à savoir:  les femmes 
participent moins au marché du travail, elles tra-
vaillent moins d’heures et/ou d’années, et elles 
perçoivent des salaires plus bas. La «mauvaise 
nouvelle» est constituée par le fait que ces trois 
facteurs ont un effet boule de neige sur les rev-
enus que les femmes tirent de leurs carrières 
professionnelles. La «bonne nouvelle» est que les 
écarts entre les salaires n’ont cessé de diminuer 
au cours des deux décennies écoulées, bien que 
les progrès en la matière aient ralenti ces dern-
ières années.
Est-ce que cela signifie que les écarts entre les 
pensions de retraite commenceront, eux aussi, 
à se réduire, avec un décalage similaire, et que, 
par voie de conséquence, ils constituent un prob-
lème qui se solutionnera lui-même? L’expérience 
des États-Unis d’Amérique à ce propos s’est avé-
rée très décevante. Une étude récente a permis 
de constater que même si les écarts entre les 
rémunérations ont diminué d’une manière dras-
tique, ceux entre les pensions sont demeurés in-
changés, pour l’essentiel. En Europe, cette ques-
tion n’a pas été formulée; ou si elle l’a été, elle 
n’a pas encore reçu de réponse. Il existe plusieurs 
études nationales qui concentrent leurs efforts 
sur les spécificités institutionnelles ou sur les 
réformes. Le tableau général de la situation de 
l’Europe (ou de l’avenir de cette dernière) y fait 
généralement défaut.
Une caractérisation statistique des 
écarts entre les pensions de retraite 
liés au genre en Europe en 2009 
Cette étude statistique s’articulait autour d’une 
série structurée de questions, à savoir:
Quelle est l’ampleur de l’écart entre les 
pensions en Europe? Notre estimation mé-
diane de l’écart entre les pensions lié au genre 
conclut à ce que l’écart est très important. La 
moyenne de l’UE-27 se situe à 39%. Les 
deux chiffres les plus élevés ont été enregistrés 
au Luxembourg (47%) et en Allemagne (44%). À 
l’autre extrémité, l’Estonie présente l’écart entre 
les pensions le plus faible (4%), suivie de la Ré-
publique slovaque (8%). Nombreux sont les pays 
à se situer à environ 30%, alors que 17 pays sur 
27 présentent des écarts entre les pensions liés 
au genre égaux ou supérieurs à 30%.
Il s’agit là de plus du double du chiffre de 
l’indicateur relatif à l’écart de rémunération (égal 
à 16%). Néanmoins, il n’existe pas de lien sim-
ple entre ces deux chiffres. Il suffit d’indiquer sur 
ce point que l’Estonie (qui présente l’écart en-
tre les pensions le plus faible) enregistre égale-
ment l’écart de rémunération le plus élevé. Dans 
certains cas, les pensions peuvent venir réduire 
des inégalités préexistantes, mais dans d’autres, 
elles peuvent aussi les amplifier, parfois en tant 
qu’effet indésirable des spécificités propres au 
système de pensions.
13
Qui sont les bénéficiaires des pensions? Les 
effets de la couverture et l’écart entre les 
pensions de personnes âgées. Les écarts en-
tre les pensions de retraite peuvent aussi faire 
l’objet d’un calcul concernant la population totale 
âgée de plus de 65 ans.  Dans certains pays (et 
probablement dans la plupart), cela ne fait que 
peu de différence, dans la mesure où l’ensemble 
des personnes âgées perçoit un type de pen-
sion quelconque. Néanmoins, il existe des pays 
dans lesquels plus d’un tiers des femmes ne per-
çoivent pas de pension, alors que dans d’autres 
ce chiffre représente plus d’une femme sur dix. 
Le fait de tenir compte de ces personnes qui ne 
perçoivent aucune pension a un effet important 
sur les écarts entre les pensions constatés, en 
ce qu’il altère considérablement les classements.
L’écart entre les pensions tend-il à aug-
menter ou à diminuer? Étude de cohorte. 
Est-ce que les écarts entre les pensions dimin-
uent-ils dans le temps, à l’instar des écarts de 
rémunération? Si l’on compare les écarts entre 
les pensions de retraite de ceux âgés de 80 ans 
et plus et ceux des personnes de 65 à 80 ans, en 
utilisant pour cela les données des statistiques 
européennes SILC, il apparaît que ces écarts sont 
nettement inférieurs dans le groupe des person-
nes plus âgées. Néanmoins, cela pourrait découl-
er de l’effet pondérateur des pensions perçues 
par les veuves. Si l’on se livre à un exercice simi-
laire, en utilisant, cette fois-ci, les données de 
SHARE, on obtient une image plus complexe: al-
ors que dans certains pays les pensions perçues 
par les jeunes retraités présentent des écarts 
plus élevés, dans d’autres, on peut constater ex-
actement le contraire. Aussi et dans ces condi-
tions, il apparaît que les données n’apportent pas 
une réponse concluante en la matière.
Les effets de la formation et des revenus 
perçus tout au long de la vie profession-
nelle. La formation est étroitement liée aux 
revenus professionnels perçus.  Si les écarts en-
tre les hommes et les femmes augmentent en 
fonction du niveau de formation (songeons, par 
exemple, à «l’incidence du plafond de verre»), on 
pourrait s’attendre à ce qu’ils s’accroissent en-
core davantage à l’avenir, puisque nous savons 
que le niveau de formation des futurs retraités 
sera plus élevé. Néanmoins, le tableau tiré des 
données est complexe. En effet, bien qu’au sein 
de l’UE-27 on constate qu’à un niveau de for-
mation plus élevé correspond un écart entre les 
hommes et les femmes plus important, il con-
vient de garder à l’esprit qu’il n’en est pas ainsi 
dans l’ensemble des États membres. Cette situ-
ation s’explique, en partie, par le fait que les dif-
férences entre les sexes à chaque extrémité du 
spectre éducatif tendent à élargir l’écart, mais 
pas au milieu.
Comment les pensions de retraite sont-
elles distribuées?  Est-ce que les écarts 
(proportionnels) liés au genre sont-ils plus 
importants pour les pensions plus élevées? 
Comment sont distribuées les pensions de re-
traite en moyenne?  Les femmes sont forte-
ment surreprésentées parmi les bénéficiaires 
des pensions les plus faibles, et inversement, 
pour chaque homme en situation de pauvreté, 
on dénombre presque deux femmes pauvres. 
Lorsque l’on calcule les écarts propres à chaque 
tercile (c’est-à-dire, au tiers de la distribution des 
pensions), on constate que dans certains pays, 
l’écart augmente avec les revenus, alors que 
dans d’autres il diminue, ce qui révèle que cet 
aspect fonctionne de manière différente en fonc-
tion des régions européennes.
Est-il possible de dégager des tendances 
dans l’écart entre les pensions dans le 
temps? En comparant les données sur cinq 
ans (entre 2010 et 2005), on obtient, une fois 
de plus, un tableau complexe. En effet, et alors 
qu’en moyenne l’on peut constater un élargisse-
ment des écarts (à hauteur de 1,7%), ce chif-
fre occulte des évolutions contrastées (qui vont 
d’améliorations entre 4 et 5% à des détériora-
tions se situant entre 4 et 6%). 
Les écarts entre les pensions et les car-
rières professionnelles interrompues. Par le 
passé, les femmes travaillaient moins d’années 
que les hommes. En général, les carrières pro-
fessionnelles plus courtes sont associées à des 
écarts entre les pensions plus marqués, bien que 
le rapport entre ces deux éléments ne soit pas 
totalement direct. Dans certains cas, les écarts 
augmentent et diminuent ensuite. Si l’on tient 
compte de «l’emploi dominant» au cours d’une 
vie professionnelle, il apparaît que les écarts liés 
au genre les plus faibles sont constatés dans le 
secteur public (dans lequel ils peuvent parfois 
être négatifs), et les plus marqués concernent 
les travailleurs indépendants.
L’effet des systèmes à piliers multiples. Les 
systèmes du deuxième pilier sont bien consoli-
dés dans un petit nombre de pays. Au Danemark, 
aux Pays-Bas et en Suisse, le deuxième pilier est 
suffisamment mûr pour permettre une analyse, 
sur la base des données SHARE. Dans ces pays, 
l’association des deux piliers présente un écart 
lié au genre plus important que le pilier public en 
tant que tel. Le deuxième pilier de ces pays per-
met également de constater des écarts de cou-
verturesignificatifs, dans la mesure où le nombre 
de femmes qui choisissent de participer à des 
plans de retraite professionnelle est plus faible.
Les écarts liés au genre et la situation de 
famille - Les maternités sont-elles pénali-
sées? Les écarts liés au genre sont plus faibles 
pour les femmes seules, bien qu’ils demeurent 
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importants, malgré tout (17%). Ils sont plus mar-
qués pour les femmes mariées, alors que celles 
divorcées se situent quelque part au milieu. Si 
l’on s’en tient aux données SHARE, il apparaît 
qu’il existe un lien de causalité clair et important 
entre le nombre d’enfants élevés et les écarts 
liés au genre.
Est-ce que les disparités sont-elles plus 
larges au sein des ménages? Les écarts en-
tre les pensions au sein des ménages. No-
tre indicateur des écarts de base (l’indicateur de 
l’écart entre les pensions des retraités percevant 
une prestation de retraite lié au genre) constitue, 
pour l’essentiel, un indicateur à l’échelle macro 
(ou indicateur agrégé), qui compare la moyenne 
des pensions perçues par les femmes par rap-
port à celles perçues par les hommes. Nous nous 
sommes également intéressés aux ménages, 
pour comparer la situation de chaque femme 
par rapport à son conjoint, afin de définir un in-
dicateur à l’échelle micro, à savoir, l’écart entre 
les pensions lié au genre au sein des ménages. 
C’est ainsi que nous avons constaté que les dis-
parités au niveau des pensions de retraite sont 
plus marquées au sein des ménages que dans 
le cadre de l’indicateur agrégé. L’écart entre les 
pensions au sein des ménages est plus élevé que 
l’écart agrégé dans l’ensemble de l’Union euro-
péenne, ainsi que dans la plupart de ses États 
membres. C’est ainsi, notamment, que l’écart 
moyen au sein des ménages est 4% plus élevé 
que son équivalent agrégé dans l’UE-27 (46% 
contre 42%) et 20% plus élevé dans cinq pays. Il 
est plus faible uniquement dans six États mem-
bres, dont quatre sont des pays de l’Europe de 
l’Est.
Obtenir une vue d’ensemble: l’analyse de 
décomposition et l’écart ajusté. Les méth-
odes de décomposition ont associé un examen 
multivarié à l’analyse facteur par facteur. La 
principale constatation est la suivante: la com-
pensation des différences entre les hommes et 
les femmes dans les caractéristiques observées 
rapportées par les données SILC (formation, âge, 
durée de la carrière professionnelle, situation de 
famille et poids des revenus de retraite issus 
du troisième pilier) n’a qu’un effet modéré sur 
l’écart entre les pensions lié au genre. Dans six 
des neufs pays soumis à analyse, l’écart «ajusté» 
(après compensation) oscille entre -15% et +11% 
par rapport à l’écart d’origine (au Royaume-Uni, 
aux Pays-Bas, en Autriche, en Grèce, en Italie 
et en Pologne). En Allemagne et en France, la 
compensation entraîne une diminution d’environ 
30% de l’écart d’origine, et de près de 100% en 
Estonie, pays dans lequel, néanmoins, l’écart 
d’origine est très faible (d’environ 4%). Dans la 
plupart des pays, un écart de taille demeure, et 
il ne trouve pas d’explication aisée dans les dif-
férences existant entre les spécificités propres 
aux hommes et aux femmes enregistrées dans 
les données disponibles. La compréhension de 
ces écarts, pour les combattre, constitue un défi 
majeur tant pour les chercheurs que pour les dé-
cideurs politiques.
Quelques enseignements tirés des 
expériences des pays.
Le présent rapport a également pour objet de 
générer des informations concernant les écarts 
liés au genre comparables aux statistiques SILC, 
en utilisant pour cela des données administra-
tives disponibles au plan local. C’est ainsi qu’il a 
été demandé aux experts nationaux de rassem-
bler et de commenter des données administra-
tives locales sur les écarts entre les pensions 
de retraite dans les dix pays suivants: Estonie, 
Pologne, Danemark, Autriche, Pays-Bas, Italie, 
Grèce, Royaume-Uni, France et Suède. Bien que 
dans certains cas de figure une telle tâche ait 
nécessité peu d’effort, dans la plupart des hy-
pothèses, il s’est agi d’un exercice difficile, voire 
parfois impossible. Aussi, dans au moins un cas, 
aucune information n’a été fournie pour ce qui 
est du genre. Grâce à une étude nationale ré-
cente consacrée aux écarts entre les pensions 
liés au genre, nous avons également eu accès 
à des informations locales concernant un pays 
supplémentaire: l’Allemagne. 
Dans les cas où les données SILC et celles issues 
des sources nationales ont pu être comparées 
(en Estonie et en Italie), la correspondance entre 
elles s’est avérée très proche. Il en va de même 
pour ce qui est de la France et de l’Autriche, où 
cette correspondance n’a été possible que con-
cernant l’écart en général. Néanmoins, dans deux 
autres systèmes à piliers multiples (le Royaume-
Uni et les Pays-Bas), la correspondance des don-
nées s’est avérée imparfaite.
Le rapport concluait avec l’avis des experts na-
tionaux sur les trois sujets suivants: les perspec-
tives d’avenir, la visibilité des données et des 
questions liées à l’égalité de genre, et la question 
des droits dérivés. Les experts se sont largement 
accordés sur le fait qu’il convient de consentir 
des efforts supplémentaires pour mesurer et 
comprendre les causes à l’origine des écarts liés 
au genre, et que, même dans les cas où le prob-
lème est moins grave, il n’y a pas lieu de faire 
preuve de complaisance.
Orientations politiques
Force est de craindre que des individus habitués 
à l’indépendance économique dans leurs vies de 
tous les jours soient confrontés, une fois arrivés 
à l’âge de la retraite, à des systèmes bâtis autour 
de la présomption selon laquelle la dépendance 
constitue une situation «normale». Ce que l’on 
aurait gagné sur le marché du travail pourrait 
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être perdu pour la retraite.
Ce qui apparaît préoccupant, c’est qu’il n’est pos-
sible de se faire une opinion sur le fait de savoir 
si une telle crainte s’avère, ou non, fondée que 
de manière graduelle. L’étude statistique a mis 
en évidence que les écarts entre les pensions de 
retraite liés au genre sont, très souvent, aussi 
importants que les écarts de rémunération. Une 
question particulièrement préoccupante a trait 
au manque de visibilité du problème. Le rapport 
a permis de mettre en lumière des écarts impor-
tants dans la plupart des pays, mais aussi leur 
énorme complexité. L’espoir que les améliora-
tions apportées dans le domaine de l’écart de ré-
munération se propageront nécessairement aux 
pensions de retraites n’est pas fondé.
Lorsqu’une nouvelle préoccupation pénètre les 
«écrans des radars» politiques, la compréhension 
s’opère en trois étapes, à savoir: prise de con-
science, amélioration et enfin, prévention. Pour 
ce qui est du déséquilibre entre les pensions lié 
au genre, nous en sommes encore à la première 
phase, qui a trait à la visibilité du problème. À ce 
stade, l’Union européenne peut jouer un rôle dé-
cisif en intégrant la question à son agenda et en 
encourageant les initiatives nationales suscepti-
bles d’améliorer la situation et de la prévenir, le 
cas échéant.
Aussi, le principal enseignement politique est la 
vigilance.
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Begründung: Weg zu einem Pension 
Gap Indikator
Renten sind ein wichtiger Bestimmungsfaktor 
der wirtscha.lichen Unabhängigkeit ihrer 
Empfänger. Wenn man die wirtscha"liche Un-
abhängigkeit von Personen im erwerbsfähigen 
Alter betrachtet, denkt man unwillkürlich an 
geschlechtsspezifische Lohngefälle. Die Aus-
einandersetzung mit geschlechtsspezifischen 
Lohnunterschieden müsste eigentlich auch zu 
einer besonderen Aufmerksamkeit auf Einkom-
mensgefälle bei Renten führen. Diese Gefälle 
müssten die kumulierten Nachteile einer beru-
flichen Laufbahn in Arbeitsmärkten wieder-
spiegeln, in denen die Bedingungen für Frauen 
und Männer ungleich sind. Das gilt umso mehr 
für ältere Kohorten. Rentensysteme reflektieren 
diese Unterschiede nicht eins zu eins, sondern 
können sie durch die Belohnung von Sparsamkeit 
verstärken oder infolge entsprechender sozialpo-
litischer Entscheidungen abfedern.
Die Komplexität von Gendereffekten auf Rent-
en könnte einen jährlichen Indikator der ge-
schlechtsbedingten Unterschiede rechtfertigen. 
Die Rentenstruktur wird von folgenden drei Grup-
pen von Faktoren beeinflusst:
Erstens sehr langfristige strukturelle Änder-
ungen: Die Altersstruktur ist diesbezüglich der 
wichtigste Faktor, wobei die indirekten Aus-
wirkungen vergangener Erwerbsbiographien 
auch eine Rolle spielen. Die Renten von heute 
können die Beschä"igung von gestern wider-
spiegeln, aber auch soziale Normen wie Schei-
dung, Witwenscha", Zusammenwohnen ver-
schiedener Generationen. Zweitens hängen die 
Renten von heute von Rentenreformen in der 
Vergangenheit ab. O" sind heutige Rentner 
durch Übergangsmaßnahmen geschützt. Sie 
haben in einem bestimmten System gelebt und 
gearbeitet, erhalten aber ihre Bezüge in vielen 
Fällen in einem anderen. Es kann sein, dass sie 
als „Gruppe dazwischen“ nicht von der internen 
Logik des Systems, alt oder neu, geschützt sind. 
Im Laufe der Zeit werden aber immer mehr Rent-
ner von neu eingeführten Merkmalen betroffen 
und daher neuen Rentenrisiken ausgesetzt sein. 
Zwei Reformen werden wahrscheinlich einen un-
verhältnismäßigen Einfluss auf Frauen haben. 
Erstens die Verschiebung des Schwerpunktes 
von öffentlichen (‚erster Pfeiler‘) zu beruflichen 
(‚zweiter Pfeiler‘) Rentenversicherungssystemen: 
Der Gesamteffekt ist tendenziell eine stärkere 
Verknüpfung von Beiträgen und Risiken, was in 
den USA „Privatisierung der Risiken“ genannt 
wurde. Zweitens der Schwerpunkt auf längere 
Lebensarbeitszeiten. Obwohl die Begründungen 
dafür unanfechtbar sind, könnten mittelfristig 
versteckte Nebeneffekte entstehen, die niedri-
gere Renten für die, die ihr Verhalten nicht den 
vorgegebenen Anreizen anpassen, zur Folge ha-
ben könnten. Die dritte Gruppe der Faktoren, die 
Renten beeinflussen, sind kurzfristige Zwänge 
durch die aktuelle Wirtscha"skrise. Diese sind in 
verschiedenen Ländern unterschiedlich, könnten 
aber zu bedeutenden Umschwüngen bei Gen-
deraspekten führen – mit Folgen für Beschä"i-
gung und Staatsysteme.
Daher sind ältere Frauen, gerade wenn sie anfan-
gen, die Zeichen zukün"iger Probleme zu spüren, 
den Spätfolgen vergangener Benachteiligungen 
ausgesetzt. Da die EU sowohl bei der Alterung 
der Bevölkerung wie bei der Gendergerechtigkeit 
eine Vorreiterrolle eingenommen hat, ist es an-
gemessen, dass sie ihre Aufmerksamkeit auch 
auf die möglichen Nebenwirkungen der gegen-
seitigen Beeinflussung dieser zwei Phänomene 
richtet. Ein entscheidender Schritt in diese Rich-
tung wäre die Entwicklung eines Indikators für 
Rentengefälle zwischen Männern und Frauen auf 
ständiger Basis.
Die einzige realistische Datenquelle für einen 
solchen Indikator wäre die Statistik der Eu-
ropäischen Union über Einkommen und Lebens-
bedingungen (EU-SILC), möglicherweise ergänzt 
durch eine andere internationale Datenquelle, 
dem Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
Kurzfassung
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in Europe (SHARE), der Daten zum Leben von 
Menschen über 50 erhebt. Mit diesem Datensatz 
könnte die Qualität der Informationen bewertet 
und mit der Zeit verbessert sowie die bislang 
noch problematischen terminologischen Fragen 
geklärt werden. Die Option, sich auf Verwal-
tungsdaten zu stützen, muss aus drei Gründen 
ausgeschlossen werden: Die Informationen sind 
nicht vergleichbar, unvollständig und berücksi-
chtigen möglicherweise in manchen Fällen gen-
derspezifische Aspekte nicht.
Der Indikator sollte auf Menschen über 65 
fokussiert sein. Jüngere Rentner sind eine atypis-
che, durch Selbstselektion geprägte Gruppe; die 
Entscheidung für eine Altersschwelle würde auch 
der gängigen demographischen Praxis entspre-
chen. Um die Gendersituation zu beschreiben, 
sind zwei Indikatoren notwendig: erstens ein In-
dikator der Rentenempfänger und zweitens ein 
Indikator, der die Unterscheide zwischen denen, 
die eine Rente beziehen, feststellt. Dieser ist 
das diagnostische Schlüsselinstrument und wird 
„Pensioners Gender gap in pensions“ genannt. 
Ein alternativer Ansatz, der sogenannte „Elderly 
Gender gap in pensions“ bezieht sich auf die 
ganze Bevölkerung, d.h. schließt auch Menschen 
ein, die keine Rente beziehen.
Der Gender gap in pensions wird als Verhält-
nis der durchschnittlichen persönlichen Alters-
sicherungsleistungen von Frauen gegenüber 
denen von Männern definiert und misst, wie stark 
Frauen diesbezüglich hinter Männern zurück-
liegen.
Dem Lohgefälle zwischen Frauen und Männern 
ist schon ein erheblicher Forschungsaufwand 
gewidmet worden. Wenngleich eine General-
isierung, die auch Renten einbezieht, eine natür-
liche Erweiterung darstellt, ist dieser Frage mit 
wenig Aufmerksamkeit bedacht worden. Werden 
im Alter bereits bestehende Unterscheide beibe-
halten, addieren und verstärken sie sich, oder 
besteht dadurch eine Möglichkeit, Lebenschan-
cen auszugleichen?
Die umfangreiche internationale Literatur zu 
diesem Thema kommt zum Schluss, dass Unter-
schiede drei Gründe haben: Frauen weisen eine 
geringere Beteiligung am Arbeitsmarkt auf, sie 
arbeiten weniger Stunden und/oder Jahre, und 
sie werden schlechter bezahlt. Die „schlechte 
Nachricht“ ist, dass diese drei Tatsachen einen 
Schneeballeffekt auf die Erwerbsbiographien 
von Frauen haben. Die „gute Nachricht“ ist, dass 
die Einkommensunterschiede in den letzten zwei 
Jahrzehnten geringer geworden sind, auch wenn 
sich dieser Rückgang in den letzten Jahren ver-
langsamt hat.
Bedeutet das, dass das Rentengefälle mit einer 
ähnlichen Verzögerung auch abnehmen und sich 
das Problem von selbst korrigieren wird? Die Er-
fahrungen in den USA sind enttäuschend. Eine 
vor Kurzem erschienene Studie hat festgestellt, 
dass bei den Renten so gut wie keine Änderungen 
stattgefunden haben, obwohl der Unterschied 
bei den Einkommen von Männern und Frauen 
dramatisch zurückgegangen ist. In Europa wurde 
die Frage bislang nicht gestellt, oder – sofern sie 
gestellt worden ist – noch nicht beantwortet. Es 
liegt eine Anzahl nationaler Studien vor, die sich 
mit spezifischen institutionellen Merkmalen oder 
Reformen befassen, aber ein Gesamtbild, wo Eu-
ropa steht oder in welche Richtung es sich be-
wegt, gibt es im Grunde nicht.
Eine statistische Charakterisierung 
des Rentengefälles zwischen Frauen 
und Männern in Europa 2009 
Die statistische Analyse besteht aus einer Reihe 
strukturierter Fragen:
Wie groß ist der Pension Gap in Europa? Un-
serer Hauptschätzung zufolge immer noch sehr 
groß. Der Durchschnitt in den EU-27-Staaten 
beträgt 39%. Die zwei höchsten Zahlen weisen 
Luxemburg (47%) und Deutschland (44%) auf. 
Am anderen Ende befinden sich Estland mit dem 
geringsten Rentengefälle zwischen Männern und 
Frauen (4%), gefolgt von der Slowakischen Re-
publik (8%). Eine große Anzahl Länder liegt bei 
ungefähr 30%, wobei 17 von 27 Ländern einen 
Gender Gap von 30% oder mehr aufweisen.
Das ist mehr als zweimal so viel wie der Gender 
Pay Gap Indikator (16%). Dennoch gibt es keinen 
einfachen Zusammenhang zwischen den zwei 
Werten, was schon am Beispiel Estlands ersicht-
lich ist: Dieses Land (mit dem niedrigsten Pensi-
on Gap) hat den höchsten Pay Gap. In manchen 
Fällen tragen Renten zu einer Minderung der 
vorhergehenden Ungleichheit bei, in anderen zu 
einer Verschärfung, manchmal als unerwünsch-
ter Nebeneffekt von Merkmalen des Altersver-
sorgungssystems.
Wer bekommt eine Rente? Versorgungsef-
fekte und Unterschiede bei Renten von äl-
teren Menschen. Das Rentengefälle kann auch 
für die gesamte Bevölkerung über 65 berechnet 
werden. In manchen oder möglicherweise allen 
Ländern macht das keinen großen Unterschied, 
da alle älteren Menschen irgendeine Form von 
Altersrente beziehen. Dennoch haben in man-
chen Ländern mehr als ein Drittel der Frauen kei-
ne Altersversorgung, wohingegen es in anderen 
mehr als jede Zehnte ist. Wenn man auch dieje-
nigen berücksichtigt, die überhaupt keine Rente 
beziehen, ist der Effekt auf die sich ergebenden 
Rentengefälle sehr groß, und auch die Reihenfol-
ge der Länder ändert sich dadurch maßgebend.
Ist das Rentengefälle tendenziell steigend 
oder fallend? Eine Kohorten-Analyse. Wer-
den die Unterschiede bei den Renten im Laufe 
der Zeit wie beim Einkommen kleiner? Wenn man 
das Rentengefälle bei den 80+-Jährigen mit 
dem in der Altersgruppe 65-80 auf der Basis der 
EU-SILC-Daten vergleicht, stellt man fest, dass 
der Unterschied zwischen Männern und Frau-
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en in der älteren Gruppe deutlich niedriger ist. 
Dennoch könnte dies durch den ausgleichenden 
Effekt von Witwenrenten bedingt sein. Eine ähnli-
che Herangehensweise mit Daten von SHARE er-
gibt ein uneinheitliches Bild: In manchen Ländern 
sind die Unterscheide bei den Renten jüngerer 
Menschen größer, in anderen ist es umgekehrt. 
Daher liefern die Daten keine endgültige Antwort 
in dieser Frage.
Auswirkungen von Bildung und Erwerbsbio-
graphie. Bildung ist eng mit dem lebenslangen 
Einkommen verbunden. Wenn die Unterschiede 
zwischen Männern und Frauen mit dem Bil-
dungsniveau wachsen (z.B. infolge der „Gläserne 
Decke“), kann man erwarten, dass sie in Zukun" 
höher sein werden, da das Bildungsniveau zu-
kün"iger Rentner bekanntlich steigen wird. Den-
noch ist das Bild, das sich aus den Daten ergibt, 
gemischt. Auch wenn in den EU-27-Staaten ins-
gesamt der Unterschied zwischen Männern und 
Frauen bei höherem Bildungsniveau steigt, gilt 
dies nicht für alle Mitgliedstaten. Das liegt zum 
Teil daran, dass die genderbedingten Unterschie-
de an den Extremen dazu neigen, das Gefälle zu 
erhöhen, die in der Mitte aber weniger.
Wie ist die Verteilung der Renten? Sind 
die Unterschiede zwischen den Renten von 
Männern und Frauen bei höherem Renten-
niveau (proportional) höher? Wie verteilen 
sich Renten um den Durchschnitt? Frauen sind 
unter den Empfängern von niedrigen Renten 
stark überproportional vertreten, und dement-
sprechend entfallen auf jeden armen Mann zwei 
arme Frauen. Wenn man den Gender Gap für je-
des Tertil (d.h. jedes Drittel der Rentenverteilung) 
getrennt ermittelt, gibt es Länder, in denen der 
Unterschied mit dem Einkommen wächst, und 
solche, in denen er abnimmt, was ein Zeichen 
dafür ist, dass sich dieses Merkmal in verschie-
denen Teilen Europas anders auswirkt.
Können wir Trends in der zeitlichen Ent-
wicklung von Unterschieden bei Renten 
erkennen? Beim Vergleich von zwei fünf Jahre 
auseinanderliegenden Zeitpunkten (2010 und 
2005) ergibt sich erneut ein gemischtes Bild. 
Während die Unterschiede im Durchschnitt stei-
gen (um 1,7%), verbergen sich dahinter gegen-
sätzliche Trends – von Verbesserungen in der 
Größenordnung von 4-5% bis zu Verschlechte-
rungen um 4-6%. 
Rentengefälle und unterbrochene Karrie-
ren. In der Vergangenheit haben Frauen weni-
ger Jahre gearbeitet als Männer. Generell sind 
kürzere Karrieren mit größeren Rentengefällen 
verbunden, aber das Verhältnis ist nicht eins zu 
eins. In manchen Fällen stiegen die Gefälle und 
nahmen danach wieder ab. Wenn man nach dem 
„Hauptberuf“ im Laufe des Berufsleben unter-
scheidet, findet man die geringsten Unterschiede 
zwischen Frauen und Männern im öffentlichen 
Sektor (wo sie mitunter auch negativ sind) und 
die größten bei Selbstständigen.
Die Auswirkungen von Mehrpfeilersyste-
men. Altersversorgungssysteme, die auf den 
zweiten Pfeiler basieren, sind in einer Handvoll 
Länder inzwischen etabliert. In Dänemark, den 
Niederlanden und in der Schweiz ist der zweite 
Pfeiler reif genug, um eine Analyse mit Daten 
von SHARE zu ermöglichen. In diesen Ländern 
ist bei den zwei Pfeilern zusammen der Gender 
Gap größer als beim staatlichen Rentensystem 
alleine. In diesen Ländern weist er zweite Pfeiler 
auch sehr signifikante Deckungslücken bei der 
Altersvorsorge auf, da weniger Frauen in eine 
berufliche Altersversicherung eintreten.
Durch Ehestand bedingte Unterschiede: 
Wird Mutterscha. nachteilig behandelt? 
Bei alleinstehenden Frauen ist der Unterschied 
gegenüber Männern geringer, aber dennoch 
groß (17%). Der Gender Gap ist für verheiratete 
Frauen am größten, währen geschiedene Frauen 
irgendwo in der Mitte liegen. Aus den SHARE-
Daten lässt sich ein sehr starker Zusammenhang 
zwischen der Anzahl der Kinder und dem Gender 
Gap feststellen.
Ist die Geschlechterungleichheit größer, 
wenn man Haushalte betrachtet? Intra-
haushaltsverteilung des Pension Gaps. 
Unser wichtigster Gap-Indikator, der Gender 
Pension Gap, ist im Grunde ein Indikator auf 
Makro-Ebene d.h. ein Gesamtindikator, der die 
durchschnittlichen Rentenbezüge von Frauen 
und Männern vergleicht. Wir haben auch die Si-
tuation in den Haushalten selbst betrachtet und 
jede Frau mit ihrem jeweiligen Partner vergli-
chen, um einen Mikro-Indikator zu erstellen, den 
haushaltsbezogenen Gender Pension Gap. Wir 
haben dabei festgestellt, dass die Unterschie-
de beim Renteneinkommen in den Haushalten 
größer sind als in der Gesamtbevölkerung. Der 
Gender Pension Gap innerhalb der Haushalte 
ist höher als der entsprechende Gesamtindi-
kator sowohl in der EU als Ganzes wie auch in 
der großen Mehrheit der Mitgliedstaaten. Der 
Medianwert des Gender Pension Gap innerhalb 
der Haushalte ist um 4 Prozentpunkte höher als 
der entsprechende Gesamtindikator in den EU-
27-Ländern (46% gegenüber 42%) und in fünf 
einzelnen Staaten 20 Prozentpunkte höher. Nur 
in sechs Ländern ist er hingegen niedriger, von 
denen vier osteuropäische Länder sind.
Zusammenfügung der Ergebnisse zu einem 
Gesamtbild: Dekompositionsanalyse und 
bereinigter Gender Gap. Dekompositionsme-
thoden wurden angewandt, um die Faktoren-
analyse mit einem multivariablen Verfahren zu 
ergänzen. Das wichtigste Ergebnis ist, dass die 
Bereinigung der Unterschiede zwischen Frau-
en und Männern bei den durch SILC erhobenen 
Merkmalen (Bildungsabschluss, Alter, Länge der 
beruflichen Tätigkeit, Ehestatus und Gewicht des 
Renteneinkommens aus Pfeiler 3) den Gender 
Pension Gap nur mäßig beeinflusst. In sechs der 
neun Länder, die analysiert wurden, bewegt sich 
der bereinigte Pension Gap zwischen -15% und 
+11% des Ausgangswertes (Großbritannien, Nie-
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derlande, Österreich, Griechenland, Italien und 
Polen). In Deutschland und Frankreich führt die 
Bereinigung zu einer Minderung des Ausgangs-
wertes von ungefähr 30%; in Estland, wo der ur-
sprüngliche Pension Gap sehr niedrig ist (ca. 4%) 
zu einer Zunahme von ungefähr 100%. In den 
meisten Ländern bleibt dennoch ein signifikan-
ter Gender Gap, der mit den unterschiedlichen in 
den Daten enthaltenen Merkmalen von Frauen 
und Männern nicht einfach erklärt werden kann. 
Diese Differenz zu verstehen und anzugehen ist 
eine wichtige Herausforderung für Forschung 
und Politik.
Erkenntnisse aus den Erfahrungen 
verschiedener Länder
Dieser Bericht hatte auch das Ziel, auf der Basis 
vorhandener Verwaltungsdaten Informationen 
über den Gender Gap zu erstellen, die mit denen 
von SILC vergleichbar sind. Experten aus folgen-
den zehn Ländern wurden gefragt, lokale Ver-
waltungsdaten über Renten und Rentengefälle 
zusammenzustellen und zu kommentieren: Est-
land, Polen, Dänemark, Österreich, Niederlande, 
Italien, Griechenland, Großbritannien, Frankre-
ich und Schweden. Dies bedeutete in manchen 
Fällen nur einen geringen Aufwand, war aber in 
den meisten Ländern sehr schwer, in manchen 
unmöglich, und in einem Fall konnten überhaupt 
keine genderspezifischen Informationen erstellt 
werden. Dank einer neuen nationalen Studie über 
den Gender Pension Gap in Deutschland konnten 
wir auch für dieses ursprünglich nicht vorgese-
hene Land lokale Informationen erhalten. 
In den Fällen, in denen die SILC-Daten mit den 
nationalen Quellen (Estland, Italien) vergleichbar 
waren, ist die Übereinstimmung sehr groß; das 
Gleiche gilt für Frankreich und Österreich, wo 
die Übereinstimmung nur für den Hauptindika-
tor möglich war. Auf der anderen Seite war in 
zwei anderen Mehrpfeiler-Systemen (Großbri-
tannien, Niederlanden) der Datenvergleich sehr 
problematisch.
Der Bericht endet mit den Meinung der nation-
alen Experten zu drei Themen: Perspektiven für 
die Zukun", Sichtbarkeit von Genderthemen und 
Daten und die Frage der abgeleiteten Ansprüche. 
Die Experten sind sich weitgehend einig, dass 
mehr getan werden muss, um die Ursachen der 
unterschiedlichen Rentenansprüche von Frauen 
und Männern zu verstehen, und auch darin, dass 
auch in Fällen, in denen das Thema weniger akut 
ist, es keinesfalls vernachlässigt werden darf.
Empfehlungen an die Politik
Es wird befürchtet, dass Menschen, die in ihrem 
täglichen Leben wirtscha"liche Unabhängigkeit 
gewohnt sind, mit Erreichen des Pensionsalters 
mit Systemen konfrontiert werden, die auf der 
Annahme beruhen, dass Abhängigkeit der „nor-
male“ Zustand ist. Was im Arbeitsmarkt erreicht 
worden ist, kann in der Rente umgekehrt werden.
Die beunruhigende Frage ist, dass wir uns nur 
langsam eine Meinung bilden, ob diese Befürch-
tung berechtigt ist oder nicht. Die statistische 
Analyse hat gezeigt, dass der Gender Gap bei 
Renten um ein Vielfaches größer ist als bei Löh-
nen. Eine besonders beunruhigende Frage ist die 
der Unsichtbarkeit des Problems. Der Bericht 
hat in vielen Ländern große Unterschiede zwis-
chen den Geschlechtern festgestellt, aber auch 
die überwältigende Komplexität des Problems. 
Die Hoffnung, dass die Verbesserungen bei der 
Lohngleichstellung sich notwendigerweise auf 
die Renten übertragen, ist unbegründet.
Wenn ein neues Anliegen auf dem politischen 
Radar erscheint, durchläu" die Erkenntnis drei 
Phasen: Wahrnehmung, Verbesserung und zu-
letzt Vorbeugung. Im Falle der Ungleichstellung 
bei Renten von Frauen und Männern befinden 
wir uns noch in der ersten Phase – Sichtbarkeit 
des Themas. In dieser Phase kann die EU eine 
wichtige Rolle spielen, indem sie das Thema 
auf die politische Agenda setzt und nationale 
Initiativen anregt, die zu einer Verbesserung und 
möglicherweise Vorbeugung führen können.
Daher ist die wichtigste Einsicht für die Politik: 
Wachsamkeit.
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1.1 The big picture: The need for 
gender vigilance for older people 
In the coming of age (1970), French existential-
ist and feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir 
highlighted the pervasive gendered attitude of 
society towards old age :
 “What we have here is a man’s problem… When 
there is speculation upon the subject (of old age) 
it is considered primarily in terms of men. In the 
first place because it is they who express them-
selves in laws, books and legends” (de Beauvoir, 
1996, p. 89).
At the same time though, things need not neces-
sarily be so.  At a later point in the same book, 
she notes a potential for redressing gender im-
balances:
“For women, the last age is a liberation (…) Now 
at last they can look a!er themselves (…)” (p. 
489).
A generation later, policy is called upon to diag-
nose and correct the problems created by hu-
man institutions and social processes in order 
to realise the potential for independence that de 
Beauvoir sensed existed.
Today as ever, in many countries older women 
are insufficiently represented in decision-mak-
ing fora, which may reinforce a pre-existing 
tendency to take their interests for granted. At 
the same time, their well-being and independ-
ence are the outcome of complex forces. Older 
women and men are affected by long-term so-
cial changes such as population ageing; they are 
the first group affected by the cumulative impact 
of twenty years of gradual institutional reform 
in pension systems and elsewhere; in the current 
economic and fiscal crisis, they are frequently 
one of the groups most immediately affected by 
fiscal retrenchment. At the same time, today’s 
older women witnessed in their working life-
times  major transformations in the role played 
by women in economy and society, a transfor-
mation that took place at different speeds across 
Europe and is yet to be completed.
Pension systems have changed considerably 
over the last 20 years, and are still changing. 
Older women have lived and worked in one sys-
tem and collect their pensions under a complete-
ly different system. In this way, older women’s 
pensions carry simultaneously echoes of past 
disadvantage and premonitions of future vulner-
ability.
All of the above implies that it is important to 
know the roots and the extent of gender differ-
ences in pensions across Europe. What is more: 
in such a complex field affected by numerous 
influences, it is important to track changes over 
time. If this can be achieved problems might be 
individuated early on, and solutions sought and 
implemented in a timely fashion.
This report suggests that policy would benefit 
if a Gender gap in pensions indicator (GGP 
henceforth) was available on a regular basis. A 
GGP indicator can be easily produced across the 
European Union on an annual basis; it can inves-
tigate the nature of the pension gap and the di-
mensions of the problem for different population 
groups  and different institutional settings; it can 
point the way to further work.
1.2. Motivation of the indicator. 
Why monitor gender differences in 
pensions?
Pensions are the single most important com-
ponent of older people’s income, and especially 
for women (Samek et al. 2011). In contrast to 
other components such as returns from savings, 
or income from property or rent, which are held 
to accrue to the whole household and cannot be 
separately attributed to a particular member of 
the household, pensions are paid to individuals. 
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They thus are an important determinant of the 
economic independence of their beneficiaries 
– that is to say, of the capacity of an individual 
to lead an independent life and to take decisions 
for him/herself. In this way, differences in pen-
sion rights between women and men form the 
foundation of gender differences between the 
sexes in later life as regards capacity for indi-
vidual choice.
The distinction between economic welfare and 
economic independence is important to make 
and to understand. Economic welfare, in other 
words: the access to resources and well-being 
potential depends on a wider set of income 
sources accruing to the household. In order to 
study welfare, all income entering a household 
is aggregated and then apportioned among 
the members of that household. Given that a 
household  is by definition a social unit where 
consumption is shared among its members, total 
household income is necessarily assumed to be 
distributed equally among its members. In social 
surveys designed to gauge economic well-being, 
this means that income of men and women liv-
ing as a couple is equal by construction.1 In this 
way, indicators relying on household income - 
such as poverty rates - assume the poverty sta-
tus of men and women living as couples to be 
identical. Therefore, differences in poverty rates 
by gender essentially rely on comparisons be-
tween single members of a household: people 
who never married, divorced individuals, widows 
and widowers.2 Due to this fact, gender differ-
ences in access to resources are almost certainly 
severely underestimated in any measure that 
relies on household income. Should our interest 
lie in the related, but conceptually independent, 
issue of relative independence between genders, 
this shortcoming is even more distorting.
For people of working age this train of thought 
leads naturally to focusing on differences in 
employment remuneration – most frequently 
encapsulated by some measure of pay or earn-
ings gap3. In the case of women this is essen-
tially an achievement gap, reflecting the fact 
that women, in many contexts, may be under-
paid, undervalued, overworked across the board; 
their responsibility for unpaid work in the family 
leads to underrepresentation in the paid labour 
market. Once people have le" the labour market, 
the analogue of pay or earnings is the source 
of income that replaces them: i.e. pensions. An 
1  See, for example, Joint Reports on pensions 2003, 2006.
2 Strictly speaking, they rely on comparisons between 
households that have an odd number of members.
3  As Goldin (1993) summarises, “when economists 
speak of the ‘gender gap’ these days, they usually are 
referring to systematic differences in the outcomes 
that men and women achieve in the labour market. 
These differences are seen in the percentages of men 
and women in the labour force, the types of occupa-
tions they choose, and their relative incomes or hourly 
wages”. Thus one can distinguish distinct notions of 
participation gap, pay gap and earnings gap.
indicator of a pension gap would in this way be 
a natural complement, almost a sequel to an in-
terest in gender pay gaps. Given that many pen-
sions systems are designed to reflect employ-
ment experience, one would expect that pensions 
would reflect the cumulated disadvantages of a 
lifetime’s involvement in a gender-biased labour 
market. The further back in time one goes (and 
hence the older the pension recipient), the more 
marked one would expect this effect to be.
However, pensions do not simply reflect labour 
market experiences in a neutral way. Systems 
which rely on the accumulation and investment 
of contributions may actually exacerbate in-
equalities in the employment remuneration. In 
contrast, as the largest single item of social pro-
tection expenditure, they are in principle called 
to correct to some degree what are perceived 
as imbalances (or even injustices) of the labour 
market. For this reason, the possibilities of inter-
vening to correct gender imbalances are much 
greater in pensions than in earnings. An inter-
vention requires information. A focus on gender 
differences in pensions would be an invaluable 
addition to the policy toolbox.
The two arguments of complementing pay gen-
der gaps and of orienting public pension deci-
sions are sufficient to justify a policy interest in 
pension differences between men and women. 
Why should that interest entail following those 
differences in regular time intervals? In other 
words, why should the EU consider adding a new 
pension gap indicator to the set of structural in-
dicators it publishes every year?
An answer to the question of “why an annual 
indicator?” can be sought in the complexity of 
influences combined to produce the pension gen-
der effects that will be appear every year. These 
influences can interact mutually or with other 
features and can frequently lead to unforeseen 
outcomes, possibly even to some ‘collateral 
damage’. The structure of pensions –and hence 
their gender-based differences- are influenced 
by three sets of factors:
First, very long-term structural changes operat-
ing like tectonic changes to transform the pen-
sion environment. Ageing and demography 
are the most well-known of these differences: 
older women are increasing in number; their 
state of health is changing while in comparison 
with earlier periods they have fewer children and 
social ties are looser. The anticipation of future 
acceleration of ageing may already have effects 
on today’s older people, as policy adjusts with a 
lead.4 Similar in effect to ageing are echo ef-
4  See for example Report on Pension Adequacy in 
the EU 2010-2050: 
EC (2012), Pension Adequacy in the European Union 
2010-2050. Report prepared jointly by the Directorate-
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
of the European Commission and the Social Protection 
Committee. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/Blob
Servlet?docId=7805&langId=en; 
22
fects of past employment patterns. Today’s 
pensions may reflect yesterday’s employment 
picture. Women’s emancipation in the labour 
market has proceeded at different speeds in 
different parts of Europe, Northern Europe be-
ing typically more advanced than the South. 
Older cohorts may be more influenced by past 
gender imbalances; younger pensioners may al-
ready show the effects of non-traditional work-
ing patterns (part-time, on-call work etc.). Finally, 
social norms have been altering aspects that 
affect pensions: the incidence of divorce, the 
prevalence of widowhood, the probability of co-
habitation between generations.
Second, today’s pensions are intimately affected 
by the extent and spread of institutional change, 
chiefly pension reform5. Pension reforms have 
been an on-going project in Europe since the 
1990s in the context of preparing for the long-
term fiscal challenge of ageing, in some cases 
transforming the pension picture completely. 
However, in most cases reforms influence the 
flow of people entering retirement, and hence 
take a long time to percolate through all pen-
sioners. Insofar as one can generalise, today’s 
pensioners are affected by the general climate 
of retrenchment. Given that in many countries 
pension reforms have been under way for al-
most two decades, they are o"en covered by 
transitional arrangements designed to smooth 
the effects of those reforms and addressed to-
wards those relatively close to retirement.6 This 
phenomenon is known as ‘grandfathering’.7 As 
time passes and new systems mature, there will 
be an increasing number of individuals whose 
pensions will be marked by the characteristics of 
the new systems and who will be vulnerable to 
new kinds of pension risks, probably linked to the 
operation of the new system. Indeed, in those 
countries where reforms took place first (e.g. the 
COM (2010a) 2020 final, 3.3.2010. “Europe 2020: A 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”, 
European Commission; 
COM (2010b) 365 final, ‘GREEN PAPER: Towards ad-
equate, sustainable and safe European pension sys-
tems’, European Commission. Available at :
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0365:EN:NOT .
5  On pension reform, see the excellent book Barr 
and Diamond 2010.
6  ‘A crucial distinction in pension reforms is between 
(a) the state when a reform is fully operational – ‘ma-
ture’, in the sense that all have participated in the new 
system both as contributors and as beneficiaries and 
(b) the transition towards full operation, when changes 
are gradually introduced and special dispensations are 
made for people who have contributed most of their 
lives to the old system. These dispensations may of-
ten be more generous than the new situation; they are 
also frequently ad hoc, in the sense that they do not 
strictly follow from the logic of either the old or the 
new system. This feature could imply that ‘grandfa-
thered’ populations may be more at risk, as they are 
more dependent on the good will of system operators.
7  One wonders to what extent grandmothers receive 
this solicitude...
Netherlands, UK, and Switzerland), those effects 
should already be visible.
The two most salient directions that are likely to 
impact on gender issues are: first, the switch in 
emphasis from first-pillar pensions (provided 
by the State and usually based on societal soli-
darity and pay-as-you-go financing) to second-
pillar pensions (i.e. provided collectively based 
on occupational solidarity, and prefunded. This 
switch is frequently (though not always) com-
bined with a change in the type of pensions from 
defined-benefit final salary schemes to defined 
contribution schemes (Mackenzie 2010; Oren-
stein, 2009). The overall effect tends to be an 
increase in individual responsibility in the form of 
a closer link between contributions and benefits8 
and hence an overall reduction in solidarity of 
the system. Indeed, in the US this trend has been 
termed ‘the privatisation of risk’, in the sense that 
it transfers risk from the employer and worker 
to the beneficiary. The second reform direction 
is the emphasis on working longer, which is a 
key message in ‘Europe 2020’. Though the long-
term rationale of this direction is unassailable, 
there may be side effects in the short and me-
dium terms that must be guarded against: dis-
incentives for early retirement may lead to lower 
incomes for those with little choice (e.g. due to 
inability to work later owing to caring responsi-
bilities). While the focus is (rightly) on the sup-
ply of labour (i.e. on incentives to work longer) 
employers’ prejudice as well as discrimination in 
training may keep demand for older workers low.9
The final set of factors shaping pensions are 
short-term pressures, usually connected with 
the current economic crisis. These pressures 
vary from country to country but could lead to 
important (and hard to predict) swings in gen-
der effects. For example, greater insecurity in 
the labour market increases the relative attrac-
tiveness of state provided Defined Benefit (DB) 
pensions; in this way fiscal problems are exacer-
bated. Second pillar pensions have been hit hard 
by the collapse of asset values.10 The sovereign 
debt crisis led to numerous cuts of pension in 
payment, making a mockery of the notion of 
‘Defined Benefits’ and fuelling pensioner insecu-
rity.11 In a cash shortage, first-pillar pensions are 
8  There is a tendency for the social component to be 
separated out or to be means-tested.
9  The conclusion in Munnel and Sass’s 2008 study 
of the US is that demand for labour factors on behalf 
of employers were responsible for the fall in average 
retirement ages in the 1970s.
10  An interesting observation was that some thri"y 
Northern pension funds had been investing in high yield 
Southern sovereign debt (used to finance, inter alia, un-
sustainable pensions). They were hit hard once those 
debts, in the Greek case, lost 75% of their value – a case 
where pension implicit debt was de facto mutualised?
11  Inadequate indexation erodes the real value of 
pensions outside the euro area.  Greece post-memo-
randum is a case in point, where pensions in payment 
were cut 7 times in two years (Tinios, 2012).
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one of the largest items of expenditure under 
the direct control of the public sector; pension-
ers as a group are vulnerable to public finance 
pressures.
Recapitulating, older women pensioners may be, 
as a group, ‘stuck in the middle’. They have lived 
and worked under one system – which frequent-
ly implicitly presupposed a ‘Male Breadwinner 
Model’ but they will in many cases receive ben-
efits under another. Where their entitlements 
are transitional (‘grandfathered’), they depend 
on government assurances given at the time of 
the original reform, the urgency of which many 
years later may be forgotten. They are, thus, not 
protected by the internal operational logic of 
the system, whether new or old. Women may be 
more at risk than men: Their rights on social in-
surance are o"en ‘derived rights’ (survivors’ pen-
sions, married people’s supplements); in those 
systems where a second-pillar is taking hold, 
women are more likely to rely on state systems, 
or to be more affected by gaps in contributions 
and broken careers; finally, in many countries 
they persist in the role of carers (for children or 
aged parents) even as unpaid work is receiving 
less recognition.
Women in particular may be vulnerable due to 
four factors:
Echoes of past problems – women may have 
fewer pension contributions. This may be due to 
broken careers, low pay, segregation, past dis-
crimination, informal work.
Anticipations of future problems. Tighter link-
ing to contributions, though desirable in itself, 
may exacerbate current disadvantages faced by 
women. Types of work such as part time may 
lead to lower rights in future; multi-pillar sys-
tems could compound disadvantages by intro-
ducing effects magnifying inequalities.
Problems where institutional change may lag be-
hind social change, For example, social insurance 
systems were originally built around the notion 
of a single provider in the family; as systems 
stress increasingly individual rights, this creates 
problems in the case of divorce or widowhood.
Women may in practice be more vulnerable to 
crisis-induced changes. If women are worse off 
to begin with, they may be more vulnerable to a 
sudden deterioration, pushing them, for example, 
into poverty. Despite protestations to the contra-
ry, ‘male breadwinners’ or ‘heads of households’ 
may implicitly be given priority in crisis respons-
es (e.g. if early retirement schemes are pursued 
where women have lower retirement ages, they 
may result in more women exiting the labour 
market).
 
Current pensions received will, thus, at any one 
time reflect both long-term factors operating 
slowly, as well as other influences due to the 
conjuncture. Some effects may be policy driven, 
while others may be due to individual choice. 
The types of policy which will affect pensions 
of women and men may be systemic features 
but also decisions taken in a shorter time frame, 
sometimes in contexts not directly related to pen-
sions, such as macroeconomic or public finance 
policies. In this type of situation it is important 
that policy makers be made aware of gender ef-
fects so that the source of the imbalance can be 
identified and –if possible – corrected.
Given that the EU has rightly taken a lead to 
guide responses to ageing populations and to 
gender balance, it is appropriate that it devote 
attention to possible side effects of one area of 
activity impinging on another. A decisive step in 
that direction would be to produce and analyse 
a gender gap indicator for pensions on a regular 
basis.
1.3. EU context: The sustainability-
adequacy policy conundrum 
There has been concern that demographic 
changes necessitate major readjustments to 
pension systems for at least 30 years (e.g. OECD 
1981, 1988). Emphasis up to the 1990s was put 
on the need to safeguard sustainability of the 
pension systems. When the EU became formal-
ly involved (as a result of the Gothenburg and 
Stockholm summits in 2001),12 it brought into 
the limelight the idea of adequacy, which can be 
understood as the extent to which pension sys-
tems fulfil their social policy functions. The two 
concepts should be complementary and insepa-
rable, in the sense that they form a trade-off: 
sustainability can always be satisfied by sacrific-
ing adequacy and vice versa. The task for policy 
is to seek changes that perform as well as pos-
sible in both dimensions.
Adequacy in the field of pensions means two dif-
ferent things: first, avoidance of low income and 
poverty at old age, which it shares with social 
inclusion policy. Second, ensuring smoothing of 
income at different stages in the life cycle; retire-
ment from employment should not lead to sharp 
falls in financial well-being. Those two objectives 
are, to some extent, antithetical. Indeed, ‘Bev-
eridge–type’ social protection systems (based 
on citizenship rights) traditionally have given 
emphasis to the first objective. ‘Bismarck-type’ 
continental systems organised around social 
insurance use income smoothing as their start-
ing point.13 However, though the two systems’ 
origins differed, as they pursued the same social 
objectives, in practice they evolved in converging 
directions, with the result that it is now possible 
to speak of a ‘European Social Model’. This mod-
12  Commission of the European Communities, 2001 
Commission Communication Supporting national strat-
egies for safe and sustainable pensions through an in-
tegrated approach, (COM 2001) 362.
13  On types of pension systems see Barr and Dia-
mond (2010). Esping Andersen (1994) is the most in-
fluential categorisation of social protection systems. 
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el has common objectives which can, perhaps, 
be pursued by different instruments. Indeed, this 
recognition is the essence of the Open Method 
of Coordination, applied in the field of pensions 
since 2001.14
The dimension of gender enters through this 
twofold framework. Private pensions in general 
allow for women’s greater longevity by spreading 
resources over a longer time span, hence leading 
to lower pensions for the same contribution his-
tory. Social policy in Europe never allowed this 
type of discrimination in public pensions – even 
where a sum has to be spread over unequal ex-
pected lifetimes, no distinction was to be made 
between men and women; this was done by en-
forcing the use of unisex tables. Unisex tables, 
by applying a common annuity factor between 
women who tend to live longer and men, implic-
itly ensure solidarity in favour of women. A re-
cent judgment of the European Court (The 2011 
Test-Achats judgment), extended the principle of 
non-discrimination to all private insurance. Thus, 
the argument of greater female longevity was 
not allowed into the discussion - which was al-
ways placed squarely within the area of social 
policy. As a result, European discussion of equity 
issues in pensions sidesteps the fact that women 
live longer;15 unisex actuarial factors are used in 
all new systems, as is common in private sys-
tems out of Europe
Given the practice of lower retirement ages for 
women, it was clear that much of the sustain-
ability adjustment had a gender dimension: 
women’s retirement ages and labour force par-
ticipation were envisaged as adjusting the most. 
At the same time, pension reforms frequently 
did away with some gender-specific aspects of 
pension systems which were originally justified 
as compensating women for non-pension obsta-
cles; features such as lower retirement ages for 
all women were replaced by targeted reductions 
such as compensation for care periods or for 
child bearing. Similarly, features of new systems 
could interact with existing gender disadvantag-
es to produce new kinds of inequities, even as 
provisions that perpetuated disadvantage were 
gradually done away with16. Finally, many of the 
principles running through reforms could, as side 
14  There have been three Joint Reports on Pensions 
in 2003, 2006 and 2009. E.g. Joint Report on Pensions, 
2009, “Progress and key challenges in the delivery of 
adequate and sustainable pension in Europe”,  Euro-
pean Economy, Occasional papers 71, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/oc-
casional_paper/2010/op71_en.htm 
15  Such a viewpoint would come naturally if pen-
sions were seen in the context of saving as a kind of 
asset accumulation. The social policy view could also 
be justified on more philosophical grounds in terms of 
certain differentiations in treatment (e.g. based on a 
statistical observation of longevity) being inadmissible 
a priori. 
16  Such are provisions encouraging exit of women 
from the labour market with few years of contribu-
tions, hence leading to permanently low pensions.
effects, lead to lower entitlements for women: 
closer linking of contributions to entitlements 
cannot avoid penalising periods out of the labour 
force, unless some mitigation is designed. These 
looming threats can be well illustrated by work 
profiling hypothetical career structures and com-
puting (‘synthetic’) replacement rates for people 
who fit those profiles; the Indicators Subgroup 
of the SPC has produced such results,17 as has 
the OECD. The work of the ISG is a clear warn-
ing sign that, should behaviour regarding years 
of contributions remain unchanged, many new 
equity issues affecting gender could appear in 
future years.
The Europe 2020 strategy18 is giving a clear 
signal that pension reforms and working longer 
will have pride of place in the overall attempt to-
wards ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’. 
In this context, though, policy formation is fac-
ing a conundrum, which is especially sharp in the 
field of gender equality.
The conundrum EU policy is facing is illustrated 
by two key documents both published in 2012. 
The 2012 Ageing Report19 notes that the re-
forms of the last few years have resulted in the 
outlook for sustainability being much improved 
in comparison with the 2009 Report. The 2012 
Adequacy Report20 is more circumspect, noting 
that “analysis of the change in replacement rates 
… demonstrates that greater sustainability ...has 
been achieved through reductions in future ad-
equacy” (p.9).21 The same report goes on to say 
that “an important part of the adequacy chal-
lenge is gender specific”. In other words, pension 
reforms could, if people’s behaviour does not 
change, pose threats to gender equity amongst 
the older population. Avoiding this is a key chal-
lenge for the EU.
Much of the Adequacy Report discusses this 
challenge. It examines statistical indications of 
today’s situation and assesses the knowledge 
gaps to be filled by future work. Indeed, it may 
17  Indicators Subgroup of the SPC 2009, Updates 
of current and prospective theoretical pension replace-
ment rates, 2006-2046
18  CEC, EUROPE 2020, A strategy for smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive growth COM(2010) 2020 final. 
The website of Europe 2020 contains annual growth 
surveys, country-specific recommendations and staff 
working documents http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/
index_en.htm 
19  EPC, 2012,  The 2012 Ageing Report: Econom-
ic and budgetary projections for the 27 EU Member 
States (2010-2060), European Economy 2|2012
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eu-
ropean_economy/ageing_report/index_en.htm 
20  Report on Pension Adequacy in the EU 2010-
2050: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=78
05&langId=en
21  The Ageing Report makes clear that the largest 
contribution to expenditure restraint comes through 
falls of the ‘benefit ratio’, i.e. the size of the average 
pension relative to the average wage. If the pension 
bill is contained by more people working longer, the fall 
in the benefit ratio may not necessarily lead to lower 
average pensions.
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be said that the Adequacy Report, through a dif-
ferent route and from a different starting point, 
has come to the same conclusion of this report: 
defining a gender pension gap indicator must be 
the next step for the EU.
1.4. A Gender gap in pensions indi-
cator: statistical description, data 
and definitions 
A good indicator tracking gender imbalances in 
the field of pension should:22
Be easily understood;
Be computed on an annual basis;
Be available and comparable across Member 
States;
Complement existing structural indicators used 
by the EU, particularly those on the risk of pov-
erty but also on gender earnings gaps.
Given the above, the only realistic source for data 
is the EU Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions - EU SILC23. This is a questionnaire-
based survey that draws on a random sample 
covering the entire population and is conducted 
annually across all 27 EU Member States. Con-
siderable effort is made to standardise answer 
categories to make them internationally compa-
rable. The latest available data is based on the 
survey conducted in 2010; given that the ques-
tions refer to the previous year, the situation re-
flected in the data is that pertaining to 2009. 
The same survey is used to construct other EU 
structural indicators, most notably those con-
nected with social inclusion and the risk of pov-
erty; its properties, advantages and disadvan-
tages are well understood.
EU-SILC asks households detailed questions 
about the income sources of all their members, 
whether from employment, from property or so-
cial transfers.24 Social transfers are defined in 
such a way as to include under the same head-
ing both first-pillar (state pensions) and second-
pillar (occupational pensions). The two pillars 
cannot be distinguished (reflecting a judgment 
that at least in some systems the demarcation 
between the two may rely on fine distinctions), a 
matter of some importance in the current inves-
tigation given the gender difference in participa-
tion in second pillar pensions. In contrast, indi-
vidually negotiated pension packages (the third 
pillar) are separately indicated. Another feature 
22  Atkinson et al (2002) was the report that led to 
the adoption of structural indicators by the EU. They 
deal extensively with the characteristics of a good in-
dicator.
23  Appendix 1 provides more information on EU-
SILC and the definition of variables contained.
24  Social transfers are defined as transfer payments 
that meet one of two criteria: Coverage is compulsory 
and / or it is based on the principle of social solidarity 
(i.e. eligibility is collectively decided and is not decided, 
as in life insurance, on individual risks).
of EU-SILC that is problematic is that (in most 
countries) survivors’ pensions paid to individuals 
older than 65 are classified as ‘old age protec-
tion’ and not separately identified.25 In situations 
such as this, where there are problems of com-
parability between countries, the sum of three 
variables (in this case ‘pensions’) may be more 
reliable and meaningful than each of its com-
ponents taken separately. These two issues, the 
inability to distinguish survivors’ pensions and 
second-pillar pensions, may be thought of as 
‘blind spots’ of EU-SILC in the context of pension 
gender gap analysis.
 EU-SILC is a survey of the overall population ir-
respective of age; moreover, it probes especially 
in the areas linked to economic and financial 
well-being – i.e. ‘income and living conditions’. 
For an older population there exist other ques-
tions and areas of enquiry that acquire greater 
importance such as health care or social rela-
tions. In order to delve in greater detail in partic-
ular issues or to investigate issues related to the 
EU-SILC ‘blind spots’, it is possible to draw data 
from another survey of European countries. This 
is the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe (SHARE), an interdisciplinary survey 
covering economic well-being, health - physical 
and  mental -  health care and social relations.26 
Though it is of the nature of sample surveys that 
they cannot be comparable in absolute terms, 
being able to draw on an alternative survey can 
be thought of as a check on key findings in EU-
SILC. Equally, the existence of more detailed 
information on items such as employment his-
tories can shed light on causal mechanisms that 
25  In the latter case the separate SILC variable on 
survivors’ pensions (PY110G) refers to payments to in-
dividuals under 65 years of age.
26  The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe (SHARE) is a multidisciplinary and cross-
national panel database of micro data on health, 
socio-economic status and family networks. The first 
wave (2004/5) of SHARE covers more than 30,000 in-
dividuals aged over 50 in 12 European countries, while 
in the second wave (2006/7) further data have been 
collected in Czech Republic, Poland as well as Ireland. 
SHARELIFE is the third wave of data collection for 
SHARE, which focuses on people’s life histories. Almost 
30,000 men and women across 13 European countries 
took part in this round of the survey. 
The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded 
by the European Commission through the 5th Frame-
work Programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in 
the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 
6th Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-
CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5- CT-2005-028857, 
and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through 
the 7th Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, N° 
211909, SHARE-LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 
261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National In-
stitute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, 
P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 AG025169, Y1-
AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and 
the German Ministry of Education and Research as 
well as from various national sources is gratefully ac-
knowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list 
of funding institutions).
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may be obscured in EU-SILC. There have been 
to date two waves of SHARE (2004 and 2007), 
while the third wave (SHARELIFE) was devoted 
to extracting retrospective information for re-
spondents’ entire life from childhood. SHARE will 
be used thus to supplement the picture derived 
from EU-SILC.
When we focus on older populations, we must 
be aware of a further blind spot – the exclusion 
of people in old people’s homes, hospitals and 
other collective habitations –i.e. not living in nor-
mal households, which is the sampling unit in 
all surveys.27 More women than men live in this 
type of accommodation (as they tend to survive 
their partners), while it is also more common in 
the West rather than the East (Bettio and Ve-
rashchagina 2011: figures 3 and 5 especially). 
Moreover, one may expect that the sampling rate 
of those parts of the elderly population who are 
infirm, bedridden or have fading cognitive abili-
ties may well be lower.28 This is an argument for 
supplementing SILC data with other surveys de-
signed for older population; statistical exercises 
that examine the older part of the population 
separately (e.g. Section 2.4) may also be used as 
further checks.
A matter of some importance is the decision of 
whom to include in the definition of ‘pensioner’. 
This has two aspects:
First, individuals themselves decide when to 
leave work and enter retirement. They decide 
whether to apply for a pension as a conscious de-
cision, depending on a number of features both 
of their personal circumstances, the parameters 
and regulations of the pensions system in place 
(e.g. minimum retirement ages) and ultimately 
whether they prefer to be pensioners rather than 
to carry on working.29 The transition from work 
to retirement is a very complex process; the is-
sues feeding  into it are largely distinct from the 
issues that motivated our search for a pension 
gap indicator. In order to abstract from these 
complications and to produce an indicator that 
retains the feature of simplicity and ease of 
understanding, we investigate a homogeneous 
group of people defined in such a way that the 
transition from work to retirement is complete 
and for whom pensions have settled into the re-
lationship with other income that will character-
ise the rest of their retirement. To achieve this, 
the simplest course is to focus on the group of 
people over 65. In all Member States, the tran-
27  The exclusion of this group of the population is a 
further source of difference with administrative data.
28  SHARE uses devices such as proxy interviews to 
get around this problem. 
29  All these considerations mean that one cannot 
take as random who is a pensioner and who is working. 
In technical terms the sample is endogenous and any 
simple observations derived from it can be seriously 
misleading. Correcting for this endogeneity is techni-
cally possible, but would greatly complicate the inter-
pretation of the indicator, whilst also making it con-
tingent on the model used to correct for endogeneity. 
sition to retirement is all but complete;30 in con-
sequence the relationship between pensions and 
other incomes, as well as, most crucially, gender 
differences in pensions have settled into their 
long-term values.31
During the course of the analysis age will be sub-
divided further (into ‘the younger old’ 65-80, and 
‘the oldest old’ 80+). Indicative results will also 
be presented for the younger pensioners (50-65) 
– section 2.4. In this way the effect of excluding 
large numbers of pensioners in those Member 
States with a lower retirement age can become 
apparent. Furthermore, the use of 65 as a cut-
off age also serves to underline the concern for 
the elderly; that age is the conventional statis-
tical start for ‘old age’ and will thus allow the 
indicator to be harmonized with a large number 
of other works in the area.
The second important issue is also related to 
the definition of who is a pensioner. The defini-
tion used here is ‘any person who appears to be 
drawing a pension as his/her own income’, i.e. 
individuals with non-zero values of pensions.32 
This excludes from the definition individuals who 
are not themselves beneficiaries of pensions, 
and whose pension income is zero.33 The defini-
tion of who is a pensioner is thus sensitive to the 
definition of what is a pension. Should Eurostat 
define in SILC small social benefits given to older 
people in, say, recognition of child-rearing, as 
‘pensions’, then our definition will include individ-
uals collecting them as ‘pensioners’;34 they will 
unavoidably enter the calculation on an equal 
standing with age pensioners whose pension 
30  Even if the latter is not 100%, the ‘missing per-
cent’ is very small and is unlikely to pose a major prob-
lem in calculations.
31  Objections to this choice may be raised by point-
ing that, in member states with a retirement age of 60, 
the cut-off of 65 will have a different meaning than the 
same age in a context where retirement takes place 
at 67. Nevertheless, the tendency of retirement to 
converge means that the alternative of having a cut-
off varying according to the general retirement age in 
each member state would add the cost of complication 
and add very uncertain benefits.
32  In France women who draw only a survivor’s pen-
sion as a derived right are excluded from the definition 
of ‘pensioner’ used in official statistics.
33  This definition may include people whose main 
source of income is not pensions (e.g. income from 
property), as well as others who may still be working 
and simultaneously drawing a pension – though the 
latter group is small for the over-65s.
34 An example of a small pension-like benefit that 
could be included in the pensions total is the “forfait 
d’éducation” (informally ‘mama rent’) which is given in 
Luxembourg  to any retired man and woman and which 
depends on the number of children the woman/ man 
has cared for. Inclusion of such payments to older peo-
ple as pensions may  bias the analysis:  if they are given 
to people with no other pension income, they would 
boost the pension gap while at the same time reduc-
ing the coverage gap. Clearing up such ambiguities and 
definitions on a country-by-country basis is an impor-
tant part of the ‘housekeeping’ exercises that need to be 
undertaken when a statistical indicator comes into use.
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is substituting at least for minimum resources. 
However, this problem may be seen as an exam-
ple of the statistical tools improving as they are 
being used.35 
Thus, a pension system would be defined by two 
indicators: one measuring gender pension dif-
ferences for those with a pension, and another 
indicator depending on system coverage – i.e. 
the gender differences for those people over 65 
who have no pension. It should be noted that 
the exact parallel exists in the case of people of 
working age: gender analysts are used to talk-
ing separately of a participation gap (i.e. how 
many more women rather than men are working 
for pay) and an earnings (or pay) gap; the latter 
looks at earnings of those who are working and 
compares women and men.
The pension gender gap is computed in the sim-
plest possible way: it is one minus women’s av-
erage pension income divided by men’s average 
pension income. To express it as a percentage 
this ratio is multiplied by 100. It is the percent-
age by which women’s average pension is lower 
than men’s, or by how much women are lagging 
behind men.
In parallel with earnings gaps we define two 
linked indicators:
35  The alternative of intervening in the SILC defini-
tions and deciding how low a ‘real’ pension can be is 
clearly unworkable. This is an example of the kind of 
adjustment that has to be undertaken at the member 
state level.
1. The coverage gap – i.e. the extent to which 
more women than men do not have access to 
the pension system (in the sense of having zero 
pension income – as that in defined in EU-SILC).
2. The pensioners’ pension gap – or else ‘the’ 
pension gap, i.e. the difference in pensions ex-
cluding zero pensions. This measures how the 
pension system treats ‘its beneficiaries’, i.e. ex-
cludes those that have no active links with pen-
sions.36 It is  what administrative data, by con-
struction, would invariably cover. This definition 
would match statistics produced by pension pro-
viders, or any other kind of administrative data 
(e.g. compilations of pension fund data).
If we include in the pension average calculation 
individuals with zero income, we come to an in-
dicator which combines the two above – which 
can be called the ‘elderly pension gap’, in the 
sense that it includes in one indicator all people 
over 65.
Thus the analysis will use the pensioners’ pen-
sion gap and the coverage gap as its ‘headline 
indicators’; it will nonetheless investigate how 
these two indicators combine in the elderly gap.
36  We must recall that, due to using SILC data, ‘pen-
sions’ in this case includes survivors’ pensions of indi-
viduals who were not themselves active contributors to 
the pension system. 
DEFINITION OF THE GENDER GAP IN PENSION
We define the Gender Gap in Pensions as:
 (1)
In order to define both women’s and men’s average pension income we 
take into account the following assumptions:
We consider the subsamples of individuals in the EU-SILC UDB p-file 
who are 65 years old at the beginning of the income reference period 
(t-1) of the EU-SILC wave concerned (t).
Among the subsample of individuals in 1), we select those who have AT 
LEAST one positive income value of old age benefits (PY100G), regular 
private pensions (PY080G) or survivors’ benefits (PY110G).
By denoting “ F” the women in subsample 2), and “ M” the men  in sub-
sample 2) formula (1) can be  re-written as follows:
 (1 b)
Where  is the personal cross-sectional weight of female i (SILC variable 
PB040), and  is the corresponding weight for male j.
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1.5 The question of administrative 
data
In the Gender gap in pensions analysis at the Eu-
ropean level a key consideration is that of com-
parability – i.e. the numbers produced have to 
mean the same thing for all Member States. In 
a survey coordinated on a European level such 
as EU-SILC, this is ensured by asking a common 
set of questions and ensuring the definitions and 
concepts can encompass the unavoidable het-
erogeneity in collecting data from 27 different 
jurisdictions. Comparability is not something that 
emerges automatically; it continuously improves 
with the use of data and with attempts to re-
solve the problems of interpretation that arise. 
Thus the very fact of highlighting a particular 
area of data by using it will bring forth improve-
ments in the survey information. 
Yet it is inescapable that in each Member State 
taken separately, the natural place to look for 
pension gender differences is from those organi-
sations that disburse pensions -that is to use ad-
ministrative data. For someone accustomed to 
the picture emerging from administrative data, 
the EU-SILC data may well be unfamiliar. It is 
thus important at the outset to understand why 
and in what directions administrative data may 
differ from survey information:
Administrative data would of necessity cover 
only those receiving a pension – i.e. what we call 
the pensioners’ pension gender gap, rather than 
the elderly pension gap.
National pension systems are frequently frag-
mented – there may be a multitude of pension 
providers and data may exist separately by oc-
cupational category. In multi-pillar systems, sta-
tistics for the pension total (equivalent to SILC 
which aggregates first and second-pillar pen-
sions) may be hard to get. The typical case is 
that statistics for the first-pillar is far easier to 
obtain than that from the second37; the latter 
is very hard to aggregate to derive a national 
picture. Sometimes data for parts of the system 
(e.g. civil servants) is only available separately 
and is not aggregated.
Administrative data is frequently produced sepa-
rately by types of pension: old age, disability, sur-
vivors may produce separate statistics.38 Pension 
providers naturally count pension cheques and 
37  In multi-pillar systems, each pillar would pro-
duce statistics taken its coverage as given. What we 
will have is a series of ‘pensioner’s gap’ for each sys-
tem taken on its own; it would be impossible to re-
produce the national coverage statistics for each pillar 
separately. It would be especially hard to aggregate 
coverage statistics in fragmented systems (especially 
multi-pillar ones) if the statistics are not produced by 
some central body. This is an important point to do 
with the governance of a multi-pillar system: system 
adequacy can only be judged if some statistics are 
produced centrally.
38  Some national systems do not produce statistics 
by gender, hence obscuring the question totally.
not people. In the (not fanciful) case of someone 
entitled to two pensions, it is fully possible that 
that person will be counted twice; indeed it is not 
unknown in pension statistics for the pensioner 
population to exceed the demographic popula-
tion. This is sometimes corrected by conducting 
a periodic (in France every 4 years, also in Ger-
many) survey of activities of pension providers.
Administrative data would normally be available 
for all pensioners. These would include those un-
der 65 which are excluded in our definition. Addi-
tionally differences will be due to those excluded 
from the EU SILC sampling frame – those living 
in old age homes, those not responding due to 
cognitive problems, those residing abroad; on 
the other side will be beneficiaries of foreign 
systems, as well as cases of fraud.
In order to highlight and illustrate the crucial dis-
tinction between administrative and survey data, 
this report will return to the issue once the Eu-
ropean picture derived from EU-SILC survey data 
is complete. This will be contrasted to a mosaic 
of available administrative data from eleven Eu-
ropean countries.
1.6 What do we know? Literature 
review
A. Gender gaps as a difference in life chances
The gender gap is one of the better-known as-
pects of empirical gender analysis. According to 
the Oxford Dictionary, gender gap (noun) is ‘the 
discrepancy in opportunities, status, attitudes, 
etc., between men and women’. The gender gap 
is essentially an achievement gap. It focuses 
on inequalities in outcomes between men and 
women and usually places emphasis on wage 
rates, earnings or other economic magnitudes.39
In more general terms gender gaps could be 
taken to mean systematic differences in access 
to resource or in life chances between men and 
women. In this way the concept could be gener-
alized in order to be applied to an older popula-
tion, whose attachment to the labour market lies 
in the past but still may be a dominant influence 
on their economic well-being. Though this is a 
natural extension, the sequel of pay gaps, it has 
received far less attention, both theoretical and 
empirical, than gender gaps more directly linked 
to the labour market. Does old age maintain ine-
qualities, does it cumulate them and make them 
worse, or does it give a chance to redistribute 
and level life chances? (O’Rand and Henrietta, 
1999).
39  The persistence of an achievement gap is some-
what paradoxical, in economic theory terms: a prefer-
ential demand for lower paid women should drive their 
wages up until they reach the level of men’s. Chichilni-
sky (2008) explains this seeming paradox by bringing 
in the economics of the family and the necessity for 
women to engage in housework.
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B. From the labour market to cumulative 
gender gaps
As Goldin (1993) says, ‘when economists speak 
of the ‘gender gap’ these days, they usually are 
referring to systematic differences in the out-
comes that men and women achieve in the la-
bour market. These differences are seen in the 
percentages of men and women in the labour 
force, the types of occupations they choose, and 
their relative incomes or hourly wages’. The gen-
der gap in labour force participation has been 
eroding steadily over the past century, at a dif-
ferent pace in different countries and periods. 
The gender gap that attracts the most attention, 
however, is in earnings: here, again, progress has 
been recorded in leaps (no steady trend).40
As for the reasons accounting for the difference 
in earnings between men and women, econo-
mists tend to come up with observable and non-
observable factors: education and shorter work 
experience belong to the first category, while 
discrimination41 to the latter (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 
2000; Smith and Ward, 1989)42. Finally, the un-
balanced gender distribution in occupations (of-
ten called occupational segregation43) supplies a 
further explanation for women’s lower earnings, 
in the sense that they tend to populate lower 
paid jobs (Bettio, 2008).
Evidence based on historical cross-section data 
provides a snapshot of different economic out-
comes in the labour market at a specific point 
in time, as well as over time. In a more dynamic 
analysis focusing on the life-pattern of the same 
individuals, the consecutive instances of differ-
ent outcomes add up to an effect of cumula-
tive disadvantage for women. Such a dynamic 
approach can follow one of the two following 
paths: either to utilize panel data comprising the 
same individuals over time, or to assess the per-
formance of different cohorts in the same phase 
in their life (say, reproductive ages 25 to 45 
years). The latter approach has been used in or-
der to evaluate the ‘maternity burden’ on wages 
throughout the life-course (Crittenden, 2001, for 
the USA; and Davies & Joshi, 1999; Davies, Joshi 
and Peronaci, 2000, for the UK).
It is thus a well-documented fact that 
women earn lower wages and tend to ac-
40  For recent comparative studies on the gender 
wage gap in the USA and in Europe see  Arumpalam et 
al. (2005), Blau and Kahn (2003); Brainerd (2000), OECD 
(2008), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008), Pastore and Ver-
ashchagina (2011),  Plantenga and Remery (2007).
41 Discrimination refers to persistent wage dispari-
ties between clearly identifiable labour segments with 
equal productivity potential (Cain 1986 cited in Bettio, 
2008: 171).
42  There is an interesting debate on whether the 
narrowing of the gender gap remained stalled since 
the late 1990s (see Goldin, 2006) and more recently 
Bettio (2008) and ITUC (2012).
43  This is the horizontal segregation. From the point 
of view of lower wages producing the gender wage 
gap, more important perhaps is the hierarchical or ver-
tical segregation. 
cumulate less income from (paid) work in 
the course of their working lives. There is 
a consensus that women’s role as the main 
carers at home largely explains their lower 
earnings record. This is the result of three 
main facts present in all national contexts, 
but to varying degrees: first, women with 
family obligations participate less in the 
labour market; second, even when they par-
ticipate, they tend to work for fewer hours 
and/or years; and third, they receive lower 
wages.
The combination of these three stylised facts 
produces a snowball effect on women’s earn-
ings and careers. Although it appears that the 
cumulative disadvantage over the life-course 
has been eased in the late 1990s for women 
with high education characteristics, there is no 
recorded improvement for women with lower 
educational attainment (Davies and Joshi, 1999; 
Davies, Joshi and Peronaci, 2000).
International comparisons reveal substantial 
differences in the cumulative earnings gap in 
Europe: Germany and the UK show similar in-
tensity in the gap, while France and Sweden 
display lower cumulative earnings gap (Davies 
and Joshi, 1994). In a more recent attempt to 
capture international variations, Sigle-Rushton 
and Waldfogel, 2007 utilised data from the Lux-
embourg Incomes Study in order to compare the 
cumulative earnings gap in eight countries.
C. From the labour market to the Gender 
gap in pensions
In a special issue on gender and ageing Folbre 
et al (2005) note that ‘(a)lthough women are a 
majority among the elderly, little is heard about 
gender differences in economic resources’ (p. 
3). Fi"een years earlier, Hurd 1990 noted that 
‘(t)he great majority of research on retirement 
has been the retirement of single men and hus-
bands’.
Even and Macpherson 2004, surveying how the 
US Gender Gap in Pensions evolved over the last 
30 years, note the key question that still needs 
to be answered. During that time there were 
dramatic improvements in gender balance in 
the labour market. Yet the gender gap in median 
incomes of the older population ‘[…] has been 
stagnant over the past fi"y years. The female-
male ratio of median incomes in the population 
aged 65 and over was 0.61 in 1950 and fell only 
slightly to 0.59 in 1994’ (p. 182). They explain 
this stagnation through countervailing institu-
tional change in pension policy (extending the 
critical period for pension calculation) as well 
as selection effects,44 mainly to do with second-
pillar pensions.
44  Though the number of women covered increased, 
those covered for pension had fewer contributions, 
probably due to lower labour market attachment. This 
feature allows them to be more optimistic about the 
future.
30
Tracking the Gender Gap in Pensions outside 
the United States has not been attempted in a 
systematic manner in a cross-section of coun-
tries, in the way that has happened to pay and 
earnings gaps (as in, say, Olivetti and Petrongolo 
2008). There have been a number of studies of 
individual countries, usually focusing on specific 
aspects of the pension system.45 This literature, 
surveyed recently by Jefferson 2009, can gener-
ate a number of hypotheses that can be used to 
explain observed differences in gender balance 
in pensions: (a) gaps in coverage in systems 
linking entitlements to contribution: coverage 
gaps in public systems are closing as new gaps 
are opening up in occupational systems (p. 120), 
thus highlighting the importance of following the 
total entitlement for all pillars, (b) benefit cal-
culation policies – (the role of derived benefits 
such as survivors’ pension, the period of earn-
ings taken into account, the existence of pension 
minima, unisex annuity tables for the second 
pillar),46 (c) methods of financing and part-shi"-
ing to funding, affecting the distribution of risk.
Most of the literature on gender and pensions is 
oriented towards the effects of reforms, usually 
focusing on a specific reform or systemic fea-
ture. In this way the effects of combination of 
factors, or indeed of the overall logic of systems 
may be missed. This piecemeal approach begs 
the question of benchmarking the starting 
point: what is the current level of gender imbal-
ance, how does it differ between countries and 
why?
In this respect the US was privileged in having 
access to good quality survey data which allowed 
researchers to pose relevant questions and to 
ponder on causes of observed phenomena. Chief 
amongst these was the Health Retirement Study 
(HRS), a panel survey of people 50+ which has 
been in operation since 199247, and has provided 
material for a large number of studies. The Sur-
vey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) was consciously modeled on the HRS. 
SHARE-based studies have begun appearing, in 
some cases attempting to explain income gaps 
in older age.48 Many of the papers in Börsch-
Supan et al., 2011 approach the issue of broken 
45  For instance, Frericks et al 2006 compare Den-
mark with the Netherlands, Balchin and Finch 2006 
look at the UK, Zajicek et al.,  2007 Poland; Steinhaler 
1996, Bonnet et al 2006.
46  Given women’ greater longevity, using a unisex 
actuarial table to convert a lump sum to an annuity, as 
is done in prefunded pensions, may be interpreted as 
advantageous to women. However, the same issue can 
be approached as an issue of gender balance in the 
labour market – as the US Supreme Court examined 
it – in which case unisex tables are a logical conclusion. 
In all EU second-pillar systems to date unisex tables 
have been applied.
47  See www.hrs.org 
48  Lyberaki et al. 2012 try to explain gaps in ‘per-
sonal income’ – an amalgam of labour and pension 
income; for people over 65 this is equivalent to a pen-
sion gap.
careers (Lyberaki et al., 2011; Tinios et al., 2011). 
However, when one looks at European-level data 
one has to get along with studies relying on local 
administrative data or impressionistic analyses 
of selective cases (see for example Frericks et 
al., 2009).
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Addendum: The Gender Gap in Pensions and the 
Gender Pay Gap
Gender gaps –from the Pay to the Pension gap 
through the life cycle
THE WORLD OF WORK











B. Hours Worked per year → HOURS GAP
Part- time
Contract or seasonal 
work
Self employment
C Years Worked→ BROKEN CAREERS




(periods credited for social in-
surance and other compensat-
ing measures could correct)
THE WORLD OF RETIREMENT
CHOICE of AGE OF RETIREMENT PENSION SYSTEM
D. PENSION → PENSION  GAP
Depending on system 
- zero pensions.
Age pensions may be 




Social insurance pensions 








second-pillar pensions may 
compound lifetime gap.
YEARS IN RETIREMENT/ LIFE EXPECTANCY
Survivors pensions




Gender differences begin cumulating from the 
World of Work. The aspect most studied concerns 
pay per hour. Differences may be ‘explained’ by 
different endowments of measurable variables 
(e.g. years of education), by concentration of the 
gender’s in different occupation, or simply due to 
‘discrimination’. The genders also differ accord-
ing to the hours worked per year, where there 
is different concentration in part-time work, sea-
sonal work or fixed-term employment but also 
differing propensities towards self-employment. 
Annual earnings cumulate through the career 
and are mediated by years worked. Gender 
differences may be due to late entry (education, 
military service) but are most commonly due to 
exit from the labour force due to child bearing 
and unemployment spells. The three aspects are 
multiplied to form total career resources – which 
could lead to a lifetime earnings gap.
The world of retirement is predicated upon the 
world of work and builds on life time earnings. 
These operate through the rules of the pension 
system but are also, in most cases, affected 
by the individual deciding on an age of retire-
ment. The resulting pension is typically affected 
by both features: early pensions typically lead to 
lower pensions; the pension system may correct 
imbalances in lifetime resources, or it may am-
plify them (e.g. where a prefunded element may 
reward saving). We may distinguish three types 
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of situations:
Some social insurance systems may lead to 
some individuals with an insufficient insurance 
record not being entitled to a pension at all (zero 
pensions). In those situations the other partner 
(in the case of married couples) may receive a 
married person’s pension supplement.
Some systems may have an age pension which 
is received by all citizens on reaching a particu-
lar age. In some countries there may be a wide-
spread use of pension-like emoluments (e.g. for 
having raised children in Luxembourg).
Social insurance pensions are designed to reflect 
lifetime contributions and can be expected to 
mirror the career earnings gaps. Nevertheless, a 
number of devices (credit for childbearing peri-
ods, minimum pensions) can temper this. Second 
pillar pensions can be expected to have a closer 
link to contributions, as well as to reflect possible 
differences in rates of return.
We must note that looking at pensions neglects 
benefits in kind, housing benefits, transport 
subsides and eligibility of other social inclusion 
benefits such as minimum income guarantees. 
(Though in most systems minimum income 
guarantees to older people are incorporated into 
the pension system).
Finally, symmetrically with the world of work, 
one may also calculate the total lifetime pen-
sion receipts. Gender differences in years col-
lecting pensions are due to earlier retirement as 
well as longer life expectancy for women, but 
may also depend on pension indexation practic-
es. The status of survivors’ pensions is unclear: 
they constitute a legal right earned by the (male) 
contributor, yet are collected by the surviving 
(usually female) partner. 
Of the various gender gaps the one most exten-
sively studied is the gap in hourly pay. Many of 
the issues that arise in the treatment of pen-
sion gaps are also met in the case of pay gaps: 
the practice of distinguishing a pay gap and a 
participation gap is the most obvious case. Other 
issues, such as the treatment of small pension-
like emoluments, can also find analogies in the 
case of pay gaps; these can serve as guides in 
defining the gap and/or refining the data that en-
ters the pension gap calculation. 
The Gender Gap in Pensions and the Gender 
Pay Gap: how far can the analogy between the 
Gender Pay Gap and Gender Pension Gap – our 
headline indicator – be carried out? In answer to 
this question we comment below on a catalogue 
of similarities and dissimilarities, strengths and 
limitations of the two indicators with respect to 
criteria such as concept, data quality, sectoral 
and population coverage, relation to labour mar-
ket inequality, and analytical fecundity.
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The Gender Gap in Pensions (GGP)
(proposed headline indicator)
The Gender Pay Gap (GPG)






The (unadjusted) Gender Pension Gap measures the difference be-
tween average gross yearly pension income of male pensioners and 
that of female pensioners as a percentage of the average gross yearly 
pension income of male pensioners. Only pensioners aged 65 years 
and older are considered.
The (unadjusted) Gender Pay Gap measures the difference be-
tween average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees 
and those of female paid employees as a percentage of av-
erage gross hourly earnings of male paid employees. All age 
groups are included.  
Comment: There is a perfect analogy in the (formal) concept. In both cases the income (earnings) for men is the standard of reference, 












The source we propose for the headline GGP is the EU-SILC survey, 
cross sectional, which is deemed the best data base at EU level for 
coverage, quality and comparability of income data.
The source of the official GPG is the Structure of Earnings sur-
vey, which is deemed to be the best source for quality and 
comparability of (hourly) wage data.
Comment: The source currently used for the GPG and that proposed here for the GGP are first choice: there is, of course, scope for 








Comment: The difference in time unit is less consequential that it may appear at first sight. The GPG refers to hourly wages in order to 
rule out differences in hours worked by sex, which are considerable and reflect personal choice, at least to an extent. All pensions are 
paid on an annual basis, so differences in hours are irrelevant. Thus year is the appropriate unit. Pensioners who also work, however, do 










The reference population is individuals aged 65 years and older receiv-
ing a pension. Two major exclusions concern:
non pension beneficiaries
pension beneficiaries younger than 65
The reference population is all waged employees. Two major 
exclusions concern:
non-working people
the self employed 
Comment: Both indicators need to be flanked by measures of coverage in order to give indications about the importance of non-
beneficiaries. In the GPG case, the coverage indicator is the employment rate, a well-known and widely used statistics. Its analogue for 
the GGP we propose is the Coverage Gap (Section 2.2, step 2).
 Coverage indicators separate out beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries. People thus excluded take no part in the calculation of gaps. 
For example, the self-employed are excluded from calculation of the GPG in the same way that younger pensioners are excluded from 
calculation of the GGP. Both exclusions are motivated by difficulties of measurement and of ensuring simplicity of the indicator. In both 
cases, moreover, the distortion that such exclusions imply is likely to vary across countries.  
A key issue relates to the definition of a pension. Certain small social protection benefits collected by old age people may be classified 










 No sectoral or firm based exclusion. 
(in administrative data there may be differences in coverage where 
the system is fragmented and/or in multi-pillar systems)
 
Data are available from the reference source for all sec-
tors excluding agriculture forestry and fisheries, activities of 
households as employers extra territorial organizations and, 
depending on the country, public administration, defense and 
compulsory social security. Moreover enterprises with 9 or less 
employees are excluded.
Comment: because of the uneven distribution of male and female employees across sectors and size of firms, the GPG may be distort-
ed by the above restrictions, the most consequential exclusions concerning public administration and very small firms. The GGP does not 
suffer from such a limitation. However, the main reference source –EU-SILC – does not allow for a breakdown by past sector of activity of 


















The GGP reflects cumulative differences in earnings measured at the 
end of one’s working life, i.e. it is influenced by differences in hours 
and days worked in one’s lifetime as well as in hourly earnings. 
The GPG captures differences in hourly earnings at one point in time 
Comment: Again, the apparently large dissimilarity between the two indicators must be qualified. Although the GPG takes a snapshot, 
hourly wages of each employee at a given point in time reflect cumulative qualifications (e.g. past education and training choices) as 
well as cumulative labour market experience. As a result, we may expect both indicators to move slowly over time insofar as they both 












The GGP is an ‘unadjusted’ indicator because it compares individuals 
with different characteristics and past work history. 
The GPG is an ‘unadjusted’ indicator because it compares indi-
viduals with different characteristics and past work history. 
Comment: both indicators are ‘unadjusted’ and can be ‘adjusted’ using the same econometric techniques (see section 2.13, step 13). 
At present, however, there is a difference in the extent of adjustment that can be carried out using the respective data sources. The SES 
source is much richer in details about past work history of waged employees than the EU-SILC survey source is about past work history 
of pensioners. This can be partly made up for by using the SHARE source for analysis of ‘adjusted ‘GGPs.
Given the very long time needed for changes to operate across lifetimes, the operational and policy significance of decomposition is 
different in the case of pensions. 
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In approaching a relatively little known and un-
der-researched field such as gender differences 
in pension entitlements in Europe, it is important 
to proceed by simple steps – each of which de-
signed to clarify a particular issue. In this way 
and by cross-checking our information and the 
robustness of our assumptions to the extent 
possible, we aim to derive a small number of 
‘stylised facts’ about the characteristics and dis-
tribution of gender gaps in Europe. These styl-
ised facts should form the backbone of a policy 
approach oriented towards getting to grips with 
this phenomenon. At the initial, benchmarking 
stage, description of the facts across the EU27 
has priority; explanation and analysis of causal 
factors will come a"erwards, quite o"en as re-
actions to the stimuli created by benchmarking 
findings.
Our analysis thus proceeds in a series of eleven 
structured steps, each addressed to a particu-
lar issue. Each step may also be thought of as 
an ‘exercise’, designed to illustrate a particular 
issue or hypothesis. In this way, a step may ap-
proach an issue in more than one way or may 
supplement EU-SILC information with SHARE.
2.1 STEP 1. The headline indicator – 
How wide is the gross pension gap 
in Europe?
It is important to have an idea of ‘the’ Gender 
Gap in Pensions (GGP) in Europe – what may be 
thought as the ‘headline indicator’ or our ‘best 
estimate’ for gender differences in pensions. 
This, for the record, consists of the difference in 
average pensions between men and women over 
65, calculated in terms of pensions gross of tax 
(i.e. before tax is deducted).49 The results appear 
in Figure 1.1.
49  The consequences of adopting alternative defini-
tions are explored in other exercises.
CHAPTER 2. 
A Statistical Characteri-
sation of the Gender Gap 
in Pensions in Europe in 
2009 in Thirteen Steps
Figure 1.1. Gender Gap in Pensions (%), 
pensioners aged over 65 years
Source: own estimation from EU-SILC 2010. Note: Estimates 
for CY and IE are based on 2009 data.
Taking the EU as a whole (weighted by popula-
tion), men on average receive higher pensions 
than women by 39%. The widest difference is 
observed in Luxembourg (47%), followed by Ger-
many (44%), and the UK (43%), which are clearly 
above the average. The Netherlands (40%), Cy-
prus (39%) and France (39%) are around the 
average. A large group of countries have values 
exceeding a third (Greece, Ireland, Austria, Spain, 
Portugal, Bulgaria), while five other countries are 
around 30% (Sweden, Romania, Italy Norway, 
and Slovenia). It is thus true to say that in 17 of 
the 27 Member States women receive pension 
on average 30% or more lower than men’s. The 
EU average, being calculated on a population-
weighted basis, is heavily affected by the gap 
of the larger countries – Germany, the UK and 
France most notably.
Finland (25%), Poland (23%) and 19% (Denmark) 
fare better, but still show sizeable differences in 
Gender Gaps in Pension. The lowest values are 
found for Eastern European countries: Lithu-
ania (15%), Hungary (15%), the Czech Republic 
(13%), Latvia (9%) and the Slovak Republic (8%). 
Estonia is ‘top of the class’ – as women’s pen-
sions are lower by only 4%.
Figure 1.2 shows the same picture normalized 
so that each country’ Gender Gap in Pensions is 
shown relatively to the EU average. The range 
between the lowest (Estonia) and the high-
est (Luxembourg) is by a factor more than 10. 
Though the breaks (especially at the top end) 
are not sharp, the existence of the four clusters 
35
of countries detailed above is confirmed, with 
the most common range among countries be-
ing some 20 percentage points (pp henceforth) 
below the EU average.
Figure 1.2. Indexed Gender Gap in Pensions 
(EU-27=100), pensioners aged 65+
Source: own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
The Gender Gap in Pensions, as here defined, es-
sentially compares each person to the society’s 
average. If those women married to richer men 
have not worked or have few years of contribu-
tions, the distance between the two pensions will 
be such as to magnify the gender gap (i.e. the 
gender gap will be affected by extreme values). 
To see how far this has affected the data, Figure 
1.3 presents an alternative definition of pen-
sion gaps, based not on average pensions, but 
on the pension of the middle individual (i.e. the 
median), a measure that is not affected by outli-
ers, whether high or low.50 In order to facilitate 
comparisons with the headline (average), the 
sequence of countries is preserved for all sub-
sequent analysis– i.e. all presentation are sorted 
by order of the headline gap: our headline esti-
mation of Figure 1.1 appears sufficiently robust.
Figure 1.3. Gender Gap in Median Pension: 
pensioners aged 65+
Source: own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
The classification of countries into four groups 
is largely preserved: in 15 countries the Gender 
Gap in Pensions based on mean pension income 
does not deviate by more than 3 percentage 
points from Figure 1.1. For example in Germany 
it only deviates by one point, in Italy by 2, in the 
Netherlands by 3. Nevertheless, there are some 
notable divergences: In Sweden, France, Ireland, 
Portugal, UK, Belgium, Cyprus, Iceland and Den-
mark the estimation of the Gender Gap in Pen-
sions based on median pension income is more 
than 5pp lower, ranging from 5.5pp in France to 
over 14pp in Denmark.51
50  This is, however, achieved at the cost of further dis-
tancing the indicator from published administrative data.
51  A large divergence of mean and median is a sign 
Women’s pensions are lower than men’s pen-
sions. At the same time, pensions across Europe 
may be higher or lower in absolute terms, but 
also relative to productive capacity of a country 
depending on how rich or poor a country as a 
whole is, or how its social protection system is 
structured. Though these matters are not part of 
the remit of this study, it is important to have 
an idea of what absolute magnitudes are to be 
found behind our relative figures. Table 1.1 sets 
out the values (in Euros) of average monthly 
pensions by gender. It also notes what percent-
age this is of GDP per capita and of the at-risk-
of-poverty threshold for a household with one 
member for each country. The variation (as ex-
pected) is enormous, with the lowest pension for 
women being in BG (113 EUR/month) and the 
highest in LU (2000 EUR); the latter interestingly 
corresponds to one of the lowest shares of pen-
sions as % of per capita GDP. Only in Bulgaria 
and Cyprus are mean women’s pensions insuf-
ficient to take a single person out of poverty.
of lack of symmetry in the distribution of individual 
values. Such would be caused by a concentration of 
larger or smaller pensions.
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Table 1.1. Mean Value of Annual Pension In-
come of Men and Women aged 65+
Persons aged 
65+
Mean monthly value of 
Pension Income (EUR)1
Mean Annual Pension 
Income as (%) of 2009 
GDP per capita2
Mean Annual Pension 
Income as (%) of 2010 
National Poverty line3
Country Men Women Men Women Men Women
LU 3751 2004 60 32 232 124
DE 1804 1016 75 42 192 108
UK 1501 858 71 40 175 100
NL 2220 1323 77 46 219 130
CY 1134 692 66 40 134 81
EU-27 1447 886 74 45 196 120
FR 1960 1205 81 50 195 120
GR 1037 667 61 39 173 112
IE 1869 1216 62 41 188 122
AT 2319 1535 84 56 225 149
ES 1168 774 61 41 179 119
PT 766 512 58 39 176 118
BG 169 113 44 30 112 75
SE 1881 1270 72 48 191 129
RO 197 135 43 29 193 133
IT 1565 1082 75 52 196 136
NO 2556 1789 55 38 158 110
BE 1622 1147 62 44 167 118
SI 874 624 60 43 149 106
FI 1738 1305 65 48 163 122
IS 1276 965 56 43 139 105
PL 403 311 60 46 183 141
MT 757 597 64 50 145 114
DK 2070 1681 61 50 161 131
LT 304 257 46 39 150 127
HU 340 289 45 38 160 136
CZ 430 375 38 33 122 106
LV 271 246 40 36 119 108
SK 383 353 40 36 125 115
EE 322 308 38 36 113 108
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
1Monthly value= Annual mean total gross pensions divided by 12
2GDP at market prices, source Eurostat
3At risk of poverty level for 1-member household, from EU-
SILC 2010
Do higher pensions coexist with a higher gender 
imbalance? This is what one would expect should 
pension systems attempt to focus on greater 
needs. This question is approached by relating 
a measure of pension generosity (average pen-
sion income of individuals 65+ as a percentage 
of GDP per capita) with the pension gap of Figure 
1.1. The result appears in the form of a scatter 
plot in Figure 1.4. The hypothesis finds some cor-
roboration in the form of a positive relationship; 
however the relationship is weak and leaves 
much dispersion around the trend line (R2=0.3). 
Figure 1.4. Plotting the gender pension gap 
against pension generosity
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
To answer the key question of interest ‘how wide 
is the pension gap in Europe?’ one needs a point 
of comparison. In the case of pensions, the ob-
vious yardstick is the pay gap -i.e. differences 
between men and women in paid labour. Pen-
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sions replace employment income at an older 
age when that ceases, so the comparison is a 
natural one to make. At the same time, the pay 
(or earnings) gap is one of the most extensively 
studied aspects of gender differentiation. It must 
be noted, of course, that today’s pay gap and 
today’s pension gaps refer to different groups of 
people. If evaluated today, pension gaps average 
income sources of a different generation than 
the one currently earning income in the labour 
market.52 Nevertheless, in order to grasp orders 
of magnitude, it is important to see how the two 
gaps compare. Figure 1.5 juxtaposes the head-
line pension gap with the latest available Gender 
Pay Gap, produced on an annual basis by Euro-
stat, based on the Earnings Database.
Figure 1.5. Gender Gap in Pensions vis-à-vis 
Gender Pay Gap (in unadjusted form)
Source: own calculations EU SILC; Gender Pay Gap from Euro-
stat’s Earnings Database for 2010 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_
market/earnings/database
Notes: (a) The unadjusted Gender Pay Gap (GPG) represents 
the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male 
paid employees and of female paid employees as a percent-
age of average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees. 
The population consists of all paid employees in enterprises 
with 10 employees or more in NACE Rev. 2 aggregate B to S 
(excluding O).
(b) Greece, Estonia, 2008. No information exists for Iceland. 
A first observation is that pension gaps are con-
siderably wider than pay gaps: the average pay 
gap (16%) is less than half the average pension 
gap (39%). This is expected given that women 
work fewer hours per year as well as receiving 
less on a per hour basis. Thus a given pay gap is 
magnified into a wider annual earnings gap. Of 
course, women also work fewer years, and hence 
we would expect an even wider career earnings 
gap. It is the latter earnings concept that most 
pensions systems base the pension calculation 
on. A large difference is thus only to be expected. 
Second, there appears no simple relationship 
linking the two indicators. The country with the 
52  In the study of ageing, a key distinction is be-
tween age groups and cohorts (i.e. people born at a 
particular time period). Today’s 60-year olds (born 
around 1950) may behave differently than the 60 
year-olds of 1990 (who had been born around 1930). 
At any one time, however, the two concepts coincide. 
One should always be careful of making generalisa-
tions based solely on age, as these may be due to a 
cohort effect and hence not hold in the future.
widest pay gap (Estonia) is the one with the low-
est pension gap. This kind of coincidence is quite 
common in Eastern Europe. Pension systems can 
intervene on market outcomes in very meaning-
ful ways. Third, the dispersion in pay gaps ap-
pears to be lower than that for pension gaps. A 
clearer picture of the relationship between pay 
and pension gaps can be derived from the scat-
ter diagram linking the two sets of observations. 
Figure 1.6 plots pension gaps against pay gaps. 
We must remember that the two sets of data 
cannot be linked with a direct causal relation-
ship, as they refer to different people: in particu-
lar a younger cohort working and an older cohort 
drawing pensions. It is partly to underline this 
fact that the pension gap appears as the x-axis 
of Figure 1.6.
Figure 1.6. Gender Gap in Pensions vis-à-vis 
Gender Pay Gap
38
Figure1.7: Gender Gap in Pensions vis-à-vis 
Gender Pay Gap: Fitting two linear trends
Source: Data from Figure 1.5
The scatter confirms the impression that there 
is no simple linear relationship between pension 
and pay gaps across countries; the line of best fit 
is almost flat and explains a tiny part of the vari-
ation (R2=0.016). However, one could tentatively 
discern two separate relationships – as shown in 
Figure 1.7 by splitting the first scatter into two 
panels. Given that the relationship essentially re-
flects (clusters of) characteristics of the pension 
system, as well as historical factors, it is prefer-
able to think of two linear relationships, than a 
single U-shaped non-linear one.
 The first panel shows an inverse relationship 
with pay – i.e. a low pension gap despite a high 
pay gap. This group of countries is comprised of 
transition countries plus Denmark and refers to 
a pension gap lower than 27%. This effect would 
be created by pension systems including some 
kind of age pension. In the second group of coun-
tries (those with a pension gap above 27%, and 
clustered around the EU average), there can be 
seen a kind of positive relationship between pay 
gaps and pension gaps, such as would be pro-
duced by pension systems which reproduce the 
labour market situation (e.g. if they are based 
on social insurance principles). If a relationship 
exists, it is interesting that it would be relatively 
steep – i.e. pension systems tend to magnify pay 
gaps. Poland and possibly Finland could be clas-
sified in either group.
Data derived from the Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) are the basis for the 
bulk of our analysis. When one looks for ‘the’ 
Gender Gap in Pensions, EU-SILC would be the 
natural place to look. However, it is important 
that this information is cross-checked against 
other data sources; it is also significant to be 
able to supplement the information which exists 
in EU-SILC for particular questions with other 
sources of data which might go into some ques-
tions at greater depth or might approach a par-
ticular question from a slightly different angle. 
Data derived from SHARE (the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe) will be used in 
a number of occasions to supplement the picture 
emerging from EU-SILC. It is thus important at 
this stage to compare the two sources and to be 
aware of their key differences, in order to dis-
count answers derived later on in the analysis. 
Figure 1.8 compares SHARE wave 2 data from 
the data derived from Figure 1.1 (what has been 
called the ‘headline Gender Gap in Pensions’) for 
the same countries. Switzerland is included in 
SHARE but not in EU-SILC.
Figure 1.8. Gender Gap in Pensions: Evi-
dence from SHARE vis-à-vis EU-SILC
Source: Own estimation from SHARE (Survey on Health, Age-
ing & Retirement in Europe), wave 2 (2006/7) and EU-SILC 
2010
The first thing to notice is that the ranking of 
countries is comparable. Germany (followed by 
France) has the widest gap, the Czech Repub-
lic and Denmark among the narrowest. Gender 
Gap in Pensions estimated based on SHARE data 
tend to be lower (with the notable exceptions of 
Italy and Poland). This could be due to a different 
definition of income (SHARE reported figures are 
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net of tax – see Figure 7.1 for the equivalents 
in EU-SILC); it may also be due to the inclusion 
of alternative or supplementary pension sources, 
as a result of a more detailed pension question-
naire. Some of the differences could also be due 
to a different reference period (SHARE 2006/7, 
EU-SILC 3 years later). However it may be, the 
differences between SHARE and EU-SILC are not 
such as to preclude SHARE as a supplemental 
source of information. In order not to confuse 
matters with alternative estimates for the same 
concept, an attempt is made to present SHARE 
information a"er normalization – i.e. to express 
values relative to a particular yardstick (e.g. as 
an index number) – rather than in absolute mag-
nitudes.
2.2 STEP 2. Introducing Coverage 
effects – the prevalence of zero 
pensions
A key characteristic of a pension system is its 
coverage: whether it leaves some people without 
pensions at all. In pension systems that include 
an age pension, paid to all citizens past a certain 
age, the gender gap in coverage will be zero. In 
contrast, we might see prevalence gaps emerg-
ing in social insurance systems where the right to 
an old age pension is dependent on a minimum 
number of years of contributions. In many such 
systems, in a distinct echo of the Male Breadwin-
ner Model (rather than a married woman who 
has insufficient years of contributions being en-
titled to her own pension), the husband’s pension 
is augmented by a married allowance (e.g. BE, 
GR). In the latter case, we might expect to see 
a large prevalence gap to be associated with a 
larger pension gap and even greater gap if zero 
pensions are included (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1. Gender Gap in Pensions and Gen-
der Gap in Coverage by the pension system
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Figure 2.1 charts the coverage gap on the same 
graph as the headline gap. In most countries, the 
entire population of men and women has active 
links and access to the pension system. All the 
countries in the group with high pension gaps 
come into that category (Luxembourg, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Cyprus and France); pension 
gaps are caused by women receiving low pen-
sions, rather than not having access to pensions 
at all. On the contrary there are countries where 
coverage gaps tell a large part of the story: In 
Malta 34 % more women than men have no pen-
sion; in Spain 27 %. Other countries with a large 
group of women with no pension are Belgium 
(27%), Greece (13%), Ireland (16%) and Austria 
12%, while Romania and Italy have values a lit-
tle over 5%. Negative values (more men than 
women having no pension), in Slovenia and Fin-
land are probably due to a misclassification of 
disability pensions. However, as already noted, 
the coverage statistic is sensitive to the statisti-
cal definition of what is a pension in SILC. Such 
an ‘anomaly’ is responsible for a negative gap 
in Slovenia.53 A similar issue may be created by 
classifying certain small social benefits as ‘pen-
sions’. This could explain the very small coverage 
gap in social insurance-based systems such as 
Luxembourg in contrast with, say, Belgium. This 
kind of issues should first be identified and then 
53  Disability pensions paid to people over 65 should 
be classified as pensions; this appears not to be the 
case for Slovenia and the Czech Republic. If such pen-
sions are reclassified, the ‘anomaly’ disappears. How-
ever in subsequent tables the EU-SILC practice is pre-
served.
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a case can be made for adapting classifications.
2.3 STEP 3. The combined picture: 
the elderly pension gap
 It is possible to combine the story told by the 
pension gap and the coverage gap in a single 
indicator, one based on the entire population. 
It would rather naturally be termed ‘the elderly 
pension gap’ as it includes everyone over 65, 
whether they have a pension or not (i.e. it would 
include individuals with zero pensions who are 
absent from Figure 1.1). Figure 3.1 shows the 
elderly gap for 2010, also noting the value of 
headline gap.
Figure 3.1. The Gender Gap in Pensions 
among the elderly: persons aged 65+
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
The overall gap is somewhat higher at 42% as 
opposed to 39%. However, in those cases where 
there exists a large coverage gap, the elderly 
pension gap is massively affected. Spain is now 
the country with the widest gap which at 52% is 
16 points (and 63%) higher. Malta follows closely 
increasing from 21% to 49%. For those two cas-
es, bringing coverage in the picture alters the im-
pression gleaned by the headline gender gap al-
most completely: the fact that women’s pensions 
are (relatively) high compared to men is due to 
the large number of women being excluded from 
pensions altogether. This may be reinforced by a 
selectivity effect: In systems where few women 
work (or do not drop out), those who are working 
may be disproportionately better paid. This, by 
raising women’s pensions (and earnings) might 
depress observed pension (and earnings) gap for 
that selected sub-group.54 Considerable (though 
not as large) differences are noted in the other 
countries with sizeable coverage gaps: Belgium, 
Ireland, Greece, and Austria.55
The implications of this discrepancy between the 
elderly and the headline gaps depend largely on 
54  This would be the case if women earning above 
average are more likely to participate in employment.
55  The seeming anomaly for Slovenia is due to the 
issue of possible misclassification of disability pen-
sions noted earlier.
the viewpoint adopted. The countries where a 
coverage gap exists have pension systems based 
on the social insurance principle, whereby the 
right to a pension is earned through the payment 
of contribution. The existence of a coverage gap 
simply reflects the fact that many older women 
had limited involvement in paid labour. However, 
it must be pointed out that other countries also 
following the social insurance paradigm (e.g. 
Germany, France) ensure that all of both men 
and women have access to a pension, presum-
ably overcoming the same issue. This observa-
tion has important implications about policy ac-
tions needed to complete the spread of social 
protection across all groups of the population.
2.4 STEP 4. Cohort analysis: Is the 
gap becoming wider or narrower 
over time?
A key point of interest is whether the passage 
of time is leading to the pension gap becoming 
wider or narrower. If over the last generation the 
situation in gender balance improved in employ-
ment, we would expect older individuals to ex-
perience worse gender imbalances than younger 
ones. In the opposite direction, the spread of 
atypical modes of employment such as part-
time working, contract employment or other 
ways of combining work and family life could 
imply, as unwanted side effects, larger number 
of individuals with insufficient (or simply lower) 
social insurance rights. Though the rapid spread 
of such contracts in the 1990s implies that most 
individuals over 65 would have been affected 
only marginally, this effect could be visible for 
some countries.56 A cohort effect would also 
be produced by pension reform. Older cohorts 
faced systems which, by encouraging early exit 
56  In the US a large improvement in pay gaps over 
50 years had no effect on pension gaps (Even and 
Macpherson, 2004).  The reason was differential par-
ticipation of women to second -illar employer-spon-
sored pensions.
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of women, also condemned them to retire with 
fewer contributions (and hence fewer rights). 
Moreover, if (as is o"en the case), some countries 
index pensions inadequately relative to inflation, 
the longer a person has remained in retirement, 
the lower his/her pension relative to the aver-
age. Finally, one should also bear in mind that 
sampling and other technical survey issues are 
likely to be more prevalent for the older group. 
Figure 4.1 is designed to examine this question 
by splitting our sample into a younger group (the 
younger old, aged 65-79) and an older group 
(the oldest old aged over 80).
Figure 4.1. Gender Gap in Pensions: cohort 
analysis, all pensions
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Figure 4.1 plots in histogram form the headline 
gap for the younger group and on the same 
graph, the same indicator for the over-80 group. 
It shows, contrary to most expectations, that the 
younger group faces considerably wider pension 
gaps than their predecessors. The average pen-
sion gap for the younger group is 41%, whereas 
for the older group it is 8 pp lower, at 33%. Dif-
ferences are especially marked in the Nether-
lands, Greece, Ireland, Austria and Italy. In con-
trast in France, Germany and Denmark there is 
no discernible difference, while in some smaller 
countries (Slovenia, Lithuania, Romania, and Es-
tonia) gender gaps widen with age; in pension re-
forms in Eastern countries older individuals were 
less affected than those who retired earlier – the 
effect of grandfathering. The more time passes 
since the reform, the more we will see the effects 
of the new system.57
We must be careful not to conclude from the 
above observation that the Gender Gap in Pen-
sions problem is getting worse. In older age 
groups survivors’ pensions given to widows be-
come very common. This type of pensions would 
depress gender gaps in pension; if men have 
higher pensions, their widows would correspond-
ingly increase the average of pensions drawn by 
57  In the ‘German Study’ reviewed under chapter 3, 
a key finding was a massive difference in gender gaps 
between the Eastern (ex-socialist) and Western parts 
of the country.
women. A simple solution would be to include 
only pensions given to individuals as a result of 
personal entitlement (i.e. old age plus disability) 
and to exclude survivors’ pensions. However, this 
is not possible in EU-SILC data, as survivors’ pen-
sions given to individuals over 65 are reclassified 
as old age protection. To compensate for this, it 
is possible to exclude all widows from the analy-
sis of Figure 4.1, hence leaving in the sample 
only pensions drawn as a personal right (Figure 
4.2 – for non-widowed persons).58
58  This would be strictly not problematic if widow-
hood was completely random. However we know that 
the average difference in age among spouses is not 
random and could hence ‘contaminate’ our results.
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Figure 4.2. Gender Gap in Pensions: cohort 
analysis, all pensions, for non-widowed per-
sons
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Note: In Malta the number of observations, by gender, of per-
sons aged over 80 years is less than 30. 
Figure 4.2 partly confirms our supposition that 
survivors’ pensions act in an equalising fashion. 
Though the average pension gap is still wider for 
the younger group, the distance between them is 
much smaller. There is also probably a selection 
effect: life expectancy is lower among disadvan-
taged groups. In some countries (e.g. Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, France) the younger group 
faces lower pension gaps. However, taking out of 
the sample a differentially large percentage of 
observations between the two cohorts is bound to 
affect the results, most probably in the direction 
of reducing gender gaps among the older group.
Given the policy importance of the question of 
whether the passage of time is making gender 
imbalances better or worse, it is worth pos-
ing the same question to our alternative data 
source, SHARE. That data set allows us to se-
lectively subtract survivors’ pensions from indi-
vidual incomes, leaving only pensions based on 
own rights and could have better coverage for 
the group of the very old. In the case, for an ex-
ample, where a widow has both a pension based 
on her own contributions and a survivor’s pen-
sion from her husband, we can focus only on the 
former. Figure 4.3 examines whether, looking at 
all pensions with the exception of survivors’ pen-
sions, the younger group faces a wider or nar-
rower pension gap. It normalises all gaps rela-
tive to the pension gap based on the pension gap 
of the younger cohort (65-80=100) using total 
pension income (i.e. the equivalent of Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3. SHARE Cohort analysis, all pen-
sions; without survivors’
Source: Own estimation from SHARE (Survey on Health, Age-
ing and Retirement in Europe), wave 2 (2006/7)
Notes: In Sweden, there is no separate answer category for 
survivors’ benefits; hence pension income without survivors’ 
benefits cannot be estimated for Sweden.
The cohort picture emerging is mixed. In some 
countries pensions of younger cohorts exhibit 
greater gaps (Greece, Germany, Austria, Swe-
den); in others they exhibit smaller ones (France, 
Spain). The effect of abstracting from survivors’ 
pensions is larger for the Netherlands, Greece, 
Austria, Poland, Denmark and Czech Republic. In 
contrast in Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Ger-
many the differences are smaller. 
Concluding this inquiry it is fair to say that, al-
though there is some evidence that pensions due 
to individuals’ own contribution history are becom-
ing more balanced by gender, this is a process that 
proceeds at different speeds across Europe, medi-
ated by characteristics of the pension systems. 
The investigation by cohorts was based on the 
comparison between two cohorts, both over 65. 
What of the situation of those approaching retire-
ment age, i.e. those aged between 50 and 65?
It is worth recalling that this group was excluded 
from the analysis on the grounds that any pic-
ture emerging will be dominated by factors re-
lated to the process of exiting the labour market, 
rather than the more structural long-term forces 
that would affect people who rely totally on pen-
sions. Also, given that the general retirement 
ages are at different ages in different countries, 
comparability will be hampered. Nevertheless, 
at this point it is appropriate to see what kind 
of gender gaps are being faced by this group. 
In particular, whether there are any discernible 
trends that would affect the situation in future 
affecting the older group, as this younger age 
group approach age 65. Figure 4.4 looks at the 
combined prevalence and pensioner gap picture, 
in a manner equivalent to Figure 2.1.
43
Figure 4.4. Gender Gap in Pensions and Gen-
der Gap in Coverage by the pension system, 
persons 50-64
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Note: Negative values in Prevalence Gap indicate that more 
men are receiving pension than women. 
The first thing to notice is that there is a far more 
complex picture regarding prevalence.59 In those 
countries where individuals receive an old age 
pension (at 65 or 60 in some cases), women at 
ages below 65 are less likely to receive pensions 
than men. This would appear as negative preva-
lence gaps (e.g. in the Baltic States, Slovenia, Ro-
mania and Austria). It would be counteracted by 
a tendency of those women who are working to 
exit into retirement before men (e.g. due to lower 
minimum retirement ages). As regards pension 
gaps, if some women retire earlier with fewer 
contributions (and hence a lower entitlement to 
pensions), whereas those women who continue 
working will end up with higher pensions, then 
gender gaps calculated for this group would be 
seriously over-estimated relative to the picture 
that will emerge at our headline indicator of over 
65s60. The same would result if lower-paid men 
retire earlier with a lower pension. We see, for 
example in the Netherlands, that the Gender gap 
is wider for this group than for the group 65-80; 
this observation also holds for Greece, Belgium 
and France. In contrast, for most countries pen-
sion gaps are lower: the EU-27 average is 34% 
for those below 65, and 41% for the immediate 
older cohort. Thus, though, it would be tempting 
to conclude that the ‘stored change’ embodied 
in this group who will enter full retirement in the 
next 10 years’ is positive, no such conclusion is 
possible, essentially due to the heterogeneity of 
that population group.
59  The group of pensioners below 50 is not exam-
ined at all, as it would be dominated by disability pen-
sioners and is likely to be even more heterogeneous. 
60  They would exclude those women who will re-
ceive a higher pension later and are not included in the 
under-65 pension data.
2.5 STEP 5. Are the pension gap 
differences due to lower education 
for older women?
The observed differences in pension gaps may 
be due to differences in the average experience 
for men and women. Pensions are linked to life-
time contributions, which are themselves a func-
tion of career earnings. In sample surveys the 
variable most closely associated with long-term 
earning potential 61 is education. Thus by seeing 
the effect of education we are getting close to 
the idea that differences in pensions may reflect 
differences in the earning potential of men and 
women.
61  Corresponding to what economists call ‘perma-
nent income’ – i.e. disregarding short term fluctuations 
and chance factors.
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Figure 5.1. Distribution of educational lev-
el, by gender (persons aged 65+)
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Figure 5.2. Number of years in education by 
gender, by cohort
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Note: Years derived by imputing number of years to educa-
tional levels
Men, for example, may systematically have 
higher pensions if they have more educational 
qualifications, i.e. more ‘human capital’. Figure 
5.1 shows that gender differences in education 
among this older group of Europeans are con-
siderable, with men having attained higher de-
grees across Europe. Figure 5.2 shows that, in 
all cases, the differences are wider in the older 
group. What is also striking is the very wide di-
vergence in educational attainments between 
the South of Europe and the rest – a difference 
which has (thankfully) shrunk decisively among 
working age cohorts.
Examining education and human capital entails 
proceeding in the direction of examining pos-
sible determinants of Gender gaps in Pension. 
Alternatively it may be seen as an investigation 
of the extent to which the observed headline 
Gender Gaps in Pension is due to composition 
effects. Given that education differences are the 
most important determinant of human capital 
endowments (and hence of income differences), 
disaggregation of the pension gap by education 
would be a natural starting point.
Figure 5.3 charts – for each of the 27 Member 
States and for the EU-27 average – the separate 
Gender Gap in Pensions according to educational 
attainment. The latter is distinguished into pri-
mary (or less), secondary and tertiary. For pur-
poses of comparison, the average (headline) gap 
is noted in each country. Given that the pension 
gap for each educational level is calculated rela-
tive to men of that same educational level (rath-
er than the average for all educational levels), 
it is perfectly possible for all three gender gaps 
by education to be below (or above) the over-
all average. For the EU-27, those with primary 
education exhibit lower gender gaps. In terms 
of Member States, this applies to Germany, the 
UK, Greece, Ireland, Sweden, Spain and Portu-
gal. However there are cases where people with 
tertiary education exhibit lower gaps than those 
with primary education, such as in Austria, Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, Portugal, Slove-
nia and Malta. Higher education carries a wider 
gap in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, 
possibly due to the effects of the second pillar, 
magnifying underlying earnings differences.62
What is the combined effect of education and 
cohort? An interesting question is to what extent 
educationally-based differences are shrinking 
among (the better educated) younger cohorts. 
62  It is o"en found that the higher the earnings, the 
higher the gap and the lower the earnings the lower 
the gap. These results are echoed here and could be 
due to the same underlying causes: the glass ceiling in 
career and earnings at the top, whereas at the bottom 
there is less scope for differentiation.
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The EU-27 average seems to be hinting at such 
an effect (the difference between gender gaps 
between primary and secondary education is 
8.9 percentage points for the older group and is 
halved at 4.3 point for the younger group). How-
ever the variation around this average is very 
considerable and sample sizes (especially for 
university educated women) rather small. The 
above exercise looked at differences within edu-
cational classes. We know that future generation 
of pensioners will be more evenly balanced in 
Figure 5.3. Gender Gap in Pensions (%), 
pensioners aged 65+, by educational level
Notes: Horizontal lines, in red, portray the total (overall) coun-
try average Gender Gap in Pensions. 
° indicates that the number between 11and 30; 
°° indicates sample size < 10 observations.
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
terms of educational achievement. If, at Europe-
an level, we will continue to witness a gap profile 
rising with the level education - as the profile 
currently evident in the EU27 - we may para-
doxically expect that growing educational attain-
ment among women will translate to a tendency 
for the overall gap to increase.
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2.6 STEP 6. How is the pension gap 
related to the level of pensions? 
Distributional calculations
So far we have been talking of pension gaps by 
comparing the average woman pensioner with 
the average man pensioner. We began to depart 
from this rule when we considered gender gaps 
in pension separately by education category. It 
is thus important to ask now how pensions are 
distributed around that pension average.
This exercise is distinct from the previous one 
in that whereas education is linked to potential 
earnings and long-term factors (prior to the fil-
tering by the pension system), looking at the dis-
tribution according to pensions is equivalent to 
looking at final pension outcomes (a!er pension 
filtering). Thus, though earning capacity is linked 
to education, it is at some removes distant from 
pension outcomes. So, we should not be sur-
prised if the pattern of effects differs between 
a distribution by education and one by pension 
level.
One way of doing that is to ask whether we find 
more or less women among individuals who 
have a lower pension. We thus take the distri-
bution of men’s pensions for each country and 
we note the pension levels that distinguish pen-
sioners into three groups: Those of low pensions 
(bottom 33%), middle pensions (between 33% 
and 66% percent) and high pensions (top 33%). 
The distribution of income thus defined accord-
ing to men’s pensions is then matched to the 
women’s distribution.
We therefore ask what share of women receives 
a pension less than the men’s cut-off point - that 
is, the amount that the richest man of the bot-
tom 33% receives. If the distribution of wom-
en is no different than that of men the answer 
would be the same as for men, i.e. 33%; if wom-
en are more concentrated among low pensions 
their share would be more than 33%; if women 
are pension-richer, it would be less than 33%. 
The result appears as Figure 6.1. Thus, for the 
EU-27 average, 64% of women are ‘squeezed’ 
into a pension range that holds the poorest 
33% of men (which could be expressed as say-
ing that there are 1.9 times as many pension-
poor women as pension-poor men; or for every 
pension-poor man there are 1.9 poor women). 
Among high income pensioners, women are cor-
respondingly underrepresented – only 11% of 
women reach the pension enjoyed by the richest 
third of men (for every 3 pension-rich men there 
is less than one pension-rich woman). This effect 
– of overrepresentation of women at the bottom 
and under-representation at the bottom – can 
be expressed more intuitively by means of odds 
ratios. Dividing the proportion of men at the bot-
tom (33%) with the proportion of women who 
are ‘squeezed’ in the same income range can 
be expressed quite simply as ‘how many poor 
women are there for every poor man?’; equiva-
lently ‘how many rich women for every rich man’ 
and ‘how many women for every middle income 
man?’. Thus figures over one imply overrepresen-
tation; less than one the opposite.
Figure 6.1. Distribution of pension income. 
Three linked odds ratios
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Figure 6.1 shows that women are overwhelming-
ly overrepresented (by a factor close to two) in 
low pensions and equivalently underrepresented 
in high incomes. Only in Estonia does the distri-
bution of women follow almost exactly that of 
men, followed possibly by the Slovak Republic. In 
Denmark, women do slightly better than men for 
low pensions (0.9), but worse for high pensions. 
At the other extreme –high incidence of lower 
pensions among women- are the Netherlands, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden and Bulgaria (all well 
above 2 for the bottom third); the same group 
of countries do badly at the top end – where 
less than 10% of women are able to attain the 
pension that the top 33% of men can attain. A 
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third group of countries, whilst over-representing 
women at the low end, come close to parity i.e. 
30% at the middle: the UK, Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal, Italy, Finland, Poland, Hungary, and Latvia.
The above exercise examines whether women 
are less or more likely to have low (or high) 
pensions than men. To judge how the pension 
distributions by gender differ we may also try 
separately comparing the gender gap for differ-
ent parts of the pension distribution. If we divide 
men and women into thirds, we can see how far 
men’s low pensions are greater than women’s 
low pensions – i.e. a separate ‘Tertile Gender Gap 
in Pensions’. The result appears as Figure 6.2, 
where each of the three tertile gaps is shown 
together with the headline gender gap for each 
of the 27 Member States and the EU average.
For the average of EU-27, there is a wider gap 
for the bottom third, whereas the other two 
thirds are close to the average. This is a pattern 
followed in many other countries, notably Ger-
many, the UK, France, Austria, and Belgium. In 
contrast, there are some Member States where 
the gender gap for the poorer people is consid-
erably lower than the average: Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Denmark are notable examples. 
There is notably greater imbalance at the high 
end in Denmark, Finland, Ireland and 
Figure 6.2. Gender Gap in Pensions (%), pen-
sioners aged 65+, by pension income tertile 
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Note: Horizontal lines in red, portray the total (overall) country 
average Gender Gap in Pensions
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Malta. Finally in the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, 
Slovenia and (possibly) Sweden, Gender Gaps in 
Pension appear not to differ by income level. An 
interesting question arises when these results 
are compared with those in education. 
Given the close link between education and in-
come, one would have expected the results of 
the current exercise to mirror the ones on educa-
tion. However, this is not the case. Pension sys-
tems alter the underlying earnings/ income situ-
ation most notably by the operation of minima 
(e.g. the age pension) or maxima (maximum so-
cial insurance pension). These results are some-
what at odds with the results for education, giv-
ing in some cases a different shape of response 
(e.g. Greece, Portugal). However, this should not 
surprise us. The pension system is not a neutral 
filter: minima and maxima for pensions as well 
as contribution requirements are sufficient to 
radically transform a relationship based on edu-
cation (and hence on long-term factors). 
The above exercises attempt to show how widely 
dispersed pension are for men and for women. 
A simple alternative way of approaching this is-
sue is to see how ‘spread out’ are the two dis-
tributions in those parts that hold the majority 
of people, i.e. the middle of the distribution. The 
interquartile (IQ) range is the range of incomes 
that holds the middle 50% of a distribution; 
counting from the bottom, if the poorest 25% 
of men has a pension of EUR 500 and the top 
25% has a pension of EUR 2500, then the IQ 
range is EUR 2000. A simple way to gauge the 
shape of the distribution is to calculate the rela-
tive  IQ range – i.e. whether the middle 50% of 
women are ’spread out’ between pensions which 
are further apart than for men. Figure 6.3 shows 
the results by normalizing so that men’s IQ range 
is 100.
Figure 6.3. Measures of dispersion: The Rel-
ative Interquartile range 
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Note: The interquartile range is set to be equal to 100 for 
men in each country. Hence, a relative interquartile range >100 
for women indicates that the interquartile range is higher in 
women’s pension distribution compared to men’s. The opposite 
is the case for values which are <100.
The middle of women’s pension distribution is 
more thickly populated than that for men, mean-
ing there is less dispersion and more women tend 
to receive similar pensions. For the EU average, 
women’s IQ range is shorter. However that hides 
some striking differences: for example in Ireland 
the value of that indicator is only 14, whereas 
in the Slovak Republic it is 140 and in the Czech 
Republic 114. The values for Germany and Aus-
tria are higher than the EU average. The countries 
fall into a large group where the relative IQ range 
is around 70 (e.g. the UK, Sweden, Italy, Poland, 
Denmark, and Hungary) and a slightly smaller 
group where they are more densely distributed 
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around the middle value (Denmark, Portugal, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain).
2.7 STEP 7. Does tax make a big 
difference to the pension gap?
The data from EU-SILC are reported on a gross of 
tax basis, i.e. before the deduction of income tax 
and social contributions.63 An interesting ques-
tion is whether the deduction of tax alters the 
Gender Gap in Pensions. In progressive income 
tax systems, higher pensions would (presumably) 
be subject to higher marginal tax. However, given 
that most un-earned income accrues to couples 
and is more easily manipulated to minimize the 
tax obligation, the extent to which marginal tax 
rates would rise as a result of taking into ac-
count other income is likely to be dampened; if 
tax engineering leads to income from property 
being taxed at the rate of the poorest partner it 
may even correct for gender imbalances. Thus 
we would be surprised if the decision whether 
to use pensions net or gross of tax would make 
much difference to our calculations.
This supposition is largely confirmed by Figure 
7.1. The average for those Member States where 
both net and gross pension gaps can be com-
puted is 39% for gross income and 37% for net 
income. In most countries the two figures, as ex-
pected, almost coincide. Considerable differences 
exist only in Cyprus (net -7 pp), Italy (net -5 pp) 
and Finland (net +20 pp). It is a matter of inves-
tigation whether those large differences reflect 
features of the tax system or are due to problems 
of the methods used by national statistical au-
thorities to transform net into gross magnitudes. 
The existence of six EU countries that have pro-
duced no data could signal that the process of 
producing net of tax data is still being developed. 
Figure 7.1. Gender Gap in Pensions based on 
gross and net pension Income, Pensioners 65+
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
63  In some Member States the data as collected in 
the questionnaire may be net of taxes, if that is a more 
familiar way of expressing pensions. In that case the 
data are converted into gross magnitudes by applying 
a tax model. This is done by each national statistical in-
stitute before the data are communicated to Eurostat.
2.8 STEP 8. Can we discern trends 
in the pension gap over time?
A question that any policy analyst would pose 
is whether there are any indications that things 
are improving over time or not. As we saw in the 
motivation of this report, there are grounds to 
suppose each of these statements may be true. 
If pension gaps are the result of past injustices, 
we may expect things to get better; if they are 
premonitions of future problems, they may be 
getting worse. However, both of these phenom-
ena are likely to operate over the longer term 
and are unlikely to be visible in changes from 
year to year. 
Given that EU-SILC is available since 2005, a 
five-year comparison i.e. between 2010 and 
2005 is the longest time comparison which is 
currently feasible. Given that EU-SILC (2010) 
refers to 2009 incomes this (in most countries, 
though not, say in Latvia or Hungary) would pre-
date the major impact of the economic crisis. 
Figure 8.1 compares the ‘headline Gender Gap 
in Pensions’ for the two years 2005 and 2010.
Contrary to some expectations, gender gaps in 
pension appear to be widening over time for the 
EU as a whole. The EU average is greater by 1.7 
pp (a 5% increase). This however is the result 
of some larger deterioration in some countries: 
Denmark (6.4pp), the Netherlands (5.4pp), Ger-
many (4.2pp), and the UK (2.8pp). On the other 
hand, there are opposing trends towards greater 
gender balance in Italy (-4.4), Belgium (-4.9), Lat-
via (-7.7). In a third group there is little change 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Finland and Hungary).
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Figure 8.1. Trends in the Gender Gap in Pen-
sions over time
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
According to the EU-SILC data, between 2005 
and 2010 there were some notable differences 
in coverage in some countries. In particular, im-
portant gaps in coverage were filled in Denmark 
(where the number of people without pensions 
was reduced by around 7pp for both men and 
women). Smaller advances in making up for cov-
erage gaps were noted in Portugal (4.3pp reduc-
tion), France (1.7pp) and Greece (1.6pp). Much 
more worrying, though, is the fall in coverage 
among women in Ireland (where the coverage 
gap increased 6.6pp). The overall picture can be 
gleaned from the elderly gender gap in pensions, 
which combines both coverage and pension gap 
(Figure 8.2). The picture differs from the headline 
pension gap variations over time only for those 
countries where there was a coverage change. 
Ireland, for example, registers an increase in 
gender gaps by 6 pp.
Figure 8.2. Gender Gap in Pensions among 
the elderly
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
2.9 STEP 9. Do pension gaps reflect 
broken careers for women? What of 
labour force involvement?
An important hypothesis explaining gender gaps 
in pension is that gender gaps in pension to a 
large extent are a reflection of women’s low and 
intermittent involvement with paid labour in the 
past. In particular, especially in past decades, a 
large number of women dropped out of the la-
bour force in order to fulfill their family responsi-
bilities. This may have reflected personal choice, 
but may also have been imposed on them by 
insufficient child care facilities, inadequacies in 
maternity leave etc.
In order to gauge the effect of ‘broken careers’ 
using EU-SILC data it is important to note that 
what a ‘broken career’ means will be different 
from one country to the other – i.e. has to be 
defined according to what is considered ‘nor-
mal’ in each country. To define what a broken 
career means, and to classify women into four 
categories according to labour force attachment, 
we have taken a mixed approach. Women with a 
number of years of employment greater than the 
median years64 for their country were judged not 
to have a broken career problem. To classify the 
remainder we note that in those countries that 
base their system on social insurance principles, 
the cut off for being entitled to a pension (‘vest-
ing’) is usually 15 years. Thus, it makes sense 
to define three groups: (1) women with years 
of employment between 0-15 (distinguished 
into two subgroups in table 9.1);65 (2) those be-
tween 15 and the median; (3) greater than the 
median. Many (perhaps most) women who have 
64  The (un-weighted) median value of years in 
paid work in the EU as a whole (but excluding Swe-
den, Denmark and Finland which do not report this 
variable in the SILC survey) is 28 years for men, 21 for 
women, with little change if we average out the single 
country s median values in lieu of calculating the me-
dian at the aggregate EU level. For women, however 
there is considerable dispersion across countries: from 
10 years in Malta and 16 in the Netherlands to  29 
years in the Czech Republic and 30 years in Hungary.
65  If the years worked data were of better quality, 
or if there could be access to administrative data, it 
would have made sense to distinguish ‘no work’ with 
even a small number of years.
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fewer than 15 years’ work would have worked 
a"er leaving school and at the early stages of 
building a family; thus at the age of 65 their in-
volvement in employment may only be a distant 
memory. Given that many pension systems have 
vesting requirements, a woman who may have 
worked in the 1970s for 4-5 years would, for so-
cial insurance purposes, be treated in the same 
way as someone who has never worked66. Both 
would only receive an age pension, or a means 
tested ‘citizens’ pension at 65. This is the reason 
for aggregating the ‘never worked’ group with 
those with few years of contributions. Table 9.1 
shows the classification of women into the three 
groups. It further breaks the low category into 
those with 0-10 and those between 11-14 years 
in employment.
Table 9.1. Classification of women over 65 
according to broken careers status 
Country 0-10 years 11-14 years
15-median ‘years in 
employment distribution’
>median
LU 43.4 7.2 49.4
DE 18.8 6.1 25.4 49.8
UK 14.3 11.1 26.1 48.5
NL 50.3 49.7
CY 43.0 3.5 3.9 49.5
FR 28.6 4.7 17.6 49.1
GR 26.0 1.3 23.1 49.6
IE 46.1 4.3 49.6
AT 20.7 3.6 25.8 49.9
ES 40.4 4.6 5.5 49.5
PT 12.4 2.3 36.8 48.5
BG 1.3 0.5 50.4 47.9
RO 15.4 1.1 35.8 47.7
IT 29.5 2.8 19.4 48.4
BE 39.5 3.4 7.9 49.1
SI 23.9 0.6 29.2 46.3
PL 11.3 1.7 38.3 48.8
MT 52.0 48.0
HU 9.6 1.9 42.4 46.1
CZ 1.8 0.1 49.0 49.2
LV 1.1 0.2 53.3 45.5
SK 4.7 0.5 50.3 44.5
EE 0.8 0.3 57.6 41.4
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Given that we are dealing with cohorts of older 
women (born before 1945), broken careers ap-
pear to be a major issue: in nine countries, where 
more than one out of four women had been in 
employment for less than 14 years: Luxembourg, 
Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Bel-
66  A recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Case C-385/11 ruled that Span-
ish legislation on contributory pensions discriminates 
against women on account of the higher prevalence of 




gium and Slovenia. On the contrary, in most 
Eastern European countries (with the possible 
exception of Poland and Romania), broken ca-
reers (in the sense of a large number of women 
with fewer than 15 years’ work) appear to be 
less of an issue. 
The next step is to apply this categorization in 
order to compute gender gaps for each grada-
tion of broken career. To do this, and in order to 
get around the problem that broken careers are 
an exclusively female issue, the average pen-
sion for women in each broken career category 
is compared to the overall mean pension for all 
males. (In this way all three computed gender 
gaps in pension have the same denominator).
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Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Notes: Horizontal lines in red, portray the total (overall) country 
average Gender Gap in Pensions (%) 
° indicates that the number between 11and 30; °° indicates 
sample size < 10 observations.
In almost all countries, women with working life 
of less than 14 years exhibit significantly greater 
Gender Gap in Pensions income. In Germany for 
instance women who had been in employment 
for less than 14 years appear to have twice as 
high a Gender Gap in Pensions income (64.1%) 
compared to women with the ‘median’ work-
ing life (31.8%).  The trend is to be seen also in 
France, Austria and to a lesser extent in Spain. 
The ‘dominant pattern’ holds with broken careers 
being associated with greater pension gaps; as 
years of employment increase past the median, 
pension gaps shrink. However, in Bulgaria and 
in Poland there appears no significant variation 
across different working life categories. Greece 
is the main exception where, remarkably, gen-
der gaps are higher for women with the ‘me-
dian’ working life. This extraordinary result may 
well be an artifact of the fragmentation of the 
system into occupational categories, each with 
very different generosity.67 Portugal is a partial 
exception since it records the lowest gap among 
women having spent between 15 years and me-
dian years in employment.   
As new cohorts enter retirement, broken careers 
may be more of an issue (for women who in pre-
vious cohorts would have remained out of em-
67  A short career may be a marker for employment 
in the government sector (with generous pensions); a 
long career may be a proxy of agricultural employment. 
ployment altogether) or less (for those women 
who took advantage of better possibilities to 
reconcile family and work). For this reason we 
reproduced Figure 9.1 by cohort; in order to ab-
stract from the equalizing effects of survivor’s 
pensions we excluded widows (i.e. similarly to 
Figure 4.2). The result appears as Figure 9.2.
The picture emerging is complex and is difficult 
to generalize.68 The finding of the previous ex-
ercise that broken careers lead to wider gaps is 
reproduced for both cohorts. Though the differ-
ence is not striking, ‘Working careers’ may be 
seen to matter more in reducing Gender Gaps 
for the younger cohort. This is more noticeable 
in UK, Cyprus, Spain and Belgium, where the 
Gender Gap in Pensions for women aged 65-80 
years is decreasing gradually as we move from 
working careers of less than 14 years to ‘me-
dian’ working life careers, while this is not the 
case in these countries for women aged over 80 
years. In France and Germany the shape of the 
response is maintained, with a lower gender gap 
penalty for full careers. Greece, once again is an 
outlier. The huge gap (over 85%) for low careers 
in Luxembourg confirms it as an outlier – most 
probably due to the classification as a pension of 
a low universal benefit given to women in recog-
nition for child-rearing.69 
68  In many instances (noted by asterisks) the data 
relies on only a few observations.
69  A sensitivity analysis was also conducted, alter-
ing the definition of what a full career is by +/- 10% 
of each country’s median. Once individuals of longer 
career were identified as full, the EU average gap esti-
mated fell. However there were many exceptions.
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Figure 9.2. The Gender Gap in Pensions (%) 
by broken careers 65-80 excluding widows; 
and 80+ excluding widows 
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Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Notes: Horizontal lines in red, portray the total (overall) coun-
try average Gender Gap in Pensions (%) 
° indicates that the number between 11 and 30; °° indicates 
sample size < 10 observations.
Given the centrality of the issue of broken ca-
reers, it was also investigated using data from 
SHARE. In that survey, rather than simply ask-
ing a single question about the number of years 
worked, the working career was followed in detail 
and each working episode was separately identi-
fied. Table 9.2 shows the years of employment 
by gender for the 13 countries that participated 
in SHARELIFE (wave 3 of SHARE).
Table 9.2. Average years in employment by sex 
in SHARE, women and men over 65
SHARE
Years in employment
(entire sample, including zero employment)
Years in employment 
(for those with some employment)
 65+ Men Women Gap (M-W) Men Women Gap (M-W)
DE 39.6 24.4 15.2 39.8 26.7 13.1
NL 39.8 16.4 23.4 40.5 19.4 21.1
FR 35.1 21.1 14.0 37.2 25.6 11.6
GR 38.6 14.6 24.0 41.5 31.7 9.7
AT 39.7 19.4 20.3 40.6 23.9 16.7
ES 43.4 12.8 30.5 44.7 22.6 22.2
SE 43.1 31.9 11.2 43.6 33.5 10.1
IT 38.6 14.6 24.0 39.6 24.5 15.0
BE 39.2 17.3 22.0 39.7 22.1 17.6
PL 35.9 24.9 11.0 37.9 30.7 7.2
DK 40.9 29.7 11.2 41.2 30.9 10.3
CZ 40.1 35.3 4.9 40.3 35.6 4.7
CH 42.4 21.8 20.5 42.5 23.4 19.1
Source: Own estimation from SHARE, wave 2 (2006/7) and 
SHARELIFE (2008/9)
We can see that in all countries women (even if 
constrained to have entered the labour market) 
have shorter careers by a very large margin70. 
Men tend to have worked for almost 40 years, 
70  It may be objected that women in Table 9.2 have 
short careers because they have also retired before 
men. However, if we calculate years of employment 
before age 50 (which would largely do away with this 
problem), the large differences remain.
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women between 20 and 30. We may note the 
large number of women who have never entered 
the labour market in Greece, Spain and Italy. 
However, even ignoring zero values, the lowest 
year gap is 4.7 years in the Czech Republic and 
the largest (22.2 years) in Spain. We see large 
gaps in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria 
and Belgium (>15 years). Germany, France, Swe-
den and Denmark have working differences of 
around 10 years.
In order to categorise SHARE respondents into 
groups by degree of attachment to the labour 
market, women were compared to men in their 
own country. Thus the groups were broken into: 
no employment, less than 10% of men’s average 
employment, 10%-50% of men’s employment 
and equal or greater than 50%. The classification 
appears in Figure 9.3: the proportion of women 
who have never been in employment or who have 
worked for less than 10% of men’s number of 
working years exceeds 50% in all but two coun-
tries (Poland and the Czech Republic), reaching 
almost 70% in Greece, Austria, Italy and Belgium, 
and exceeding 80% in Netherlands and Spain. 
Figure 9.3. Distribution of women’s working 
career vis-à-vis men’s
Source: Own estimation from SHARE, wave 2 (2006/7) and 
SHARELIFE (2008/9)
Figure 9.4 examines the effect on gender gaps 
of separately identifying the four groups of em-
ployment attachment. The penalty exacted by 
a broken career is all too obvious. Even in Den-
mark and the Czech Republic (where gaps are 
lower anyway), the gap for shorter careers is 
of the order of 15%. The most common situa-
tion is for the short career gap to be between 
40 and 50% (e.g. Germany, France and Italy). If 
survivors’ pensions are excluded (not reported) 
that penalty becomes even larger, reaching 68% 
in Italy ad 62% in France. The reverse effect in 
the Netherlands and Austria is probably due to 
a small sample size; in contrast the same effect 
for Greece corroborates the EU-SILC findings.
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Figure 9.4. Gender Gap in Pensions, by wom-
en’s working career in SHARE, all pensions
Source: SHARE, wave 2 (2006/7) and SHARELIFE (2008/9)
SHARE also allows asking whether the sector of 
employment makes a difference for gender gaps. 
It is possible to identify for people who have re-
tired their ‘dominant’ sector of employment of 
the period they were working. In all cases, the 
widest gaps appear amongst self-employed 
(Figure 9.5). The public employees in local and 
central administration (‘civil servants’), where 
they could be identified, have very low or even 
negative gender gaps: given that the civil service 
has large numbers of low paid men (working for 
local authorities) but also a fairly large number 
of high paid women (e.g. doctors and magis-
trates) that result is explainable. Of course, the 
civil service can also be expected to keep dis-
crimination by gender low.
Figure 9.5. Gender Gap in Pensions, by sec-
tor of dominant job
Source: Own estimation from SHARE, wave 2 (2006/7) and 
SHARELIFE (2008/9)
Note: in Italy and in Poland, there is no civil-servant category 
in SHARELIFE questionnaire. 
2.10 STEP 10. The effect of multi-
pillar systems in SHARE
The tendency in many advanced countries is to 
move towards ‘multi-pillar pension systems’. 
These systems, supplement State provision of 
pensions with an additional occupationally-
based pension, usually financed through pre-
funding and calculated as a return on accu-
mulated contributions. Typically each individual 
would receive two pensions: a pension from the 
State first-pillar system and a second from the 
occupational system. Of course, people who 
want may add to those pensions an individually 
negotiated third pillar pension from an insurance 
company. Such systems have been in operation 
since the early 1990s in Switzerland, the Nether-
lands and Denmark. They have been introduced 
recently in countries like Sweden, Germany or 
Poland, while progressing towards such a sys-
tem may be a reform option in the remaining 
countries. What effect multi pillar systems would 
have on gender gaps in pension is of major poli-
cy significance; by taking part of income replace-
ment out of the ambit of direct public responsi-
bility and subjecting to the logic of accumulating 
contributions.
Unfortunately EU-SILC does not allow us to ex-
amine pillars 1 and 2 separately. The third pil-
lar (individual pension provision) is separately 
identified, but is, in most countries, very small.71 
We can only guess at the impact of multi-pillar 
systems by seeing whether some effects in those 
countries with mature pension systems are con-
sistent with how the operation of a second-pil-
lar may affect the data. The weight of analysis 
should thus fall on SHARE data. Particular atten-
tion must be paid to those countries where the 
second-pillar is relatively mature and would thus 
have spread even in the older population which 
is the focus of this report: Switzerland, the Neth-
erlands and Denmark are the three cases where 
we might see what a multi-pillar system would 
look like.
71  The third pillar is essentially a means of savings; 
it is hence debatable whether much is gained by ag-
gregating with the other two.
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Table 10.1. Gender Gaps in Pension, by Pil-
lar, SHARE wave 2
SHARE Gender Gap in Pensions, by Pillars
Combined income
Persons 65+ Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 Pillars 1+2 Pillars 1+2+3
DE 34.3 26.4 52.2 36.5 36.4
NL -3.1 30.6 -7.8 23.1 22.7
FR 32.5 32.8 na 32.9 32.7
GR 29.9 30.1 na 30.5 30.5
AT 30.5 -49.3 21.1 29.4 29.1
ES 26.9 25.7 na 28.7 29.2
SE 14.4 29.2 29.5 15.1 17.0
IT 35.7 32.8 na 35.2 35.2
BE 20.3 -5.3 na 20.9 20.8
PL 23.2 na na 23.2 23.4
DK -3.5 43.8 12.2 9.2 12.8
CZ 10.6 48.7 na 10.5 11.5
CH -4.4 34.8 26.8 23.5 23.0
Source: Own estimation from SHARE (Survey on Health, Age-
ing and Retirement in Europe), wave 2 (2006/7)
Table 10.1 examines the headline pension gap 
for each pension pillar separately. In the last two 
columns it aggregates pension from the first two 
pillars, and then also adds the third pillar. The 
three countries with mature multi-pillar systems 
are shaded. In those countries, the first-pillar is 
gender balanced, in all cases showing a slight 
advantage for women (negative gender gap). 
The second pillar, taken on its own for those who 
have it, yields much larger gender gaps, reflect-
ing the return of contributions. The third pillar 
in the Netherlands appears to correct some of 
the gender effects of the first and second pillars. 
The combined effects of first and second-pillar 
systems in the three mature systems is at the 
low end of country gender gaps (especially for 
Denmark). This shows that, at least in aggregate, 
the first-pillar is exerting its influence to restrain 
gender imbalance effects. The effect of the third 
pillar, given its small size, is minor. A discernible 
effect widening the gender gap exists in Den-
mark and Sweden. In step 13th we shall find that 
the third pillar increases the Gender Gap in Pen-
sions in two other, third-pillar mature, countries: 
the UK and Germany. This could operate through 
coverage effects (more third pillar for those with 
higher pensions) as well as through higher re-
turns to those with third-pillar pensions. As was 
mentioned, multi-pillar systems were introduced 
in some countries in the 1990s and are spread-
ing through their population. Thus it is important 
to check how far coverage of the second pillar 
has progressed through the population (Table 
10.2).
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Table 10.2. Gender Gap in Coverage by Pen-
sion System, by Pillar
 Gender Gap in Coverage by Pension System, by Pillar (Persons aged 65+ years)
 Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3
 Mean Pension Gap Mean Pension Mean Mean Pension Gap
 Men Women W-M Men Women W-M Men Women W-M
DE 94.0 90.2 -3.8 30.3 13.0 -17.3 4.5 4.0 -0.5
NL 93.2 96.3 3.1 76.8 48.4 -28.4 10.1 7.2 -3.0
FR 99.4 94.2 -5.2 4.7 1.7 -3.1 4.8 3.3 -1.5
GR 82.8 72.5 -10.3 8.7 6.1 -2.6 0.2 0.2 0.0
AT 98.5 88.6 -9.9 11.0 4.9 -6.1 1.8 4.3 2.5
ES 90.1 62.7 -27.4 4.5 1.2 -3.4 1.0 1.4 0.4
SE 94.5 95.6 1.2 64.8 69.0 4.3 21.3 14.9 -6.4
IT 90.1 82.8 -7.3 6.7 3.9 -2.7 0.2 0.1 -0.1
BE 92.9 78.7 -14.2 6.7 2.5 -4.1 2.0 1.0 -1.0
PL 97.4 95.2 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.9 0.1
DK 96.9 97.9 1.0 23.3 16.2 -7.0 21.6 13.7 -7.9
CZ 96.5 98.9 2.4 4.0 5.8 1.8 1.4 0.9 -0.5
CH 93.2 98.0 4.8 60.7 27.9 -32.8 5.7 7.3 1.6
Source: Own estimation from SHARE (Survey on 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe), wave 
2 (2006/7)
The important point to note is that in those coun-
tries with mature multi-pillar systems, there are 
very important gender gaps in coverage for the 
second pillar. This is most evident in the oldest 
of the mature systems (Switzerland) but also in 
the Netherlands, where gender gaps are of the 
order of a third. In contrast Denmark, though 
overall the spread of the second-pillar is more 
limited, has managed to ensure that the spread 
is more gender balanced (coverage gap 7%). As 
second pillars spread to newer generations of 
pensioners, the combined effect of second-pillar 
coverage gaps and pension gap can be expected 
to affect overall gender gaps to an increasingly 
greater extent.
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2.11 STEP 11. The effect of marital 
status and family
Women’s pension and labour force involvement 
are closely related to the family status of wom-
en. Graph 11.1 examines the effect on pension 
gaps of women’s current marital status – i.e. 
single, married 
Figure 11.1. Gender Gap in Pensions by 
marital status
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Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Notes: Horizontal lines in red, portray the total (overall) coun-
try average Gender Gap in Pensions (%) 
° indicates that the number between 11 and 30; °° indicates 
sample size < 10 observations.
(living in a couple), divorced and widow. Average 
pensions for each category of women are com-
pared to the overall mean for men to avoid the 
problem of low sample sizes.
Single women in general face lower gender gaps, 
as do widows. In Denmark single women actu-
ally have an advantage over men; this might be 
due to that group of women having characteris-
tics which differentiate them from other women. 
Granted that, it is significant that even in this 
category where broken careers would have lower 
importance, gender gaps in pension remain size-
able (the EU average being around 17%). In all 
cases, married women have the widest gaps, the 
EU average being 54%. In many cases this gap 
even exceeds 60%: In Germany it is 66%, the UK 
60%, France 56%.
Divorced women as a category lie between mar-
ried and single women: for the EU-27 average 
their Gender Gap in Pensions at 26%, is almost 
exactly between single and married women. 
However, given that, unlike married women, di-
vorced women will have smaller access to their 
ex-spouse’s resources, a given gap will doubt-
less translate to a greater welfare problem. The 
treatment of divorce appears to be very system-
specific: in France, for example, divorced women 
fare better than widows and only slightly worse 
than single women. Eastern European countries 
do particularly well for divorced women, there 
being small differences by family status anyway. 
Portugal and Italy appear to do well for divorced 
(though the sample for these two Catholic coun-
tries is very small).
The problem of small sample sizes precludes ex-
amining the question whether the way pension 
systems treat women of different marital status 
has changed over time. Current marital status is 
not necessarily a good indicator of the kinds of 
constraints women had faced over their working 
lives. The most significant such factor is child-
rearing – the number of children that women have 
raised. Given that this information does not exist 
in EU-SILC, this question was approached using 
data from SHARE72. The sample of women was 
divided into those women who had no children, 
those who had 1-2 and those who had 3 or more.
Figure 11.2 reports the Gender Gap in Pensions 
of the three groups of women relative to aver-
age pensions for all men. Having children leads 
to a pension disadvantages everywhere, except 
in Poland and possibly Austria. In most cases 
the ‘children penalty’ increases linearly with the 
number of children; in France, Austria, Denmark 
and Switzerland there appears to be more than 
proportionate burden for three children or more 
children. According to Figure 11.2, the most 
‘child-friendly’ countries are Denmark and Spain.
72  The number of children exists for couples of 
working age whose children are cohabiting. In an older 
population such as the one we are dealing with here, 
grown-up children will not be known.
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Figure 11.2. Gender Pension Gap of women 
by number of children vis-à-vis men
Source: Own estimation from SHARE, wave 2 (2006/7) and 
SHARELIFE (2008/9)
2.12 STEP 12. The Intra-household 
Gender Gap in Pensions
A. Motivation
The unit of measurement for the Gender Gap in 
Pensions income is the individual. We essentially 
compare each individual female pensioner with 
the average pension for male pensioner and 
compute the average. This has evident compu-
tational and analytical advantages. However, a 
gender gap indicator can also be meaningfully 
computed at household level in the case of pen-
sion income. In that case, i.e. by looking inside 
the household, we will be comparing each wom-
an with her own partner rather than with the 
population average. Such an indicator is also apt 
to capture the relative economic independence 
between men and women at the micro level. Ac-
cording to a well-known argument in econom-
ics - the intra-household bargaining hypothesis 
introduced by McElroy and Horney (1981) - the 
partner with the largest bargaining power has 
the largest say in decisions taken at household 
level. Bargaining power crucially depends on the 
amount/adequacy of resources each partner 
would muster in case of separation, and pension 
income is one such resource in old age.
From a policy perspective, knowledge of the way 
the intra-household gap behaves in different 
types of families is clearly important for target-
ing social provisions; a"er all, most decisions 
of how to react to changed incentives of, say, 
the pension system, are taken jointly by the two 
partners, i.e. are household decisions. However, 
information about the way ‘her’ pension com-
pares to ‘his’ is very scant (EC, 2012);73 equally, 
there exist a number of difficult technical and 
conceptual problems to overcome. This section 
makes a start and illustrates some basic find-
ings about the intra-household gap, including 
essential comparison with the aggregate gap we 
have been examining up to now. For semantic 
73  EC (2012), Pension Adequacy in the European 
Union 2010-2050. Report prepared jointly by the Di-
rectorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion of the European Commission and the Social 
Protection Committee.
clarity and consistency, we shall continue to re-
fer to the aggregate gap as simply ‘the’ Gender 
Gap in Pensions (or GGP), while denoting intra-
household gaps with GGP-H.
B. Measurement
As with measurement of the GGP, we propose 
two ‘headline indicators’ in order to track gender 
imbalances in pension income within households: 
namely  the intra-household gender coverage 
gap and the intra-household pensioners’ gap. 
Underneath the similarity of concepts and labels 
there are, however, important differences be-
tween the two sets of headline indicators. The 
first difference concerns the sample. In analogy 
with the criteria used for the GGP we consider 
the population older than 65, but in the intra-
household case the sample is also confined to 
couples where at least one of the members re-
ceives a positive pension. This introduces addi-
tional and complex sample selection issues.
Therefore:
- The intra-household coverage rate 
indicator measures the extent to which 
more women than men receive no pen-
sion among households where at least 
one member is a pensioner.
- The intra-household pensioners’ 
gap provides a summary measure of 
gender disparities within households 
where both members are pensioners. 
Additional differences concern the measure-
ment of the pensioners’ gap. In analogy with 
our measurement of the GGP, we consider both 
the median and the mean values for the GGP-H. 
The mean GGP-H gap can be unduly influenced 
and is more sensitive to extreme values (outli-
ers), with the result of distorting information. To 
remedy the distortion we ‘trimmed’ the mean 
GGP-H by removing 3% of the households at ei-
ther extreme of the distribution of households’ 
gaps. Contrary to the mean, the median statis-
tics is robust with respect to outliers and does 
not change whether we trim it or not.74
74   The Gender Gap in Pensions, our headline in-
dicator, takes the ratio between two mean pension 
amounts (a mean difference at the numerator and the 
mean value for men at the denominator). In contrast, 
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C. Expectations 
We may expect the intra-household gap to differ 
from the aggregate gap in response to interac-
tions among four set of factors - sample selec-
tion, assortative mating, income role spe-
cialization, and the institutional design of 
the pension system. The term sample selection 
alludes to the consequences of confining analy-
sis to elderly couples, to the exclusion of the wid-
ows, the never married and the divorced. Since 
women in the excluded groups tend to have 
higher pensions (see step 11) we may expect the 
selection effect to drive the intra-household gap 
upward. ‘Assortative mating’ implies similarity 
between spouses, a widely studied social phe-
nomenon (Vandenberg, 1972). This phenomenon 
concerns the choice of spouse: women gradu-
ate tend to meet and marry men graduate. Each 
scientific discipline uses the term somewhat idi-
osyncratically, and economists stress education, 
attitudes, and productivity as key components of 
similarity.
When people marry, however, an opposite effect 
is triggered by income role specialization, the 
tendency for men to ‘specialize’ in market work 
and for women to ‘specialize’ in child rearing 
and housework. Having married, though, some 
women might decide to drop out of paid employ-
ment (especially common among older cohorts), 
leading to a higher pension gap. If they carry on 
working, on the other hand, they are likely to 
have higher pensions, implying a smaller gap. 
The rationale for such specialization between 
paid and unpaid work is disputed within econom-
ics as well as outside the discipline (see Becker 
1981 for one of the earliest views and the cri-
tique by Bergmann 1995). The extent of speciali-
zation is much weaker now than in the past, but 
still exists and introduces a North-South gradi-
ent in behaviour. Yet, marriage is still strongly 
associated with higher pension gaps (step 11) 
indicating that income role specialization tends 
to prevail over assortative mating. If this evi-
dence is combined with the expectations of a 
gap-augmenting selection effect, we should find 
larger within-households gaps. Superimposed to 
these three effects, however, institutional fac-
the mean intra-household gender gap in pensions 
takes the average of a distribution of ratios, each ratio 
representing the gap in a given household. Such dis-
tribution is ‘right censored’ at 1 (the woman cannot 
draw less than zero pension and with zero pension the 
gap is 1, i.e. 100%) and skewed to the le" with nega-
tive values theoretically unbounded. For example if the 
wife receives 500 and the husband receives 100 the 
gap is -4 (i.e. -400%).  This skewness is the source of 
the distortion and calls for trimming.  Symmetric trim-
ming limits the arbitrariness entailed by any correction.
The median of a distribution of ratios (the household 
gaps) is not unduly affected by outliers as it counts the 
number of households rather than the value of each 
household’s gap. Not only, therefore, is trimming not 
required, but, by construction, the median does not 
change with symmetric trimming because the same 
share of households is removed on either side.
tors may push the gap in either direction. For ex-
ample the gap may be compressed by providing 
generous old-age benefits unrelated to labour 
market behaviour. This way, each country is re-
ally a case on its own, while we may also expect 
to find differentiation between cohorts and be-
tween North, South and Eastern Europe.
D. First results
Figures 12.1 to 12.4 display the intra-household 
coverage rate gap, the median and the mean 
intra-household pensioners’ gap (both trimmed 
and untrimmed). In order to facilitate compari-
sons with earlier work, the ordering of country 
is that of the headline aggregate indicator, the 
pensioners’ gap in average income. Within elder-
ly couples households, the coverage rate gap is 
relatively high, in fact higher than at aggregate 
level (13% in Figure 12.1 for EU27 compared to 
6% in Figure 2.1). The highest gap countries are 
the same we found at aggregate level, namely 
Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Malta and 
Spain, all of which record intra-household cover-
age rate gaps higher than 25%. In most of these 
countries high coverage rates are driven by the 
fact that relatively few women belonging to ear-
lier cohorts were in paid work.
Figure 12.1. Coverage Rate Gap among el-
derly couples (aged 65+) with at least one 
pension recipient
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
For the ‘middle’ elderly couple, the intra-
household gap is high in absolute terms and 
higher than its GGP equivalent (46% in the EU27 
compared to the 42% of Figure 1.3). In fact the 
intra-household median gap dominates the ag-
gregate gender gap in median pension in all the 
countries except in Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Lat-
via, Romania and Slovenia. It is also more dis-
persed, with the lowest gap country (Estonia) 
boasting absolute equality (zero gap) while Ger-
many records slightly over 64% and Luxembourg 
an astounding 90%.75 Eastern and Nordic coun-
tries tend to have the smallest intra-household 
75  Luxembourg reports an astoundingly high figure, but 
caution must be exercised because of the sample size.
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gap, some continental countries like Luxemburg, 
France and Germany the highest, but this is also 
broadly true for the aggregate gap.
Figure 12.2. Intra-Household Median Gap 
in Pension for elderly couples (aged 65+), 
both pensioners
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
For the average elderly couple in the EU27, 
the intra-household gap is higher than its aggre-
gate equivalent but only if the mean is trimmed 
(42% in Figure 12.3 against 39% in Figure 1.1). 
Trimming consistently increases the gap across 
countries76, with the sole exception of the Slovak 
Republic where there is no change (Figure 12.4). 
The size of the increase varies from hardly 1 
percentage point in Estonia to almost 25 points 
in France.
Figure 12.3. Intra-Household Mean Gap in 
Pension for elderly couples (persons aged 
65+), both pensioners (Trimmed mean)
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
Figure 12.4. Intra-Household Mean Gap in 
Pension for elderly couples (persons aged 
65+), both pensioners (Untrimmed mean)
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010
76  The reason for this is that we are excluding cases 
where the wife’s pension is many times larger than the 
husband’s, e.g. if the husband is still working.
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E. Discussion 
If we take the median and the trimmed mean 
gaps as the most robust measures at the intra-
household level, the evidence is fairly consist-
ently in favour of higher within-household gaps, 
which is broadly consistent with expectations. 
There are some exceptions depending on the in-
dicator, and they are mainly found among East-
ern countries.
A fine grained analysis is needed to discriminate 
among the four effects that might account for 
discrepancies between the aggregate and the 
intra-household level. Although such an endeav-
our is outside the scope of this report, it is rela-
tively straightforward to provide some evidence 
of how much one of the effects weighs, specifi-
cally the sample selection effect. This is done in 
Figure 12.5 where the aggregate, median gap is 
compared for two samples, respectively all the 
pensioners older than 65 years (the sample used 
for the rest of the report) and all the pensioners 
older than 65 living in couple households (the 
sample used in this section). Among the latter, 
the (aggregate) gap rises by nearly 12 points in 
EU27 and by various amounts in the different 
countries, and falls in three countries (GR, IE, SI). 
In other words, excluding single and widowed in-
dividuals accounts for an increase of more than 
one quarter in the original gap.
Figure 12.5. Gender Gap in median pension 
income for pensioners aged 65+ years (the 
effect of selecting couple households)
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010 Note: the bars 
reproduce Figure 1.3
2.13 STEP 13. Putting a complex 
mosaic together: Decomposition 
analysis
This investigation has proceeded by means of 
a series of linked steps, factor by factor. These 
exercises have shown beyond doubt that gender 
gaps in pension are a very significant part of life 
for older European citizens. Gender gaps in pen-
sion of the size located in many Member States 
could mar individual lives; if these gaps grow 
further in the future, they might constitute an 
important obstacle to any policy on gender bal-
ance or social inclusion. The picture uncovered 
was also very complex: gender gaps vary with 
education, but they also depend on aspects such 
as age, level of income, broken careers or mari-
tal status and child rearing history. These factors 
could plausibly explain some of the observed 
phenomena. However, in the typical case, they 
are also highly related among themselves. We 
see, for instance gender gaps varying by mar-
riage status, number of children and labour mar-
ket career, but we cannot tell which of those two 
factors is doing more of the explanation.77
A. Motivation
The factor-by-factor approach was motivated by 
the assumption that differences between men 
and women in these characteristics are driv-
ing the gap, although their influence is filtered 
through the   architecture of the pension system.
While simple and intuitive, a factor-by-factor 
analysis may yield a fragmented picture and 
may even be inaccurate because the different 
factors o"en reinforce or offset one another. If 
a person is highly educated s/he is likely to have 
been more years in employment, hence sepa-
rate analysis of the impact of education may be 
‘picking up’ also part of the effect imparted by 
years in employment (and conversely). Factor by 
factor analysis can describe the data, i.e. of what 
we observe. This description can be adequate for 
designing palliative interventions to ‘cure’ the 
effects of a particular issue. Indeed, given than 
most of the effects would operate over entire 
lifetimes, dealing with the ‘root causes’ of ob-
served phenomena would largely be irrelevant 
for social policy, given the latter’s primary em-
phasis on current welfare. To give a concrete 
example, finding that the treatment of broken 
careers in the 1970s is ‘responsible’ for pen-
sion gaps in 2013 may imply changes to prevent 
the same thing happening for the pensioners of 
2030; for today’s pensioners the intervention 
has to be directly in current pensions.
However, for certain policy interventions, we 
need to go beyond analysis of each factor taken 
separately and allow for interaction between 
factors by a multivariate analysis. A well-known 
approach is to build a counterfactual gap that 
77  They might even be ‘explaining’ matters because 
they are related to other unobserved influences – cas-
es of spurious correlation.
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simultaneously removes the effect of gender dif-
ferences in education, marriage status, cohort, 
labour market career and so on, and to compare 
this counterfactual with the actual gap.78 So 
called decomposition analysis has been used to 
this purpose in labour economics, and has been 
widely applied in the analysis of pay gaps. We 
may in fact denote the proposed counterfactual 
‘adjusted Gender Gap in Pensions’ in close anal-
ogy to the concept of ‘adjusted gender pay gap’.
Let’s take this analogy a step further. Women 
may be low paid in the labour market because, 
say, they have lower experience or because they 
receive a lower salary for each year of experi-
ence. In the literature the first possibility is o"en 
referred to as ‘explained component’ of the wage 
gap’ and the second as ‘unexplained component’. 
This hints to the fact that gender pay disparities 
may be more easily tracked to and justified by 
higher experience on the part of men whereas 
further analysis is needed to explain why men 
should also be rewarded more for each year of 
experience.
In the same fashion, women may receive lower 
pension income because they spent fewer years 
in the labour force ( explained component) or 
because they receive less pension income per 
year spent in the labour force effect on account 
of low pay or other reasons to be investigated 
(unexplained component).  An adjusted or unex-
plained Gender Gap in Pensions computes the 
gap that would result if the relevant explained 
components were simultaneously removed. It 
compares women and men with the same char-
acteristics without ruling out the possibility that 
the characteristics may be rewarded differently. 
Individual characteristics are not confined to 
personal attributes. For example, the pillar com-
position of one’s pensions can be treated as a 
characteristic.
B. Literature review
In the field of pay the Blinder-Oaxaca decompo-
sition approach (named a"er Blinder 1973 and 
Oaxaca 1973 who introduced it) seeks to de-
compose the gender gap in wages by asking this 
kind of counterfactual questions. Well- known 
applications of Blinder-Oaxaca type methods in 
the field of pay gaps have been surveyed recent-
ly by Jann (2008) and Fortin et al. (2011) who 
also assess the econometric techniques that 
have been developed to deal with many techni-
cal issues.
However, there are very few applications of de-
composition methods in the field of pensions. A 
notable recent exception is Even and Macpher-
son (2004) for the US, while Lyberaki, Tinios and 
Georgiadis (2012) look at the allied issue of old 
78  In mathematical terms this is equivalent to the 
difference between a partial and a total differential. 
For palliative purposes the total differential is needed; 
for prevention we need to see the root causes – i.e. a 
partial differential. 
age personal incomes using SHARE data. The key 
difference between analyzing pay gaps and pen-
sion gaps arises from the special circumstances 
of pensions. Pay arises in a market and wage 
rates are outcomes of market processes. Pen-
sions are four times removed from this, in the 
sense that four processes ‘filter’ market out-
comes: pay is transformed into annual earn-
ings; annual earnings enter into career (lifetime) 
earnings through the length of career; finally the 
pension system transforms career earnings into 
pension entitlements.
What we see in the results is the total and cumu-
lative effect of all four processes; special impor-
tance may be accorded to the operation of the 
pension system and social policy which may act 
to correct (in most cases) and (in fewer cases), 
possibly even to magnify imbalances. This im-
plies that we must be very careful with the inter-
pretation of decomposition results – most of the 
interpretations of the pay decompositions must 
be adapted. So, at this stage of the analysis, the 
results are indicative, they should be used to nu-
ance the factor-by-factor analysis and should be 
used to chart future work.
C. First Results
At this very preliminary stage of investigation, 
the rationale for computing an adjusted Gender 
Gap in Pensions is straightforward: the idea is to 
compare likes for women with likes for men and 
to derive a measure of gender differences that 
cannot be easily explained away with clearly 
observable gender differences. We will also be 
able to gauge the combined effect of these ob-
servable differences by simple comparison of the 
adjusted and the unadjusted gap.
We adopt the Neumark (1988) variant of the 
Blinder-Oaxaca methodology to ‘adjust’ the gap 









2010 SILC data are used for nine of the eleven 
countries we have chosen for deeper investiga-
tion in this report – Austria, Germany, Estonia, 
France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland 
and the UK (see Chapter 3). Sweden and Den-
mark have not been included because they do 
not record years in employment, which is an 
important determinant of pension income. The 
results are displayed in Figure 13.1 where the 
adjusted gap is reported in percentage of the un-
adjusted value for the country. The methodologi-
cal details can be found in Appendix 3.
Two caveats deserve mention. First is what is 
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known in the literature as selection issue. Years 
spent in paid work are recorded only for those 
who have ever worked, leaving out of the analy-
sis the segment of men and women who never 
participated in the labour market.79 Thus the 
average gap computed is close to the headline 
indicator for the country but the two gaps do 
not coincide because not all the pensioners (over 
65) have been in paid employment. Because 
of the non-negligible differences that exist be-
tween women ever and never in paid work, the 
results we obtain for the adjusted gap may not, 
therefore, be extended to all the pensioners or 
all the elderly (for men the problem is negligible 
as there are very few who never worked). Ideally, 
the fact that those not covered by the pension 
system, or who have never worked for pay, are 
not a random group must be taken on board. The 
second caveat concerns the set of characteristics 
included in the estimation of the adjusted gap. 
We stick here to those we have chosen for our 
earlier factor-by-factor analysis. This decompo-
sition analysis is thus a kind of complement to 
the preceding work. However, choosing a differ-
ent set could alter the results. With this caveats 
in mind, the findings are ‘plausible’ although not 
entirely expected. For example, selection effects 
could explain the apparently counterintuitive 
finding of adjusted gaps wider than unadjusted 
ones (e.g. in Italy); an equally possible explana-
tion may lie with some omitted variables being 
correlated with one of (the limited set) of vari-
ables included in the analysis.
Figure 13.1. The adjusted gap as a percent-
age of the original gap for each country
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010. Note: see Ap-
pendix 3 for details
The key finding is that netting out differences 
in observed characteristics between men and 
women (who were ever in employment) has a 
modest impact on the average pension gap in 
most but not all the cases. In six countries the 
adjustment ranges from -15% to +11% (UK, the 
79  Participation in the labour market is what is 
known as a ‘discrete choice’, implying that it is a quali-
tative issue, and not simply equivalent to choosing x 
rather than x+1 years. In practical terms, we do not 
know what those women would done in the labour 
marker, had they decided to enter. All we know is that 
they did not enter.
Netherlands, Austria, Greece, Italy and Poland). 
In Germany and France the adjustment reaches 
around -30% while in Estonia it more than can-
cels out the original gap resulting in a (minimal) 
gap in favour of men. Unlike France and Germa-
ny however, Estonia has a very low gap to start 
with (around 4%). We find high gap countries 
among those where the gap decreases (Germa-
ny, France) but also where it increases (the UK: 
recall that the countries are listed in decreasing 
order of the headline GGP). Hence adjusting the 
gap is not likely to substantially lessen the dis-
persion of GGP values across countries. There 
is also no obvious divide in our results between 
high and low employment countries: the adjust-
ed gap increases in a low female employment 
country like Italy but decreases in Greece.
One basic reason why no clear pattern emerges 
is a complex interaction between factors that 
weigh differently from country to country al-
though, individually, they pull in the same direc-
tion across countries. This is shown by Table 13.1 
that renders visually the impact of each char-
acteristic on the original (unadjusted) country’s 
gap. The countries are listed by row, the charac-
teristics by column and each cell of the result-
ing matrix is shaded white, grey or blue. White 
stands for no discernible (statistically significant) 
impact, grey for an augmenting effect and blue 
for a decreasing effect.
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Table 13.1. The impact of gender differ-
ences in characteristics on the GGP (unad-
justed)
Source: our estimations from EU-SILC 2010 data
Legend: White: the impact is not statistically significant
Grey: the impact is statistically significant and increases the 
gap
Blue: the impact of the variable is statistically significant and 
decreases the gap
Note: see Appendix 3 for details 
Women are more likely to be widows or married, 
as well as being older in general. Differences 
between men and women in the prevalence of 
marriage and widowhood as well as in age tend 
to lessen the gap across countries, with mar-
riage and widowhood exerting the strongest and 
more consistent effect. The results for widow-
hood are straightforward as there are far more 
widows among women and they o"en receive 
survivor’s pensions. That for marriage warrants 
an explanation. Being married is generally asso-
ciated with higher pension for men and lower for 
women, but the depressing effect for the latter 
is stronger than the augmenting effect for the 
former. As there are more men than women in 
the reference population, the net result is a lower 
gap. Divorce or separation have a discernible and 
augmenting effect on the gap only in Germany. 
Lack of a discernible effect in the remaining 
countries might be due to be the low numbers 
of divorcees.
Gender differences in the level of education 
tend to augment the gap at both ends. At the 
low end of the educational spectrum women 
outnumber men in the sample used for estima-
tion (recall the sample only includes people who 
ever worked and are entitled to a pension); at 
the high end the opposite holds. In both cases 
this translates into a disadvantage for women, 
and longer years in employment among men 
add to this disadvantage. As concerns the effect 
of pension pillars, SILC data separates out the 
third pillar while bunching the first two pillars. 
However, the beneficiaries of third-pillar pension 
schemes are less than 100 in our dataset for all 
the 9 countries except Germany and the UK. In 
Greece third-pillar pensions are so few that the 
variable was dropped from the analysis and in 
Poland third-pillar is not separately recorded. 
The two mature third-pillar countries give the 
clear indication that participation in third-pillar 
schemes tends to increase the gap because it is 
less frequent among women but yields relatively 
generous pensions.
Summing up, the combined differences in the 
distribution of men and women by age, marriage 
status, education, employment career and par-
ticipation in third-pillar schemes have a modest 
impact on the GGP in most cases – lower than 
15%. Three exceptions are worth noting: Ger-
many and France where the share of the gap ex-
plained rises to around 30% and Estonia where 
the entire (very small) gap is explained by differ-
ences in marriage status, education or age. Al-
though the same characteristics tend to pull the 
gap in the same direction across countries, the 
combined effect differs from country to country 
because of the complexity of interactions, and it 
may augment or decrease the gap. This leaves 
a sizeable Gender pension Gap warranting ex-
planation in the majority of the countries we 
considered: if we except Estonia, the adjusted 
gap ranges from more than 100% (where the 
‘explanation’ is negative) to 70 percent of the 
original (unadjusted) gap; and all of it cannot be 
explained with the characteristics we considered 
here. The challenge is thus to know why women 
similar to men as concerns education, family 
status, working career and even propensity to in-
vest in third-pillar pension schemes are ‘treated’ 
differently by pension systems. Is it because of 
personal characteristics that we were not able to 
include in this analysis – e.g. motherhood status 
or attitudes towards financial risk - or because of 
systematic discrimination in the way the labour 
market and the pension systems treated women 
in the different countries over their lifetimes?
Having used SILC data the analysis was neces-
sarily limited to the characteristics reported by 
this source. Investigating pension entitlements 
necessitates possessing information about 
events that took place a long time ago – such as 
changes of job, number of children ever born, and 
so forth. SILC has information about respondents’ 
current status, which in the case of pensions may 
frequently be irrelevant. Moreover, SILC is rich in 
personal details but poor in legal and administra-
tive details relating to individuals’ relationship to 
the pension system which would be decisive in 
explaining pensions. While SILC remains the best 
source for calculating the gaps, it has limitation 
for the analysis of what determines the gaps.80
80  Using SHARE would allow a richer description of 
the process. 
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The analysis to this point has relied on perform-
ing a number of statistical exercises ‘horizontal-
ly’ across the 27 Member States and for the EU 
on average. A different and complementary kind 
of understanding can be gleaned by examining 
specific countries in some depth and comment-
ing on important features. Ten national experts 
were asked to answer a questionnaire relating to 
country data features, as well as on institutional 
details that may shed explanatory light to find-
ings that might otherwise appear opaque. The 
respective countries are Austria, Denmark, Es-
tonia, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Po-
land, Sweden and the UK. For Germany we relied 
on a recent study by the German Federal Min-
istry for Family Affairs, Senior citizens, Women 
and Youth
3.1 STEP 14. A comparison of EU-
SILC and administrative data
Experts from the countries enumerated above 
were asked to investigate the possibility of repli-
cating gender gaps using definitions as close as 
possible to EU-SILC, in order to derive a first as-
sessment of the kind of differences that may be 
expected.
?? A number of issues hinder comparisons in 
some countries:
?? In Austria, administrative data do not include 
civil servants.
?? A number of social insurance-based systems 
rely on separate institutes to collect informa-
tion from pension providers every four years 
or so; one of their chief duties is to match 
pensions to individuals, using some kind of 
unique social security number (France, Swe-
den). The production of reliable person-level 
data is an important governance tool whose 
importance cannot be overestimated.
?? However in the Netherlands it is still not pos-
sible to match first and second-pillar incomes 
in order to come to a single pension average. 
In Denmark it is possible to match second 
and third pillars with each other but not with 
the first. Similar problems are caused in the 
UK by the existence of large numbers of pro-
viders, but also of system fragmentation.
?? Even in those cases where data exist and 
cross-tabulation can be produced, the dis-
semination of the data and production of in-
dicators such as gender gaps is very limited.
?? In some systems (e.g. Denmark), everything 
works on an individual basis. Other systems 
(Austria, Italy) rely on derived rights.
?? A number of systems exhibit a pervasive ‘lay-
ering’ of reforms of different generations, so 
that different people may be subject to dif-
ferent rules. This appears to be especially an 
issue in the UK but was also mentioned in Es-
tonia, Austria and Italy.
Table 14.1 compares administrative and EU-
SILC data for equivalent definitions. Where the 
two sources can be matched (Estonia, Italy), the 
correspondence is very close; the same holds for 
France and Austria where correspondence was 
only possible for the headline gap. It is notable 
that differences are greater in the older age 
group. However, in the other two multi-pillar sys-
tems (UK, Netherlands) matching of data was 
very imperfect.
CHAPTER 3. 
Some Lessons from 
Country Experience
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Table 14.1. Cross-checking administrative data
Gender Gap in Pensions (%) Prevalence gap
Administrative Data EU-SILC 2010 Adm/ve Data EU-SILC
Country 65+ 65-80 80+ 65+ 65-80 80+ 65+ 65+
Italy 29.7 35.2 17.2 30.9 35.2 20.3 -9.8 -8.1
Estonia 3.4 2.2 8.5 4.4 3.1 9.5 -3.3 0.0
Denmark 20.7 23.1 9.5 18.8 18.8 17.2 0.5 -0.1
Sweden 36.1 .. .. 32.5 33.9 25.7 0.5 0.0
Austria 31.9 .. .. 33.8 37.4 25.6 .. -12.3
France 36.0 .. .. 38.5 39.3 37.3 .. -2.7
Netherlands 50.91 .. 40.1 40.4 44.5 26.6 .. 0.0
UK 25.02 .. .. 42.8 44.9 37.4 .. -0.1
Poland 30.53 .. .. 22.9 22.8 24.7 .. -0.7
Source: Administrative data obtained by the ENEGE group of 
experts from publically available data.
Notes: (1) In the Netherlands, the reported Gender Gap in Pen-
sions refers to pillars 2 & 3.
(2) In the UK the reported Gender Gap in Pensions refers to 
pillar 1 and the data are not disaggregated by age.
(3) Covers only ZUS system (excludes farmers); all pensioners 
regards.
Figure 14.1. Administrative data vis-à-vis 
EU-SILC data: a comparison of the Gender 
Gap in Pensions 
Source: Own estimation from EU-SILC 2010 and administra-
tive data from table 14.1
Table 14.4 was compiled with the help of experts; 
it shows that national systems differ according to 
the data they produce and the conventions used. 
The table also brings out that systems differ ac-
cording to how far they are based on individual 
rights and the treatment given to derived rights, 
such as survivors’ pension or the treatment of 
social insurance entitlements upon divorce. 
The overall impression is one of heterogeneity. 
Administrative data obviously and by definition 
describe the operation of their pension system in 
a way best adapted to their own circumstances; 
yet their use can be misleading when the ob-
ject is to understand differences in national ex-
perience. Especially worrying is the low visibility 
of the data by gender. Even in those countries 
where the data exist, computing gender gaps 
that would be meaningfully comparable to other 
countries was a non-trivial issue.
A. Benchmarking the eight country studies
Table 14.2 benchmarks the eight countries cor-
responding to the country studies by compiling 
for 2009 structural indicators and social pro-
tection macroeconomic magnitudes (ESSPROS 
data). Table 14.3 further collates information 
derived in the course of this report for the same 
countries.
The two tables together show that the eight 
countries between them encompass the range 
of European experience, both in terms of the role 
of pensions in social protection, types of pension 
systems and pension gender gap experience.
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Table 14.2. Benchmarking the eight country 
study: Structural and social protection indi-
cators, 2009
Indicators DK SE FR PL NL AT IT UK GR
Structural Indicators
% At risk of poverty: National 13.3 12.9 13.3 17.6 10.3 12.1 18.2 17.1 20.1
% At risk of poverty rate:          
Total 65+ 17.7 15.5 10.6 14.2 5.9 15.2 16.6 21.4 21.3
Males 65+ 16.8 7.8 8.7 9.9 5.5 10.4 12.6 17.6 18.8
Females 65+ 18.5 21.6 12.0 16.8 6.3 18.7 19.5 24.5 23.3
Total 75+ 24.9 23.5 13.2 12.4 7.1 17.9 18.5 25.5 25.5
Males 75+ 25.0 11.0 10.7 7.0 7.1 13.6 13.5 20.6 25.2
Females 75+ 24.8 31.5 14.9 15.1 7.1 20.5 21.6 29.1 25.8
Total 65+ 11.7 10.7 14,0 16.1 10.2 15.5 16.2 19.2 14.6
Males 65+ 11.7 10.0 14.3 16.1 10.2 15.3 16,0 18.3 14.2
Females 65+ 11.4 10.8 13.4 16.2 10.5 15.5 16.2 19.5 15.8
Total 75+ 12.0 10.9 12.2 14.6 11.7 15.1 14.6 19.6 14.6
Males 75+ 12.0 9.9 12.6 16.1 9.0 16.7 13.0 18.5 14.2
Females 75+ 12.0 11.5 12.2 14.1 31.4 15.1 14.9 19.7 15.0
Social Protection expenditure (% GDP, ESSPROS) 
Pensions 12.1 12.9 14.5 12.4 12.8 15.1 16.0 12.5 13.4
Old age protection 8.4 9.3 11.7 6.9 9.0 10.5 12.5 10.2 7.6
Survivors’ pension 0.0 0.6 1.9 1.7 1.2 2.0 2.6 0.2 2.2
Means tested : : 0.8 : 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.5
Pensions as % of total Social 
protection expenditure 
37.1 41.0 45.9 63.9 43.2 50.4 56.4 44.5 49.3
Source: Eurostat 
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Table 14.3.Collecting findings for the eight 
country cases
Indicators DK SE FR PL NL AT IT UK GR
Women’s mean pension as (%) of GDP per 
capita
49.7 48.4 49.5 46.0 45.7 55.8 51.5 40.4 39.1
Women’s mean pension as (% )of national 
poverty line 
130.9 128.8 120.1 141.1 130.4 148.9 135.8 100.3 111.6
Women’s median pension as (%) of GDP 
per capita
45.3 45.1 45.5 42.5 38.0 48.1 43.1 34.7 32.1
Women’s median pension as (% )of na-
tional poverty line 
119.3 120.1 110.4 130.1 108.2 128.4 113.6 86.3 91.7
Gender Gap in Pensions (%) 18.8 32.5 38.5 22.9 40.4 33.8 30.9 42.8 35.6
Indexed Gender Gap in Pensions (EU-
27=100)
48.5 83.9 99.4 59.0 104.3 87.2 79.7 110.5 91.9
Gender Gap in Median Pension 4.1 27.1 32.6 22.9 37.1 34.8 33.2 35.9 32.2
Gender Pay Gap (in unadjusted form) 16.0 15.8 16.0 5.3 18.5 25.5 5.5 19.5 22.0
Gender Gap in Coverage by the pension 
system (M – F)
-0.1 0.0 -2.7 -0.7 0.0 -12.3 -8.1 -0.1 -13.3
The Gender Gap in Pensions among the 
elderly
18.9 32.5 40.2 23.5 40.4 42.0 36.5 42.9 44.5
Gender Gap in Pensions by cohort and 
marital status 
                Persons aged 65-80 18.8 33.9 39.3 22.8 44.5 37.4 35.2 44.9 38.3
 Persons aged 80+ 18.9 32.5 38.5 22.8 40.4 33.8 30.9 42.8 35.8
                Non-widowed persons aged 
65-80
24.1 36.2 46.9 29.9 53.8 48.6 43.9 54.8 40.6
Non-widowed persons aged 80+ 28.3 34.8 51.9 26.9 51.0 38.0 36.9 48.8 32.2
Persons aged 50-64: Gender Gap in Pen-
sions
24.1 36.2 46.9 29.9 53.8 48.6 43.9 54.8 40.6
Persons aged 50-64: Gender Gap in Cover-
age (M – F)
1.1 4.8 -5.9 24.1 -7.3 12.0 -5.4 -1.8 -3.9
Gender Gap in Pensions by educational 
level 
(shape primary-tertiary)
U shape Rising Flat Flat
Rising for 
tertiary
Falling Flat Rising Rising
Distribution: Number of poor women for 
poor man
0.9 2.2 1.9 1.6 2.3 2.1 1.7 2.0 1.7
Relative interquartile range (men=100) 51. 7 80.4 76.5 73.9 49.9 89.0 72.9 65.7 44.4
Trends in the Gender Gap in Pensions over 
time: Difference between 2010 and 2005 
in pp
6.4 1.7 3.7 -0.9 2.8 -1.9 -4,4 2.8 -0.3
Broken careers % 0-10 28.6 11.3 20.7 29.5 14.3 26.0
Analysis based on SHARE data: Gender 
Gap by Pillar
Gender Gap in Pensions: Pillar 1 -3.5 14.4 32.5 23.2 -3.1 30.5 35.7 29.9
Gender Gap in Pensions: Pillar 1+2 9.2 15.1 32.9 23.2 23.1 29.4 35.2 30.5
Gender Gap in Coverage by Pillar 2 cover-
age (M – F)
7.0 -4.3 -3.1 0.0 28.4 6.1 2.7 2.6
Gender Gap in Pensions by Number of chil-
dren 
None 4.3 15.9 19.0 38.7 -6.5 25.7 16.9 25.9
1-2 5.0 23.0 30.7 30.0 32.4 19.2 34.2 29.2
>2 16.3 26.7 50.2 34.5 29.6 40.3 42.7 35.4
Source: Chapter 2 of this report
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Table 14.4. The portrait of the national systems
Existence of publically available 
administrative data by gender
Entitlements of those who have 
never worked (e.g separate age 
pension)
Supplements on 
behalf of non-working 
spouse
Divorce treatment 
Denmark Possible to disaggregate by Pillar1 and Pillar2+3 
OAP pension at 65. Full for resi-
dence period of 40 years No
Until 2007 only lump sum pensions were 
divided; since 2007 no pensions are divided
Sweden
The Swedish Pension Agency covers 
the first pillar
Statistics Sweden publishes system-
wide data
Guarantee pension at age 65
Spouse eligible to 
guarantee pension (at 
lower rate)
Pension rights are individual rights
France
Based on annual survey of all funds. 
Every 4 years detailed data from 
inter-pension fund survey
Although the system is con-
tributory, those without pension 







No rights for divorcees
Poland
Only for ZUS
Not for farmers’ system.
(data not aggregated)
No (only social assistance). To 
some extent, the family pen-
sions are a way to obtain a pen-
sion benefit for a non-working 
spouse if she/he is 45+
None
None for current pensioners




Data for first  pillar provided by the 
SVB
second-pillar  consists of 651 funds; 
Data collected but not published
Gender gap not published
First pillar (AOW) is flat rate; all 
are entitled to it at 65.
Different rates by family situ-
ation
 None
Partners are entitled to 50% of old age pen-
sion accrued during marriage or partnership.
Applicable unless explicitly ruled out by agree-
ment
If an ex-partner dies, the survivor draws full 
pension
Austria
Data provided by Federation of Aus-
trian Social Insurance Institutions
Civil servants excluded
second-pillar  very small
Means tested equalization 
supplement to low pensions. In 
practice if the husband has a 




Right depends on guilty verdict for divorce; if 
amicably dissolved, no division
Italy
Istat publishes data, converting 
pensions into pensioners; some inac-
curacies




Survivor’s pension granted, with conditions to 
divorced ex-spouse
UK 
Department of Work and Pensions 
publishes data for different first pillar 
schemes; separated by pillar. Aggre-
gation over pillars difficult
May qualify for Flat rate Basic 
state Pension based on spouse’s 
contributions
Pension Credit may top up
No Courts decide one of three ways of financial settlements
Estonia
Pension register of the Estonian 
National Social Insurance board
Second-pillar  still very small for 
pensioners




Survivors’ pension, if the marriage had lasted 
at least 25 years, the person had reached 
pension age or had become permanently 
incapacitated before divorce or within 3 years 
from divorce
Greece
No data published; Social budget 
stops in 2008
No gender disaggregation
Means tested pension at 65 
equal to farmer’s pensions Yes
Received only at death of ex-spouse; strictly 
means tested.
Survivors’ pensions Multiple pension entitlement: are total entitlements aggregated?
Cross-border pension 
payments Tax treatment of pensions
Denmark
All first pillar pensions are individual.
Many second and third-pillar schemes 
may incorporate
Data only available for pillar 1 
and pillars (2+3). All though are 
individualized by pillar
Not included in data Data refer to gross. Interest earned on pension investment treated preferentially.
Sweden
Pension rights are individual rights. 
A married person can choose to 
transfer his/her pension entitlements 
to her/his spouse or partner
Data on total pensions from all 
sources can be produced upon 
request, but are not available to 
the general public.
Included in data
Gross. Certain supplements are not subject to 
tax; taxed less favourably than employment 
income
France
Survivor’s pensions are mean tested
Women only having derived rights 
(widow’s pensions) not included in 
data, approx.. 900k women
Yes, in the Inter-pension fund 
sample (EIR)
Data does not include 
payments to non-
residents
Gross; but pensioners pay lower social insur-
ance contributions.
Poland
85% of spouse’s pension, provided 
+50 years old (if 45 y.o. at the mo-
ment of spouse’s death, he or she will 
receive spouse pension when turning 
50 y.o.). If spouse dies before retire-
ment age, then pension is calculated 
as 85% of disability pension
(new) Mandatory system: 
entitlements for both pillars in 
individual personal accounts.
The data prob-
ably does not include 
cross-border pay-
ments
Gross. Treated as income from employment




Gross. Marginal rates lower for pensioners
Austria
Depends on relation between own 
and deceased spouse’s income; 0%-
60%; minimum for low incomes
Administrative data refer to 
rights not persons
Included in adminis-
trative data Gross. Treated as income from employment








Rights differ by kind of public scheme. 
Earnings related part can be inherited 
to max 50%
Problem in aggregating total 
pensions of first plus second and 
third pillars
Pensions paid out; 
may lose indexation. 
Separately identified 
in the data
Both Gross and Net data provided
Estonia
Survivors’ pension to a survivor who 
has reached pension age or has 
become permanently incapacitated 
and the marriage had lasted at least 
1 year  
Each beneficiary may receive 
only one state pension at his/her 
choice at any time
Not included in data Gross
Greec
Yes, depending on fund 70% of 
deceased pension
Possibility of choosing if own pension 
exists
No Not separately identi-fied Gross; net of social insurance contributions
Source: ENEGE experts group: Michael Jørgensen (DK), Anita 
Nyberg (SE), Rachel Silvera (FR), Dariusz Stanko (PL), Chantal 
Remery and Janneke Plantenga (NL), Ingrid Mairhuber (AS), 
Gian i Betti (IT), Colette Fag  and Helen Norman (UK), Lauri 
Leppik (EE), Platon Tinios (GR)
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B. Three recurring themes from the mosaic 
of national specificities – Comments from 
ten Member States
Apart from attempting to collate administra-
tive data, the experts illustrated three recurring 
themes in the report.
Theme 1: Interpreting long-term trends / project-
ing the future
Some experts commented on aspects of relative 
performance, and what could be possible future 
prospects. The common denominator was one 
of unease about possible future developments, 
even in those cases where the current situation 
appears relatively benign. This worry is clearest 
in the case of Estonia, where pension reform has 
moved the pension system to a closer linkage 
with contributions. In this way, the discrepancy 
between a wide pay gap and a narrow pension 
gap is certain to give way to a worsening of pen-
sion gaps in the future – especially if women are 
either unable or unwilling to respond to incen-
tives to increase their working lives. The Danish 
expert outlines the ways in which means test-
ing and the existence of a basic public pension 
combine with occupational pensions to correct 
the tendency of occupational systems to widen 
preexisting gender differences. 
Estonia (Lauri Leppik)
Why does Estonia have the lowest Gender 
Gap in Pensions in the EU, whilst also hav-
ing the widest pay gap? 
The Gender Gap in Pensions in 65+ age group is 
explained by the following factors:
1. The old age pension formula has a flat rate 
element, which in 2010 was about 38% of 
the average old age pension;
2. Pension rights up until 1999 are counted on 
the basis of the length of service, while the 
amounts of contributions determine only 
those rights which are acquired from 1999 
onwards;
3. Employment rates of women in Estonia have 
been historically rather high;
4. Even if the current gender wage gap is high, 
the wage gap is higher in younger age groups 
and somewhat lower in older age groups, 
hence the wage gap does not (yet) show up as 
pension gap. The wage gap is influencing only 
those cohorts which have retired a"er 2000 
and only for that part of pension which re-
lates to rights acquired from 1999 onwards.
5. Up until 1999, the periods of taking care for 
children were taken into account in a gener-
ous manner: the periods of parental leave 
up to three years were equalized with em-
ployment, and an additional two years were 
credited for each child raised for a maximum 
of 8 years. Even though the periods credited 
for child-rearing became considerably less 
favourable a"er 2000, most of the current 
pensioners have raised their children before 
1999 and get their child-rearing credits81. 
If the high Gender Pay Gap persists, the Gender 
Gap in Pensions will gradually increase in the 
coming years, as pension rights acquired since 
1999 are based on the amounts of contribu-
tions paid. Furthermore from 2002 a mandatory 
funded pillar was introduced, directly linked to 
contributions (contributions for the funded pil-
lar are 6% of wage). Currently second and third 
pillar pensions have still a marginal role in re-
tirement incomes as benefit payments from the 
second-pillar have commenced only from 2009 
and many of these payments are still lump sum 
due to a short accumulation period. 82 
Poland (Dariusz Stanko)
Multi-pillar Reform and the prospects of 
the Gender gap:
The Gender Gap in Pensions in Poland, even 
though quite substantial, is likely yet to become 
a problem to come, because most of the pen-
sioners received their pensions from the old pre-
1999 pension system. The old pension formula 
contained a common social term, which flat-
tened to some extent the differences in benefit 
values of males and females. Those who retired 
a"er 1999 (when the pension reform was intro-
duced) still have most of their pension financed 
from entitlements acquired from the old system.
In the case of the large agricultural pension 
system one can infer that there are no serious 
gender differences due to two factors. First, the 
agricultural pension formula depends only on the 
number of years, when a person was liable to 
pension insurance or worked in a farm. Thus, this 
condition does not differentiate the situation of 
men and women. It is due to the fact that, in 
spite of its name, the pension system for farm-
ers has no insurance features and is financed 
through taxes of other social groups. Second, the 
absolute values of pension benefits are quite low 
due to the flat nature of the formula; therefore, 
any gender differentiation is likely to represent 
also small absolute values.
The new Defined Contributions (DC) pension 
formula in the statutory pension system (cov-
ering the vast majority of Polish workers) does 
not offer the redistribution part (from poorer to 
richer and/or from men to women). The value of 
monthly pension benefits is calculated as the re-
sult of dividing the value of pension entitlement 
(first, unfunded pillar) or pension savings (sec-
81  The child rearing credits have been improved 
again in 2012. These will be applied retrospectively 
also for child raising periods 2000-2012.
82  The unisex life tables for calculating annuities 
in the second pillar will in future entail some gender 
redistribution, in particular considering the very wide 
gap between life expectancy of men and women in 
Estonia.)
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ond, funded pillar) by the number of months of 
expected lifespan in retirement (unisex tables). 
Bearing in mind the typical problems women 
face (lower salaries, longer career breaks due 
to child and family care), the new DC formula 
may result in drastically lower retirement 
benefits for women in the Polish system.
However, there are some factors mitigat-
ing the pension gap: i) unisex life tables favour 
women, ii) equalized retirement age (from 2040, 
67 years for both sexes), iii) a minimum pen-
sion guarantee (calculated for both funded and 
unfunded pillar for the insured whose insurance 
coverage was 20 (women) or 25 (men) years 
long), iv) crediting mechanism for both pillars for 
women who are on maternity leave (contribu-
tion take into account the maternity benefit). The 
pension gap is also mitigated by  v) survivors’ 
pensions granted under conditions to a surviving 
spouse. Usually this is the case of women who 
either obtain a survivor pension equal to 85% of 
the husband’s pension or - if already retired – 
can choose the full pension. 
Denmark (Michael Jørgensen) 
Historical development of the multi-pillar 
system and simulating future prospects
Until 1990, only about 30 % of the working 
population was saving for an occupational pen-
sion. Because of this relative low rate, an agree-
ment between employees, employers and the 
government was reached in 1987 to increase 
the savings in occupational pensions. As a re-
sult, by 2009 around 90 % were saving in an 
occupational pension fund, while the saving rate 
for the new occupational pensions had increased 
to 12 %. The increase was primarily due to the 
private sector, where before 1990 only people 
with tertiary education and salaried employees 
were supplementing their old age pension with 
occupational pensions. Given that more women 
are employed in the public sector than the pri-
vate sector, the spread of occupational pensions 
affected men more strongly than women. Coun-
teracting this tendency, a bigger share of women 
started working in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s 
and could take part in the expansion of occupa-
tional pensions.
It is possible to project total income replace-
ment at retirement for today’s 40-45 year 
olds (for the sum of public and occupational 
pensions). Because the old age pension is uni-
versal and pensions are flat-rate (before means 
testing), public pensions are not equally impor-
tant for people with high and low incomes. For 
people with very low incomes, the saving needed 
in order to get a reasonable replacement rate 
upon retirement is much lower. This is ampli-
fied by the progressive taxation and the means 
testing of public old age pensions. Progressive 
taxation forces high income earners to save rela-
tively more because they are taxed more heavily, 
and since the means testing starts at a certain 
threshold (at about 50 %. of the old age pension) 
it reduces the marginal value of saving more for 
people who have a large pension wealth. These 
facts are important when comparing men’s and 
women’s pensions, because men on average 
earn more than women, and therefore they also 
have to save relatively more in order to obtain 
the same replacement rate.
Austria (Ingrid Mairhuber)
The risks of closer linking of pensions to 
contributions and gender gaps
Despite the five year difference in the statutory 
retirement age, women do not retire significantly 
earlier than men. This is because women reach 
the required insurance period for an early retire-
ment due to long insurance duration less o"en 
than men. Even so, a large difference in benefit 
levels between women and men remains, as dif-
ferential treatment of women is in practice em-
bodied in the logic of earnings-centered Austrian 
pension system (Mairhuber 2009):
The pension is dependent on the type (of em-
ployment contract), length and continuity of 
gainful employment as well as the level of earn-
ings. The “female life context” of breaks in em-
ployment and reduction of gainful employment 
owing to unpaid care work, limited employment 
opportunities and income discrimination results 
in structural disadvantages for women. The tra-
ditional male “norm(al) biography” can hardly 
be achieved by women, above all in the case of 
earning mothers. A number of changes make the 
situation more difficult for women: changes in 
employment structures, the growth of “atypical” 
employment, such as part-time work, broken ca-
reers and rising unemployment among women 
combine with the tendency of pension reforms 
to strengthen the connection between gainful 
employment and benefit levels to threaten a 
widening of gender difference in entitlements in 
the future
When assessing the gender balance of the Aus-
trian pension system over time it is important to 
note, that with the “Act on the Harmonisation 
of Austrian Pension Systems” (2004) a new 
pensions system has been introduced, but the 
new regulations are only fully applied to those 
who had not acquired any pension entitlements 
before 2005. For those younger than 50 on that 
date, pension entitlements are calculated as a 
mix of old and new provisions on a pro rata tem-
poris basis, whereby different regulations apply 
to different age groups. The new regulations will 
be less favourable to women, especially in the 
case of discontinuous working biographies.
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Theme 2: The question of Data and data 
comparability
National administrative data has to contend with 
system fragmentation or heterogeneity. In some 
cases (multi-pillar systems, such as UK, Neth-
erlands or Denmark) this is a design feature; in 
others it may be seen as a governance short-
coming (in Greece there exists a multiplicity of 
uncoordinated first-pillar pension providers). In 
all cases the key problem is to match pension 
entitlements to individual people.
The Netherlands (Chantal Remery and Jan-
neke Plantenga)
Data availability problems in a multi-pillar 
system
Administrative (aggregated) data are available 
for the AOW (Dutch General Old Age Pensions 
Act) and are provided by the Sociale Verzeker-
ingsbank (SVB). This organization implements 
national insurance schemes in the Netherlands. 
With respect to the second and third pillar, 
there are only very few administrative data pub-
licly available (provided by the Nederlandsche 
Bank (DNB)). The reason might be related to the 
number of actors involved. The Dutch pension 
system consists of 651 pension funds (end of 
2008); 543 of these funds are single-employer 
funds, 95 concern industry wide funds (of which 
69 mandatory) and funds are for professional 
groups. Together, these schemes cover approxi-
mately 6 million members. Though these pen-
sion funds provide data on pensions to Statistics 
Netherlands, these are not publicly available. 
The publicly available data do not enable a dis-
aggregation by pillars. There is information of the 
SVB on the first pillar. This information includes 
data on all persons in the Netherlands receiv-
ing the state pension AOW. Data are available on 
the number of recipients by sex, age-categories 
and household characteristics. In addition, there 
is information on the number of persons whose 
pensions are adjusted because they did not live 
permanently in the Netherlands between the age 
of 15 and 65. There is, however, no information 
published on the number of people who are not 
entitled to the AOW. Survey data from Statistics 
Netherlands indicate that this is a very small 
group. There are no public data on the average 
amount of AOW paid per person (by sex). 
There exists some information on the total 
amount of additional pensions (pillar 2 and 3), 
but a breakdown by the two pillars is not pos-
sible. These data are from Statistics Netherlands 
and are based on National (representative) in-
come surveys.  
Italy (Gianni Betti)
How many pensioners? Data cleaning dif-
ficulties 
Note: some prevalence ratios are greater than 
100 because there are more pensioners than 
people in the age class. This is due to the fact 
that the original administrative data record pen-
sions not pensioners. The source of the table 
below (ISTAT; the main statistical Institute) con-
verts pensions into pensioners, but clearly the 
conversion is imperfect and some double count-
ing remains. This affects especially older people 
and especially widows who are likely to cumu-
late more than one pension originally accruing to 
different beneficiaries.
Coverage of the Italian system (Istat)
Greece (Platon Tinios)
Gender invisibility and system opaqueness
Greece produces no individual-level data. Data 
aggregates on social insurance providers’ budget 
data were available in the Social Budget, an an-
nual publication. The last available year is 2010 
(budget data for 2009, which would have been 
compiled in 2008). Thus no official information 
exists on the effects of the crisis yet. Distribu-
tional information on pensions exists only for 
the private sector fund, IKA; however, no gender 
breakdown was ever available, while the last 
available data refers to 2007. That data never 
aggregates primary and supplementary pen-
sions, while it refers to pension rights and not 
people. Nevertheless, information is produced 
and is made available to the National Actuarial 
Authority, which in its turn, produces some actu-
arial studies and has projected expenditure for 
the Economic Policy Committee’s Ageing Work-
ing Group. This data, however, is not made publi-
cally available.
As a consequence, gender imbalance in pensions 
as an issue remains invisible. The pension sys-
tem is insurance-based, and hence leads to low-
er pensions for women. A large vesting require-
ment (minimum 15 years’ contribution) plus a 
requirement for active links to the labour market 
prior to retirement leads to many women having 
no right to a pension at all.
In a very fragmented system of pension provi-
sion, the Farmer’s pension provided a ‘floor’ for 
gender differences; all women resident in rural 
areas were entitled to such a pension at 65. In-
deed, the farmer’s provider was the only one in 
which rights were individual, rather than fam-
ily- based. However, the introduction of a new 
contribution-based system in 1998 reverted to 
a traditional system where farmer’s wives were 
insured through their husband’s contributions 
and would not be accumulating towards their 
own pension. 
77
Theme 3: Pensions rights unrelated to own 
contributions
When analyzing SILC data, time and again, the 
issue of pension rights not directly associated 
with the payment of contributions was raised 
as a key factor intervening so that the pension 
system may lead to outcomes different from the 
simple accumulation of lifetime earnings. What 
is striking is the heterogeneity of such provisions. 
The comments illustrate this. 
UK (Colette Fagan and Helen Norman)
State Pension entitlements for divorcees: 
three court-determined divisions of rights
The 1999 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act gave 
powers to the Court to split rights to occupation-
al and personal pensions between husbands and 
wives on divorce (and following dissolution of 
civil partnerships) filed on or a"er 1 December 
2000 (Pensions Advisory Service 2009). 
Following divorce from a marriage or civil part-
nership, an individual has the right to make a 
claim on their husband, wife or civil partner’s 
pension with the financial agreement to be set-
tled in one of three ways: 
1) Pension offsetting takes place when the value 
of one partner’s pension is compared to the val-
ue of the couple’s other assets, such as property 
for instance. Once the financial arrangement is 
made, the partner with the pension will retain 
this while the other partner will receive some-
thing of equal value.
2) Pension sharing occurs when the value of one 
partner’s pension at the time of divorce is divid-
ed between the couple. The shares may not be 
equal as they are determined by the court.
3) Pension attachment is when an individual re-
ceives an agreed proportion of their partner’s oc-
cupational or personal pension when it is paid to 
them, which could be a lump sum or money or a 
regular pension payment although if the partner 
dies, the payments will cease (Directgov 2012)
France (Rachel Silvera)
Survivor’s pensions and other pensions for 
derived rights
In France, there is the minimum old-age pension 
for people who have never worked and have no 
right from a spouse. Widows, widowers and the 
disabled have pension rights, but survivor’s pen-
sions are means-tested. There is an important 
distinction between direct personal rights and 
derived rights. The main derived rights concern 
widowers and above all widows in the form of 
survivor’s pensions. But in (administrative) data, 
only people who have direct AND derived rights 
are included. There are not many people (mainly 
women) who only have derived rights (namely 
totally economically inactive widows). According 
to data for 2004, 900,000 women and 19,000 
men were in this situation, but many of them 
were not yet 65 and therefore had not yet ap-
plied for their direct rights. 
Other derived rights are linked to the presence 
of children, who lead to advantages for parents 
in the form of additional contribution years. De-
rived rights (on top of direct rights) play an im-
portant role for women and fill in some of the 
gap regarding direct rights. These derived rights 
in fact represent 20% of women’s total pensions 
(compared with only 1% for men). 
Monthly gross amounts and composition of pen-
sions (all ages) by gender in 2008
Sweden (Anita Nyberg)
The guarantee pension
The Guarantee Pension is part of the national re-
tirement pension and is paid to those who have 
had little or no pension-qualifying income dur-
ing their lives. A person is entitled to Guarantee 
Pension at the age of 65.  In order to get a full 
Guarantee Pension a person must have lived in 
Sweden for 40 years. If a person has lived in 
Sweden less than that, the Guarantee Pension 
will be lower. A Guarantee Pension will also be 
reduced if a person has an earnings-related pen-
sion. It can be paid to persons who are residents 
in an EU or EEA country. 
Pension rights are individual rights. In the case 
of married couples where only one spouse has 
been employed, the non-employed spouse is en-
titled to a Guarantee Pension. The full Guaran-
tee Pension is lower for married/cohabiting/reg-
istered partners (6,967 SEK) than for a person 
who is single (7,810 SEK). A married person or a 
registered partner can choose to transfer her/his 
pension entitlements to the premium pension to 
her/his spouse or partner. 
C. A Comparison with the German Federal 
Ministry Study (2011)
In November 2011 a study on Gender Gaps in 
Pension in Germany was published. The study, 
entitled “The Gender Pension Gap: Developing 
an indicator measuring Fair Income Opportuni-
ties for Women and Men”, was commissioned by 
the German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, 
Senior citizens, Women and Youth and was con-
ducted by Judith Flory of the Fraunhofer Institute 
for Applied Information – henceforth referred to 
as the ‘German Study’.83 Its subject matter, its 
methodology, focus and recent publication, make 
83   The importance of women’s family related char-
acteristics  – career interruptions, number of children 
and so on – is explored  in a companion study titled 




comparison with this study an exercise which will 
aid understanding and take the discussion for-
ward. 
The definitions employed by the German Study 
are identical to those employed in our study. The 
indicator, as is the case with our ‘headline indi-
cator’ is confined to individuals over 65, which is 
the legal retirement age in Germany. The study 
employs administrative data for 2007 compiled 
every four years in the ASID database of all pen-
sion funds, conducted on behalf of the Federal 
Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. The use of 
administrative data, rather than survey data, is 
the main source of difference with our study. Us-
ing administrative data amounts to attempting 
to calculate our ‘pensioner’s pension gap’; people 
not covered by the pension system are by defini-
tion excluded84. The ASID database aggregates 
all pension rights into total individual-based en-
titlements, i.e. the total of all pensions of all pil-
lars and all providers. An interesting point, which 
differentiates it from EU-SILC, is the ability to net 
out survivors’ pensions.
The key findings of the German study are as fol-
lows:
?? The gender pension gap is very large – fully 
60%;
?? The gender gap is lower in the East (37%) 
than in the West (64%);
?? Higher education implies lower pension gap;
?? The presence of children widens the gap more 
in the West than in the East. 
??
The results by marital status are especially in-
teresting. Germany has a system whereby upon 
divorce the couple’s total pension entitlements 
are aggregated and then split equally. This has 
the effect of increasing women’s entitlements at 
same time as reducing men’s, which explain the 
lower gaps for divorced people – a little larger 
than for singles but far smaller than for either 
married or widowed people85. 
The German study asks how the gender gap is 
evolving over time. It is able to do that, as by 
netting out survivors’ pensions, it can compare 
pension outcomes that accrued to individuals 
who were born at different times. Indeed com-
paring the youngest cohorts (aged 65-69) in 
ASID from 1992 to 200786, pension gaps have 
fallen from 64% to 54%.
The German study concludes by examining SILC 
data for 2007 for the EU-15. They do not exclude 
non-pensioners, so they estimate what we have 
called the ‘Elderly Pension Gap’. That gender gap 
for Germany is some 20 points lower than that 
derived from ASIP administrative data. The dif-
ference is accounted for by the exclusion of de-
84  Though, as we saw above, the coverage gap in 
Germany is not very large.
85  Survivors’ pensions are disregarded in this com-
parison.
86  i.e. people born between1910 and 1942.
rived rights, the chief of which is the survivors 
pensions; when they add survivors’ pension to 
ASIP data, the gender gap drops to comparable 
levels with EU-SILC.
The German study can be taken as an exam-
ple of the constructive dialogue which can take 
place between the EU benchmarking level and 
national systems. Administrative data can be 
used to elucidate and explain comparative find-
ings, whereas use of local systemic information 
can highlight the effect of specific features im-
pinging on gaps (e.g. the treatment of divorce). 
This dialogue can be fruitful and useful insights 
drawn both at the national and the EU level. 
Such interplay characterized the progress in ar-
eas such as social inclusion and is one of the 
key areas of value added of the Open Method of 
Coordination. Should this dialogue also operate 
in the field of pension gender gaps, one would 
expect equivalent gains of understanding and an 
enrichment of the policy toolkit. 
4.1 An overview of the argument
Whereas the pay gap between men and women 
– known as the Gender Pay Gap – is regularly 
monitored and studied and its amelioration is a 
policy target, its natural sequel– the Gender Gap 
in Pensions – was hardly ever mentioned until 
recently. Very little internationally comparable 
information exists, while the suspicion lurks 
that gender imbalance may be worse in those 
countries where less is known about it:  Such a 
case is Greece, where no gender-sensitive ad-
ministrative information is produced, yet gender 
imbalances among the population (the elderly 
pension gap- figure 3.1) are amongst the largest 
in Europe. Given the difficulties in producing ad-
ministrative data on total pensions in multi-pillar 
systems, there is a real danger that, as occupa-
tional pensions spread, the danger of growing 
gender imbalances may remain undocumented. 
For example in both the UK and the Netherlands 
administrative data on total pension entitle-
ments do not exist. The estimates that exist for 
individual countries are sufficient to engender a 
sense of unease. They can also signal that infor-
mation gaps could have important welfare im-
plications, in the sense that the important policy 
areas and initiatives are missed out through be-
ing unremarked. That issues of great importance 
for the independence of older women lack vis-
ibility, could be interpreted by some as another 
example of that group of citizens being taken for 
granted.
This report argues that the gaps in pension en-
titlements between women and men in Europe, 
should be the object of an statistical indicator. 
Given the exposure of pensions to short term 
changes in the context of retrenchment in many 
countries (above, section 1.2), this indicator 
should be produced on an annual basis, along 
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with other pension indicators. This indicator 
should be equal to the percentage by which 
women’s average pensions are smaller 
than men’s average pensions, calculated 
for pensioners over 65 years of age. Such a 
simple indicator would, for the first time, produce 
comparable information across Europe and will 
be able to chart changes from year to year. It 
would complement existing indications on pov-
erty and well-being. Those indicators, through 
being based on household income, assume 
by construction that resources are distributed 
equally within the couple; they are thus incapa-
ble to describe systematic gender imbalances. A 
pension gender gap indicator solves this prob-
lem, by attributing incomes to individuals within 
households according to who has legal right to 
such income. It is thus able to capture gender 
differences in the extent of independence pro-
vided by access to resources. In this way it is a 
natural complement to earnings gap information 
applied to individuals of working age and has a 
similar interpretation. 
The ready availability of such an indicator would, 
of itself, provide visibility to the underlying so-
cial problem. Having established key differentia-
tions, a better understanding of their underlying 
causes will come about. Many of the technical 
problems that relate to definitions or that would 
impede comparisons between countries can be 
first diagnosed and later smoothed out. Such is-
sues (‘teething problems’) are unavoidable when 
a new indicator comes into use; similar issues 
have been dealt in the case of the risk of pov-
erty. In this way, constructive use of statistical 
information should lead to an improvement in 
data and definitions that could deal with many 
of the technical issues noted in this report. The 
final reward would be a detailed understanding 
of policy initiatives that can ameliorate problems 
and possibly prevent them.
The key characteristic of pension gender differ-
ences is their complexity. In the pensions of to-
day’s older generation we see at the same time 
the legacy of past imbalances and the anticipa-
tion of future problems, some of which unwant-
ed consequences of reforms undertaken in the 
past. The year-on-year problems caused by the 
economic crisis and the conjuncture add a fur-
ther twist. The situation affecting today’s older 
population is due to a mixture of all three class-
es of factors – past problems, future difficulties 
and year-on-year adjustments. This mixture of 
factors will be different in different parts of Eu-
rope, and may even be moving in different direc-
tions over time. An example of how the same so-
cial need may lead to different outcomes may be 
provided by the pension effects of widowhood, 
divorce or broken careers across Europe. Euro-
pean pension systems are gradually switching 
from stressing family entitlements and derived 
rights for dependents, towards an emphasis on 
individual entitlements and a tighter link be-
tween contributions and pensions. The way this 
switch interacts with existing family structures 
of today’s older cohorts explains a good deal of 
the observed gender heterogeneity. 
Taking this diagnosis as a starting point, this re-
port argued that, in order to base initiatives on 
a sound foundation, the first step should be to 
benchmark the current situation facing the older 
population of the Member States of the EU. To 
do this it is imperative that information is de-
rived from a European data source. Administra-
tive data may be more familiar to local users, 
but their use in comparisons raises a host of 
questions and would complicate rather than en-
lighten the issue.
Thus, having established the motivation for 
a Gender Gap in Pensions indicator, the report 
proceeded in twelve linked statistical steps, de-
signed to establish a statistical starting point for 
the analysis. This was done by supplying robust 
stylized facts about particular issues, but also 
by charting the degree of complexity that would 
otherwise cloud judgments.
The final step was to revisit administrative data. 
A network of ten experts from ten different Mem-
ber States were utilised together with a recent 
study commissioned by the German government. 
Experts were asked to report information about 
gender gaps comparable to the one produced by 
our analysis, using locally available administra-
tive data. In the typical case the data had been 
produced as a side product of the process of 
paying pensions. The comparison of administra-
tive and survey data (Table 14.1) showed that 
in some cases finding the data and producing 
the breakdowns required proved little problem 
(EE, DK); in the majority of cases producing data 
which conformed to some minimum theoretical 
requirements proved difficult; in others, such as 
the UK, France or Poland a full breakdown was 
not possible; in one case, at least, Greece, no in-
formation was produced by sex at all. Even when 
the data existed, differences in coverage and 
definitions would further hinder their regular us-
age. It might have been a coincidence, but Esto-
nia with the smallest measured gap also was the 
easiest to compare data; data was problematic 
or non-existent in countries where the problem 
(as evidenced in the SILC analysis) was most 
acute, such as Greece.
The report concluded by viewpoints of the ten 
national experts which covered three themes: 
Prospects for the future; data and gender visibil-
ity; and the issue of derived rights. The experts 
largely concur with the conclusion that more 
needs to be done to understand what causes 
gender gaps; and that, even in those cases where 
the issue is less acute, there are few grounds for 
complacency. As older reasons for gender diver-
gences are receding, new ones are taking their 
place – chief among which the closer linking of 
entitlements to contribution histories.
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4.2 Findings of the fourteen statisti-
cal steps: towards stylised facts
The statistical analysis proceeded in a series 
of structured lines of inquiry – what we termed 
‘steps’. Each was designed to investigate par-
ticular aspects or questions; each step may have 
undertaken and presented more than one statis-
tical exercise and on occasion used more than 
one data source to approach the same question. 
In summary the results are as follows:
STEP 1: how wide is the pension gap in Eu-
rope?
Our central estimate of pension gap – what we 
termed the ‘headline indicator’ is very wide. The 
EU-27 average is 39%. The two highest fig-
ures are for Luxembourg (47%) and Germany 
(44%). At the other extreme, Estonia is lowest 
(4%) followed by the Slovak Republic (8%). A 
large number of countries are around 30%, while 
fully 17 out of the 27 have Gender Gaps in Pen-
sion greater or equal to 30%. 
This is more than twice the figure of the pay gap 
indicator (equal to 16%). However, there is no 
simple relationship between the two figures. Suf-
fice it to say that Estonia (lowest pension gap) 
also has the highest pay gap.  Indeed, it is pos-
sible that two separate relationships exist: one 
where high pay gaps coincide with lower pension 
gaps, typical in Eastern Europe; and one where 
a large pay gap is associated with a large pen-
sion gap. This can be taken as an indication that 
pension may dampen pre-existing inequality, but 
may also widen it, sometimes as an unwanted 
side-effect of design features.
STEP 2 and STEP3: who has a pension? Cov-
erage effects and the elderly pension gap
Pension gaps may also be calculated for the to-
tal population over 65, what we called ‘the El-
derly Pension Gap’. In some countries (e.g. Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Denmark) this makes for 
little difference, as all elderly people are drawing 
some kind of pension. However, in a large subset 
of countries there are large numbers of women 
who have no pension, probably because they 
have not accumulated sufficient rights for their 
own pension, or because they are thought to be 
dependents of their husbands. These countries 
are Malta (coverage gap 34%), Spain (27%), Bel-
gium (17%) and Ireland (16%), while six coun-
tries have coverage gaps greater than 10% and 
nine greater than 5%. Including people with no 
pensions predictably has a large effect on com-
puted pension gaps. The country with the largest 
Elderly Pension Gap is Spain (52%), followed by 
Malta (49%), hence altering the country rankings 
considerably. 
STEP 4: is the pension gap tending to rise or 
fall? Cohort analysis
The pay gap in all developed countries and in 
Europe has been shrinking in the past 20 years, 
although progress may have stalled in recent 
years. Is this mirrored in pensions? A caution-
ary note must be sounded from the US, where 
an equivalent reduction in pay gaps was asso-
ciated by immobility in pension gaps (Even and 
Macpherson 2004). 
If we compare pension gaps of those aged 80+ 
with those aged 65-80, we see that pension gaps 
are considerably lower for the older group. How-
ever, this may be due to the equalising effect of 
survivors’ pension collected by widows. Indeed, 
excluding widows from the analysis reduces the 
difference but does not obliterate it. A similar ex-
ercise using data from SHARE leads to a mixed 
picture: In Greece, Denmark, the Czech Republic 
and Austria (and possibly in Germany) younger 
people have higher gender gaps in pensions. In 
contrast, in France and Spain the opposite is the 
case, while in Italy and Belgium (and possibly in 
the Netherlands) differences are small.
In consequence, for this very important issue, the 
data do not allow us to draw general conclusions.
STEP 5: effects of education and lifetime 
income.
Education is a key determinant of lifetime 
chances and is thus closely linked to lifetime 
income (what economists call ‘permanent in-
come’). Given that we know educational attain-
ment of future pensioners will be higher than 
for current pensioners, if gender gaps rise with 
education, through, for instance, the operation of 
a ‘glass ceiling’ or through women being concen-
trated in occupations which are less well remu-
nerated, that would serve as an indicator that 
gaps will rise in the future. However, the picture 
emerging from the data is very mixed. Though 
in the EU27 the higher the education, the larger 
the gender gap, this is not a picture which holds 
in all Member States. In some it does (Sweden, 
the UK, the Netherlands), in some the opposite 
holds (Spain, Austria, Portugal), while in others 
most of the gender effect comes from differ-
ences between and within educational catego-
ries (Greece, Germany). Decomposition analysis 
suggests, in particular, that the gap was boosted 
by (past) gender disparities at the bottom and at 
the top of the educational spectrum, not around 
the middle – largely consistent with other edu-
cation findings. This suggests that the greater 
equality in educational achievements of cohorts 
yet to enter retirement would not, of itself, act to 
correct future gender pension gaps. 
STEP 6: how are pensions distributed? 
Pension gaps focus on average pensions; howev-
er, a linked issue of importance is how pensions 
are distributed around the average. Predictably, 
women are greatly overrepresented among 
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lower pensions and underrepresented in higher 
pensions. Fixing the pension level to that of the 
poorest third of men, we see that for every poor 
man, we have almost two poor women. Denmark 
is the country where the shape of women’s pen-
sion distribution (rather than pension levels – 
which is the distinction of Estonia) comes closer 
to men’s, while the Netherlands is at the other 
extreme. Even when the linked issue of calcu-
lating separate gaps for each third of the dis-
tribution is examined, there are some countries 
where the gap rises with income (IE, PT, DK) and 
some where it falls. In general, the link of pen-
sion gaps with level of pensions appears to be a 
systemic characteristic which operates in differ-
ent ways in different parts of Europe.
STEP 7: does income tax make a difference?
Pension gaps a"er tax are very little different 
from pension gaps before tax, with the exception 
of Finland and Italy.
STEP 8: can we discern trends in the pen-
sion gap over time?
Comparing points five years apart (2010 and 
2005), we again see a mixed picture. Where-
as on average there is a widening of gaps (by 
1.7pp), this masks opposing trends – from im-
provements in Belgium (-4.9), Latvia (-7.7) and 
Italy (-4.4) to deterioration in Denmark (6.4) the 
Netherlands (5.4), Germany (4.2). 
STEP 9: pension gaps and broken careers. 
 Women have worked for fewer years than men. 
In general shorter careers are associated with 
larger pension gaps, though that relationship is 
not one-to-one. In some cases gaps rise with the 
length of the break and then fall. Distinguish-
ing ‘dominant job’ during one’s working life, the 
lowest gender gaps are found in the public sec-
tor (where they might even be negative), and the 
largest for the self-employed.
STEP 10: the effect of multi-pillar systems: 
some indicative results
Our focus on people 65+ means that in most 
countries the effects of multi-pillar reforms are 
not yet visible. However, in Denmark, the Neth-
erlands and in Switzerland the second-pillar is 
sufficiently mature to enable some analysis, us-
ing data from SHARE. In those countries gender 
gaps of the public pillar on its own is negative; 
the gap in the occupational pillar is heavily im-
balanced by sex. Thus the gender gap is wider 
in the composite of the two pillars than in the 
public pillar. The second and third pillars in those 
countries also display a very significant coverage 
gap, especially for the second pillar.
STEP 11: gender gaps by marital status; is 
there a motherhood penalty?
Gender gaps are narrower for single women; 
even so, though, gender gaps remain large 
(17%). Gender gaps are widest for married wom-
en, while divorced women are somewhere in the 
middle. However, there are very marked national 
differences. Using SHARE data, a very clear and 
strong relationship is apparent between the 
number of children raised and the gender gap. 
This relationship is strongest in France and 
weakest in Denmark.
STEP 12: the intra-household Gender Gap in 
Pensions
The unit of measurement for the headline indi-
cator, the Gender Gap in Pensions income, is the 
individual. The comparison here involves judging 
the average pension for women against the av-
erage for men. However, a gender gap indicator 
for pensions can also be meaningfully computed 
at household level. By looking inside the house-
hold, we compared each woman with her own 
partner and generated a distribution of house-
hold gaps. The median and the trimmed mean of 
this distribution turned out to be the most robust 
indicators for the intra-household Gender Gap in 
Pensions.
We found that the intra-household gap is higher 
than the aggregate gap in the EU as a whole and 
in the vast majority of its member countries. This 
follows from complex interactions involving the 
institutional design of the pension system as 
well as statistical factors - the intra-household 
and the aggregate gaps are measured for dif-
ferent subgroups of the elderly population - and 
behavioural processes – such as who marries 
whom and who earns the most within families. 
In particular, the median intra-household gap is 
4 percentage points higher than its aggregate 
equivalent in the EU27 (46% against 42%) and 
over 20 points higher in five countries. In only six 
countries the median gap is lower within house-
holds than in the aggregate: Estonia, Greece, Ire-
land, Latvia, Romania and Slovenia.
STEP 13: Putting the picture together: de-
composition analysis
Decomposition (‘Oaxaca’) methods were em-
ployed on SILC data in order to supplement the 
factor-by-factor analysis with a multivariate ex-
amination and to begin the search for a causal ex-
planation. The picture, once again, is of complexity 
and heterogeneity: the combined gender differ-
ences in those variables available in SILC have a 
modest impact on the Gender Gap in Pensions. 
In six of the nine countries we investigated, net-
ting out the combined effect of gender differ-
ences in marriage status, education, age, years 
in paid work, and weight of third-pillar in pen-
sion income causes the ‘unexplained’ (adjusted) 
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gender gap to vary in a range comprised from 
-15% to +11% of the original gap (UK, the Neth-
erlands, Austria, Greece, Italy and Poland). In Ger-
many and France the original gap decreases by 
around 30% as a result of the netting out while in 
Estonia it disappears entirely; unlike France and 
Germany, however, Estonia has a very low gap to 
start with, around 4%. Although any given char-
acteristic tends to pull the gap in the same direc-
tion across countries, their combined effect dif-
fers from country to country and it may augment 
or decrease the gap. This could be because of the 
complexity of interactions, of influences not ex-
plicitly included in the analysis, but also may be 
due to the operation of the pension system.
STEP 14: Comparing EU SILC and adminis-
trative data
An attempt was made to reproduce EU SILC find-
ings with publically available administrative data 
for ten European countries. It was possible to 
reproduce a very basic set of cross-tabulations 
only in three countries, whereas in the other 
cases only very basic information was available. 
In one case no gender information existed in ad-
ministrative data at all. 
4.3 Policy lessons
Gender gaps in pension are an important issue 
both for welfare, and chiefly for the economic 
independence of the older Europeans – both 
women and men. As those newer and larger gen-
erations of pensioners, who will have experienced 
the benefits of greater gender balance in employ-
ment, enter pensionable age, they might find the 
situation awaiting them in the pension system 
unfamiliar, anachronistic and limiting. The risk is 
that, individuals accustomed to economic inde-
pendence in their daily affairs might be confront-
ed with a pension context presuming dependence. 
What has been gained for gender balance in the 
labour market may be reversed in pensions.
Is the danger of shrinking independence for 
women in retirement unfounded?
The worrying fact is that, in most European con-
texts, we still do not possess a totally convincing 
answer to this question – one way or another. 
The statistical analysis showed that gender gaps 
in pension are unexpectedly wide – many times 
wider than pay gaps. In some countries (e.g. NL, 
UK) or some categories of individuals (e.g. bro-
ken careers) the analysis uncovered mechanisms 
operating to widen existing differences further. 
One especially unsettling issue is to do with the 
lack of visibility and awareness of the problem. 
This is partly due to problems in national ad-
ministrative data but is certainly aided by lack 
of information benchmarking national situations 
against a European norm.
This report made a start in this direction. It un-
covered wide gaps in most countries, a wide dis-
persion of gaps across Europe, but also an over-
whelming complexity especially when trying to 
relate observed behavior to causal influences. A 
key part of this complexity is to do with the co-
hort effect: what is observed to hold for today’s 
older population 65+ may not hold when they 
are replenished by those who today are in their 
forties. We know that the older generation in fu-
ture decades will be more educated, will have 
worked to a greater extent and will have ben-
efited from all the improvements of the heyday 
of the welfare state of the 1970s to 2000s; so 
many of the factors behind today’s disadvantage 
will gradually decrease in importance. A key area 
of ignorance is how the population responds to 
the o"entimes radically altered incentive struc-
ture embodied in reformed pension systems.
What is certain is that wide gender gaps in pen-
sion are the outcome of a series of overlapping 
factors, at least some of which are due to un-
foreseen and unanticipated consequence of 
policy decisions made in other contexts. What is 
also certain is that in many, if not most, cases re-
lying on improvements in pay gaps of the work-
ing generation to percolate through to pensions 
would be insufficient.
When a new concern enters policy ‘radar screens’, 
understanding proceeds in three steps. The first 
stage is awareness – simply to make the issue 
visible. With the second phase comes ameliora-
tion – correcting the worse consequences, a"er 
the fact. By the third phase, the source of the 
problem is sufficiently well understood to pro-
ceed to prevention.
In the case of gender gaps in pension we are still 
in stage one – visibility of the issue and an abil-
ity to grasp its complexity. It is in this first stage 
that the EU can play a decisive role: to place the 
issue on the agenda and, through benchmark-
ing to galvanise the type of national initiatives 
that would be in a position to deal with actions 
ameliorating the worse effects but also acting to 
prevent the underlying causes giving rise to the 
issue.
The report uncovered wide gender gaps. It also 
uncovered particular instances where develop-
ments were in the direction of making matters 
worse in a relatively short period of five years. 
Examination of the national differences in ex-
perience uncovered very few ‘easy generalisa-
tions’.87 For instance Denmark and the Nether-
lands have opted for a stronger second pillar; 
87  The SILC data, on which the report is based, in 
the majority of cases does not allow to credit specific 
individuals with access to particular benefits. Thus 
comparisons are essentially limited to comparing na-
tional averages for countries with different systemic 
features. Other data sources such as SHARE may allow 
a more complete characterization of benefits going to 
the individual level. See the papers in Börsch-Supan, 
2011.
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however, this choice did not translate, at least 
in our work, in consistent clustering of these two 
countries. The worries about gender impacts and 
unpredictable effects may be exacerbated as the 
economic crisis and the need for retrenchment 
affects pensions in as yet unforeseen ways.
The report can, nevertheless, hint at the exist-
ence of policy alternatives that by, compensating 
disadvantage, end up perpetuating it. Such would 
be measures encouraging women to leave the 
labour market early, with the consequent perma-
nent reduction of pensions and increase of the 
poverty risk of single women. Policies that miti-
gate disadvantage – relying on survivors’ pen-
sions, on ‘married bonuses’ to men’s pensions 
– can also fall in this category. In contrast, poli-
cies that attack the root cause of disadvantage, 
such as credits for child rearing, can be thought 
to operate towards creating a level playing field 
between men and women.
The one policy lesson that – at this early stage - 
can be repeated is: Vigilance.
4.4. Directions of future work
The present report essentially dealt with descrip-
tion of the underlying situation in the 27 Member 
States. This was done through a factor-by-factor 
analysis. This type of analysis, by associating a 
given characteristic to an outcome for today’s 
pensioners, is appropriate to pinpoint and cor-
rect existing problems, -i.e. if what is required is 
the amelioration of current problems. To exam-
ine the root causes of problems one needs to go 
beyond characterising the current situation. The 
analysis made a start on a simple multivariate 
analysis using the Neumark version of the Blind-
er- Oaxaca decomposition, as well as examining 
intra-household pension gaps. What was appar-
ent all along is that there must be a number of 
influences behind the overwhelming complexity. 
We can observe clustering of Member States, but 
the identity and membership of the clusters is 
shi"ing and does not appear to follow any sim-
ple organising principle. For example, the three 
countries with relatively mature second-pillar 
systems, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark, 
were seldom found in the same grouping, hence 
precluding any easy generalisations about the 
effect of multi-pillar systems.
These observations imply three separate direc-
tions – one for statistical improvement, the sec-
ond for policy discussion and policy formation at 
EU level, and the third for research.
Some knowledge gaps ought to be filled for a 
benchmarking exercise to be satisfactory. A sur-
vey source such as the SILC overcomes many 
of the comparability problems arising from the 
use of national data. However, two blind spots 
hinder analysis of gender pensions gaps based 
on this source, namely the inability to distinguish 
survivors’ pensions and second pillars pensions. 
We also suggested earlier that in order to further 
research on the gender pension gap SILC ought 
to be made richer in other respects, e.g. iden-
tification of childcare credits and small social 
benefits. 
As for EU policy work, once sufficient visibility is 
given to a benchmarking exercise, the question 
could be put to each member state to ‘respond’ 
by explaining and projecting its own national is-
sues. This kind of structured dialogue in similar 
issues has been undertaken with some success 
in the context of the Open Method of Coordina-
tion in pensions as well as in other fields. Its prin-
cipal benefit is in highlighting an issue and bring-
ing it to the limelight, which are factors which 
would help most where the problem is least ac-
knowledged. It is thus something which the EU 
has much fruitful experience to share, and can 
usefully adapt to an issue which naturally flows 
from the pension OMC. It should not be forgotten 
that the main adequacy challenge to future pen-
sions is acknowledged by the Pension Adequacy 
Report 2012 (EC2012) to have a strong gender 
dimension.
Research needs to go beyond simple descrip-
tion in order to ask analytical questions. It will 
be recalled that at the outset of the analysis are 
the indications of impending gender problems 
generated by the Synthetic replacement rates 
calculated by the ISG (ISG 2009). To take the 
discussion forward we need to be clear about 
(a) the composition of the population around the 
various ‘profiles’ and (b) behavioural reactions to 
the changed environment. Such could be working 
longer for women or intra-household decisions 
leading to more equal distribution of pensions 
within the household. 
In the field of taxation and policy on social ben-
efits, the EUROMOD model has aided policy 
making and has proved itself invaluable for ev-
idence-based policy formation. To proceed in a 
similar direction in the field of pensions (which 
is clearly advocated by the Pension Adequacy 
Report 2012) would require data far richer than 
SILC, given that it requires detailed information 
on past characteristics88. In the US the Health 
Retirement Survey (the precursor and model 
for SHARE) has been utilised for such purposes. 
Apart from data, we need to research how in-
dividuals respond to changed incentives, which 
needs to utilise amongst others international 
experience.
A richer set of data would allow us to enrich the 
analysis by a formal clustering exercise based 
explicitly on system parameters. In this way we 
could identify the effectiveness of, say, child 
rearing credits or the impact of more part-time 
working. The second is to expand the decomposi-
tion exercise by including other variables, system 
88  For example, we saw in chapter 3 that using SILC 
we cannot tell how many children a woman over 65 
has reared.
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parameters but also more sophisticated econo-
metric methodology. The third possible direction 
is to attempt to link more closely the situation in 
the labour market and that in pensions through 
a better understanding of the transition from 
work to retirement – the sample selection is-
sues that we encountered throughout the report. 
Those kind of issues are especially important as 
regards intra-household effects, which supply 
the fourth direction: The decision how to react to, 
say, lower accrual rates (less generous pensions) 
is a decision taken at the level of the household. 
Understanding the dynamics of these effects 
may hold the key to the policy conundrum: how 
can we have sustainable pension systems which 
serve adequately the social functions for which 
pensions systems exist in the first place?
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EU-SILC survey is the major source of compara-
tive statistics on income and living conditions 
in Europe. It covers data and data sources of 
various types: cross-sectional and longitudinal; 
household-level and person-level; economic 
and social; from registers and interview surveys; 
from new and existing national sources.
EU-SILC collects a variety of social benefits at 
individual level, which are reported in the so-
called p-file of the UDB (User Data Base). These 
income variables are collected through personal 
interviews with all adults aged 16+ in each sam-
ple household, or are reported from registers for 
the so-called “Register Countries” (see Annex 1 
below).
According to Eurostat (2011), social benefits1 
are defined as current transfers received during 
the income reference period2 by households in-
tended to relieve them from the financial bur-
den of a number of risk or needs, made through 
collectively organised schemes, or outside such 
schemes by government units and NPISHs.
It includes the value of any social contributions 
and income tax payable on the benefits by the 
beneficiary to social insurance schemes or to tax 
authorities.
In order to be included as a social benefit, the 
transfer must meet one of two criteria:
– Coverage is compulsory (under law, regulation 
or a collective bargaining agreement) for the 
group in question;
– It is based on the principle of social solidar-
1  The social benefits included in EU-SILC, with the 
exception of housing benefits, are restricted to cash 
benefits.
2  In order to get a closer measure to the well-being 
of the household, the lump-sum benefits received dur-
ing the income reference period shall be treated ac-
cording to Eurostat technical recommendations. In the 
same way, lump-sum received before the income ref-
erence period could be taken into account and imputed 
according to Eurostat recommendations.
ity (i.e. if it is an insurance-based pension, the 
premium and entitlements are not proportional 
to the individual exposure to risk of the people 
protected).
The Social benefits collected a individual level 
are the following:
?Unemployment benefits (PY090G)/ (PY090N)
? Old-age benefits (PY100G)/ (PY100N)
? Survivor’ benefits (PY110G)/ (PY110N)
??Sickness benefits (PY120G/PY120N)
??Disability benefits (PY130G/PY130N)
?? Education related allowances (PY140G/
PY140N)
Social benefits exclude:
– Benefits paid from schemes into which the re-
cipient has made voluntary payments only, in-
dependently of his/her employer or government 
(which are included under ‘Pensions from indi-
vidual private plans (other than those covered 
under ESSPROS)’ (PY080G)).
In order to construct a Pension Gender Gap for 
the European Union EU-27 countries, the EU-
SILC variables which are here taken into account 
are:
??Old-age benefits in gross form (PY100G);
??Survivor’ benefits in gross form (PY110G);
??Pension from individual private plans in gross 
form (PY080G).
1.2 EU-SILC UDB variables3
1.2.1 Old age benefits (PY100G)
The Old age function refers to the provision of 
social protection against the risk linked to old 
age, loss of income, inadequate income, lack 
of independence in carrying out daily tasks, re-
duced participation in social life, and so on.
Old age benefits cover benefits that: provide a 
replacement income when the aged person re-
3  See Eurostat (2011) ‘Description of SILC User Da-
tabase Variables: Cross-sectional and longitudinal’, for 
further details.
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tires from the labour market, or guarantee a 
certain income when a person has reached a 
prescribed age.
It includes:
– Old age pensions: periodic payments intended 
to maintain the income of the beneficiary af-
ter retirement from gainful employment at the 
standard age or support the income of old per-
sons
– Anticipated old age pensions: periodic pay-
ments intended to maintain the income of ben-
eficiaries who retire before the standard age as 
defined in the relevant scheme or in the scheme 
of reference. This may occur with or without a 
reduction of the normal pension.
– Partial retirement pensions: periodic payment 
of a portion of the full retirement pension to old-
er workers who continue to work but reduce their 
working hours or whose income from a profes-
sional activity is below a defined ceiling.
– Care allowances: benefit paid to old people 
who need frequent or constant assistance to 
help them meet the extra costs of attendance 
(other than medical care) when the benefit is not 
a reimbursement of certified expenditure.
– Survivor’s benefits paid a"er the standard re-
tirement age.
– Disability cash benefits paid a"er the standard 
retirement age.
– Lump-sum payments at the normal retirement 
date.
– Other cash benefits: other periodic and lump-
sum benefits paid upon retirement or on account 
of old age, such as capital sums paid to people 
who do not fully meet the requirements for a pe-
riodic retirement pension, or who were members 
of a scheme designed to provide only capital 
sums at retirement.
It excludes:
– Family allowances for dependent children 
(which are included under ‘Family/children re-
lated allowances’ (HY050G)).
– Early retirement benefits paid for labour mar-
ket reasons or in case of reduced capacity to 
work (they are included respectively under ‘Un-
employment benefits’ (PY090G) or under ‘Dis-
ability benefits’ (PY130G)).
– Benefits paid to old people who need frequent 
or constant assistance to help them meet the 
extra costs of attendance when the benefits are 
reimbursed against a certified expenditure.
1.2.2 Survivor’s benefits (PY110G)
Survivors’ benefits refer to benefits that provide 
a temporary or permanent income to people be-
low retirement age who have suffered from the 
loss of their spouse, partner or next-of-kin, usu-
ally when the latter represented the main bread-
winner for the beneficiary.
Survivors eligible for benefit may be the spouse 
or ex-spouse of the deceased person, his or her 
children, grandchildren, parents or other rela-
tives. In some cases, the benefit may also be 
paid to someone outside the family.
A survivor’s benefit is normally granted on the 
basis of a derived right, that is, a right originally 
belonging to another person whose death is a 
condition for granting the benefit.
It includes:
– Survivor’s pension: periodic payments to peo-
ple whose entitlement derives from their rela-
tionship with a deceased person protected by a 
scheme (widows, widowers, orphans and similar).
– Death grant: single payment to someone 
whose entitlement derives from their relation-
ship with a deceased person (widows, widowers, 
orphans and similar).
– Other cash benefits: other periodic or lump-
sum payments made by virtue of a derived right 
of a survivor.
It excludes:
– Family allowances for dependent children 
(These benefits are included under Family/chil-
dren related allowance (HY050G)).
– Funeral expenses
– Additional payments made by employers to 
other eligible persons to supplement the sur-
vivors’ benefits pay entitlement from a social 
insurance scheme, where such payments can-
not be separately and clearly identified as so-
cial benefits (those payments are included un-
der ‘gross employee cash or near cash income’ 
(PY010G)).
– Survivor’s benefits paid a"er the standard re-
tirement age (these benefits are included under 
‘Old age benefits’ (PY100G)).
Note: periodic payments to people whose enti-
tlement derives from their relationship with a 
deceased person during a war are included in 
PY110. Survivor’s benefits paid a"er the stand-
ard retirement age are included under ‘Old age 
benefits’
1.2.3 Regular pensions from individual pri-
vate plans (other than those covered under 
ESSPROS) (PY080G)
Regular pensions from private plans (other than 
those covered under ESSPROS) refer to pensions 
and annuities received, during the income refer-
ence period, in the form of interest or dividend 
income from individual private insurance plans, 
i.e. fully organised schemes where contributions 
are at the discretion of the contributor indepen-
dently of their employers or government.
It includes:
- Old age, survivors, sickness, disability and 
unemployment pensions received as interest 
or dividends from individual insurance private 
plans.
It excludes:
- Pensions from mandatory government 
schemes.
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- Pensions from mandatory employer-based 
schemes
1.3 Methodology for constructing a Pension 
Gender Gap from EU-SILC UDB variables
We define the Pension Gender Gap as:
 
(1)
In order to define both women’s and men’s av-
erage pension income we take into account the 
following assumptions:
We consider the subsamples of individuals in the 
EU-SILC UDB p-file who are 65 years old at the 
beginning of the income reference period (t-1) of 
the EU-SILC wave concerned (t)4.
Among the subsample of individuals in 1), we 
select those who have AT LEAST one positive 
income value of variables PY080G, PY100G or 
PY110G.
Denote “ F” the women in subsample 2), and “ M” 
the men in subsample 2).




Where  is the personal cross-sectional weight of 
female i (SILC variable PB0405), and  is the cor-
responding weight for male j.
Usually, the Pension Gender gap assumes posi-
tive values (i.e. women’s average pension income 
is less then men’s average pension income); 
however it could also be negative in the opposite 
case.
 
4  For instance, for the EU-SILC 2009 wave, the 
income reference period is from 01/01/2008 to 
31/12/2008.
5  Note that PB040 weights let the SILC sample to 
be representative of the concerned country’s popula-
tion, and that the sum of the weights gives the exact 
number of individuals in the concerned country.
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2.1 Description of the pension va-
riables in SHARE wave data
SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe) covers individuals aged 50+ providing 
information for pensions (distinguishing types 
of pensions, on careers, family and an ability to 
relate economic conditions to other dimensions 
of well-being such as health and family). SHARE 
wave 1 was collected in 2004 and wave 2 (with 
the addition of new countries) in 2007. SHARE 
wave 3 (SHARELIFE) is a specialised retrospective 
questionnaire covering career experiences; it thus 
has richer information on broken careers, changes 
of occupation, marital changes etc. SHARE does 
not exist for all member states but is available for 
a cross-section covering a wide range of pension 
experience. Tables A1 to A3 present the descrip-
tion of the pension variables of SHARE wave 2 
that used in the analysis of the present report for 
pillar 1, pillar 2 and pillar 3 respectively. 
Table A1: Description of the pension variables, 
SHARE wave 2, pillar 1 (statutory pensions 
schemes)
Va r i a b l e ’s 
Name
Code in the 
Quest/naire PILLAR 1: STATUTORY PENSIONS SCHEMES
pen1v ep078_1 Monthly public old age pension, previous year
pen2v ep078_3 Monthly public early or pre-retirement pension, previous year. In Sweden, it refers to inva-lidity and disability pension
pen3v ep078_4 Monthly main public disability insurance pension, or sickness benefits, previous year. In Sweden, it refers to the survivor pension
pen4v ep078_6 Monthly public unemployment benefit or insurance, previous year. In Sweden, it refers to occupational pensions for blue-collar workers in the private sector
pen5v ep078_7 Monthly public survivor pension from partner, previous year. In Sweden, it refers to occupa-tional pensions for white-collar workers in the private sector
 pen7v ep078_9 Monthly war pension, previous year. In Sweden, it refers to occupational pension for work-ers in municipalities, in counties or in the government
pen12v ep078_2 Monthly public old age supplementary pension or public old age second pension, previous year
pen13v ep078_5 Monthly secondary public disability insurance pension, or sickness benefits, previous year
pen14v ep078_8 Monthly secondary public survivor pension from spouse or partner, previous year
pultv ep078_10 Monthly public long-term insurance payments, previous year
APPENDIX 2: 
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Table A2: Description of the pension variables, 
SHARE wave 2, pillar 2 (occupational pensions)
Variable’s 
Name
Code in the 
Quest/naire
PILLAR 2: OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS
pen8v ep324_1 Monthly private (occupational) old age pension, previous year
pen9v ep324_4
Monthly private (occupational) early retirement pension, previous year. 
In Sweden, it refers to unemployment insurance benefits
pen10v ep324_5
Monthly private (occupational) disability insurance, previous year. In 
Sweden, it refers to sickness benefits
pen11v ep324_6
Monthly private (occupational) survivor pension from partner’s job, pre-
vious year
pen15v ep324_2 Monthly occupational old age pension from a second job, previous year
pen16v ep324_3 Monthly occupational old age pension from a third job, previous year
pen17v ep324_5
(only in Sweden) - Monthly private (occupational) disability insurance, 
previous year
Table A3: Description of the pension variables, 




Code in the 
Quest/naire
PILLAR 3: INDIVIDUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISION
reg1v ep094_1 Monthly life insurance payment received, previous year
reg2v ep094_2 Monthly private annuity or private personal pension, previous year
reg3v ep094_2
(only in Greece) Monthly private health insurance payment received, 
previous year
reg4v ep094_3 Monthly alimony received, previous year
reg5v ep094_4 Monthly regular payments from charities received, previous year
prltv ep094_5 Monthly private long-term care insurance payments, previous year
2.1 Questions on Pension Coverage in SHARE 
wave2 Questionnaire
All data are collected via face-to-face, comput-
er-aided personal interviews (CAPI). The infor-
mation on pension coverage is based, mainly, on 
three questions in EP (employment) module that 
ask respondents to report: 
EP071: income from public pensions in last year 
(that is pillar 1)
EP324: occupational pensions (that is pillar 2)
EP089: Individual supplementary provision (that 
is pillar 3)
Answer categories of pension pillar 1 ques-
tion: Statutory pensions schemes
EP071_ INCOME FROM PUBLIC PENSIONS IN 
LAST YEAR 
Please look at card 29.Have you received income 
from any of these sources in the year {previous 
year}]? 
1. Public old age pension
2.  Public old age supplementary pension or pub-
lic old age second pension 
3.  Public early retirement or pre-retirement pen-
sion 
4.  Main public disability insurance pension, or 
sickness benefits 
5.  Secondary public disability insurance pension, 
or sickness benefits 
6. Public unemployment benefit or insurance 
7.  Main public survivor pension from your spouse 
or partner 
8.  Secondary public survivor pension from your 
spouse or partner 
9. Public war pension 
10. Public long-term care insurance 
96. None of these
96
Table A4: Country deviations in EP071 (pensions 
not included in the questionnaire of countries)
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
DK     X   X  X
FR     X     X
DE  X   X   X   
GR   X       X
IT  X   X   X  X
NL  X      X X X
CH     X   X X X
PL  X   X    X X
Answer categories of pension pillar 2 ques-
tion: Occupational pensions
EP324_ OCCUPATIONAL PENSION INCOME 
SOURCES 
Please look at card 30. Have you received income 
from any of these sources in the year [{previous 
year}] ? 
1. Occupational old age pension from your last job 
2. Occupational old age pension from a second job 
3. Occupational old age pension from a third job 
4. Occupational early retirement pension 
5. Occupational disability or invalidity insurance 
6. Occupational survivor pension from your 
spouse or partner’s job 
96. None of these 
Answer categories of pension pillar 2 ques-
tion: Individual supplementary provision
EP089_ ANY OTHER REGULAR PAYMENTS 
RECEIVED
Please look at card 31. Did you receive any of the 
following regular payments or transfers during 
the year [{previous year}]? 
1. Regular life insurance payments
2. Regular private annuity or private personal 
pension payments 
3. Alimony
4. Regular payments from charities
5. Long-term care insurance payments from a 
private insurance company
96. None of these
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The adjusted pension gap was estimated us-
ing EU_SILC 2010 data and the STATA so"ware 
command ‘oaxaca’.
In the first stage of the Oaxaca procedure OLS 
regressions were separately estimated for men 
and women. Observations in the sample used for 
estimation comprise 65+ pensioners with posi-
tive pension income and positive years in paid 
work. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of pen-
sion income as defined for our headline indicator, 
while the independent variables include:
three dummy variables respectively for married, 
divorced /separated and widow status, with nev-
er-married being used as the reference category;
two dummy variables respectively for primary 
and secondary education, with tertiary education 
being used as the reference category; 
the number of years in paid work; 
the square of the number of years in paid em-
ployment in order to capture decreasing returns 
to career length, e.g. because earning decrease 
as workers age;
a dummy for the older cohort (elderly aged 80+);
the share of pension income from pillar 3 
schemes.
In all the countries the vast majority of these 
variables, very o"en all, turn out to significantly 
contribute to defining the level of individual pen-
sion income, and in the expected direction. The 
adjusted R” ranges from 16% to 43% in the re-
gression for men and from 30% to 56% with the 
exception of Estonia where it falls to 16%.
In the second stage of the Oaxaca procedure, the 
unadjusted pension gap (was decomposed into 
the explained and the unexplained component. 
Because the dependent variable is in log form, 
the unadjusted gap is measured as the log dif-
ference of the average predicted pension for men 
and for women (where the average predicted 
value in OLS regressions coincides with the re-
spective sample average).
For a two-fold decomposition an assumption 
must be made as to which is the reference popu-
lation, men, women or an average individual in 
the pooled (merged) sample. We took this latter 
option as suggested by Neumark (1988), with 
the STATA so"ware automatically correcting for 
the omitted variable distortion that this proce-
dure otherwise entails. We also incorporated cor-
rections for the omitted dummy category prob-
lem in order to ensure that the results do not 
depend on the choice of the omitted category (in 
our case never-married individuals and individu-
als with tertiary education, respectively). 
In this second stage of the Oaxaca procedure, 
the contribution of the single independent vari-
able to the total ‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ 
components was also computed. Figure 13.1 dis-
plays the total unexplained component (alias the 
adjusted gap) in ratio to the unadjusted. Table 
13.1 features the direction and statistical signifi-
cance of the contribution of each independent 
variable to the explained component of the gap.
APPENDIX 3: 
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